


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STUDIES

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IN

MORAL SCIENCE.

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"Soteriology," and "Atonement and Law' Reviewed."

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DEDICATION.

To the Memory of my Beloved Daughter,
Corinne Burney Landrith,
whose acute perception, good taste, and
deft fingers rendered me valuable assist-
ance in the preparation of this work,
this volume is appropriately dedicated
by a grateful father,
the Author.

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CONTENTS.

PART I.—STUDIES IN MORAL SCIENCE.

	PAGE.
PREFACE	ix
INTRODUCTION	xiii
CHAPTER I.	
GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE SUBJECT	1
SEC. 1. Terms and Definitions	1
2. Speculative Ethics	5
3. Method or Plan	6
4. Natural, Christian, and Theological Ethics	7
CHAPTER II.	
GOVERNMENT AND LAW	15
SEC. 1. Government	15
2. Moral Government	18
3. The Rule of Government	21
4. Rule of Right Must be Known	23
5. Objective and Subjective Law—Relation	26
6. Law Must be Adapted to the Subject	28
7. The Penalty	30
8. The Penalty Inevitable	30
9. No Commutation	34
10. Sin Against God is Sin Against Our Neighbor	35
CHAPTER III.	
GOVERNMENT AND MAN	40
SEC. 1. End of Moral Government	40
2. Objections to this View	45
3. Unhappiness Never Divinely Willed	54
4. Only Rational Creatures Accountable	57
CHAPTER IV.	
NO ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT FREEDOM	65
CHAPTER V.	
THE MORAL FACULTY	73
SEC. 1. Terms Employed	73
2. Different Theories	74
I. Educational Theory	74
II. Intuitive Theory	77
III. Alexander's Opinions	79
IV. Dabney on Conscience	81
V. Gregory on Conscience	84
3. Haven on the Moral Sense	91

CHAPTER VI.

INTUITIONAL THEORY UNSATISFACTORY	103
---	-----

CHAPTER VII.

THE TRUE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENSE AND CONSCIENCE	107
SEC. 1. Fundamental Facts	107
2. Characteristics of Tuition and Intuition	108
3. Proof of the Author's View	109
4. Objections to this View	111

CHAPTER VIII.

NEW TESTAMENT USAGE OF THE WORD CONSCIENCE	122
SEC. 1. Preliminary Explanations	122
2. Examples of Usage	124

CHAPTER IX.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSCIENCE	130
---	-----

CHAPTER X.

ULTIMATE GROUND OF RIGHT	135
SEC. 1. Eternal Nature of Things—Haven's Views	135
2. Dabney on Eternal Nature of Things	139
3. A Query Considered	146
4. Nature of God	151
5. Sovereign Will of God—The True Theory	158

CHAPTER XI.

ULTIMATE END OF RATIONAL ACTION	163
SEC. 1. The Disinterested Theory	163
I. Gregory's Opinions	163
II. Gregory on End and Tendency	166
III. Newman on End and Tendency	170
IV. Practical Rule of Conduct	174
V. Hodge on the Disinterested Theory	177
2. The Perfection Theory	182
I. Hickok's Views	182
3. The True Theory	186
I. Paley's Views	186
II. Defects of Paley's Theory	195
III. Hopkins' Views	204
4. Correct Statement of the True Theory	208
5. Is All Virtue Reducible to Love?	214
I. Gregory's Negation	214
II. Alexander's Negation	217
III. The Affirmative	218
6. Is All Vice Reducible to Selfishness	223
7. No Conflict of Duties	223
8. No Impossible Duties	224

PART II.—PRACTICAL ETHICS.

INTRODUCTION	227
------------------------	-----

SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE FIRST TABLE OF THE LAW.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST COMMANDMENT	235
---------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER II.

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT	239
SEC. 1. Authoritativeness of Command	239
2. Philosophy of the Evil Effects of Idolatry	241
3. Reasons for the Command	243

CHAPTER III.

THE THIRD COMMANDMENT	250
SEC. 1. The Prohibition	250
2. Reasons for the Command	255

CHAPTER IV.

THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT	257
SEC. 1. The Duty	257
2. Manner of Observing It	258
3. Reasons for the Command	260

CHAPTER V.

DUTIES TO SELF	263
--------------------------	-----

SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE SECOND TABLE OF THE LAW.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT	268
SEC. 1. The Injunction	269
2. Duties of Parents to Children	270
3. Parental Authority	276
4. Requirements of the Fifth Commandment	277
5. Reasons for this Command	282

CHAPTER VII.

THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT	286
SEC. 1. Collateral Texts	286
2. Justifiable Homicide	286
3. Criminal Homicide	290
4. Dueling	297
5. Suicide	301
6. Judicial Murder	304
7. Implications	307
8. Spirit of the Sixth Commandment	308

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT	311
-----------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER IX.

THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT	315
SEC. 1. Preliminary Statements	315
2. Law of Love in Respect to Property	317
3. In Relation to Property	318
4. Stealing by Fraud	321
5. Infidelity in Office	323
6. Non-official Robbery of the Public	325
7. Frauds in Relation to Private Obligations	326
8. Gambling	328

CHAPTER X.

THE NINTH COMMANDMENT	331
SEC. 1. Definitions and Examples of Falsehood	331
2. How the Sin May be Committed	333
3. False Swearing and False Statements	335
4. Distinction Between a False Oath and a False Statement	336
5. Truths Worth Remembering	338

CHAPTER XI.

SOME HARD QUESTIONS ;	340
SEC. 1. Is Deception Ever Justifiable?	340
2. May an Oath Ever be Violated?	342
3. May One Ever Take an Oath with the Purpose to Violate It?	343
4. Oaths and Promises Made in Good Faith—May They Ever be Violated?	344
5. Objections Considered	347
6. "The End Justifies the Means"	351
7. Are Atheists Eligible to Office, Etc.?	353

CHAPTER XII.

THE TENTH COMMANDMENT	357
SEC. 1. Characteristics of this Commandment	357
2. Its General Requirements	358
3. Its Specific Requirements	360
4. Covetousness in Relation to Other Things Mentioned in the Commandment	373
5. Avarice	375
6. Excitants to Cupidity	376
7. Pursuit of Wealth not Immoral in Itself	378

CONCLUSION.

DECALOGUE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY	379
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PREFACE.

The contents of the following pages were prepared for the benefit of students entering upon the study of Systematic Theology. Such is the relation of Christian Ethics and Systematic Theology, that the latter can not be studied with much success without a fair knowledge of the former—the more thorough this knowledge the better. The sacred Scriptures give us neither a formulated scheme of Theology, nor of Ethics; nor of one more or less than the other. They, however, furnish the essential cardinal truths with which such systematized schemes of Theology and Ethics may be constructed. Many of the fundamental truths are common to both sciences, viz.: capacity for knowledge, for rational motivity, for voluntary action, and for moral retribution; also, the origin or source of the divine or moral law, its nature, adaptations to its subjects, its requirements, and awards. Now, all these subjects belong properly to Christian Ethics, and no scheme is properly called Christian that pretermits them. They also belong equally to a scheme of theology, especially that branch of theology properly termed Anthropology. The principal difference between the two sciences, in dealing with the same facts, seems to be this: Theology accepts the facts and attempts their systematic adjustment into a creed form without concerning itself with the ground and reason of the facts themselves, or attempting any formal vindication of the

proposed adjustment into a creed form. Ethics also accepts the facts and concerns itself with their ground and reason, and attempts their explanation in harmony with the ascertained facts of human nature and the accepted statements of the Christian Scriptures. From this relation of Ethics and Theology, it is certainly true that just in proportion as Theology ceases to be arrogantly dogmatic will it become more strictly scientific and commend itself with greater clearness and force to the judgments and hearts of men. The day has measurably passed when the pulpit can, without protest from the pew, especially in cultured communities, substitute fictions for facts, and dogmatism for reason. No study so much facilitates the acquisition of a defensible and practical theology as that of Christian Ethics. This work has been prepared with special reference to this important end.

It is, however, of material value, not to the theologian alone, but to all students of moral science in whatever vocations or professions they purpose to engage; also, to all persons, old or young, professional or non-professional, that desire to know themselves and the methods of securing to themselves the highest and most enduring good possible to them.

The country abounds with learned and valuable works on moral science, some of American, some of English, some of German, and some of French origin. Almost every aspect of the subject has been presented and ably defended. Still, on many vital questions, no satisfactory conclusions have been reached, no general *consensus* attained. If among these works I had found any one wholly satisfactory to myself, I should not have offered the public

another work on the subject. This I have not found, and this is my apology, if apology is necessary, for the publication of this volume. As the reader will learn, the work is somewhat polemic in character, but, it is hoped, is not objectionably so. This, in fact, is common with Ethical discussions, as it is also with Theological discussions, and for similar reasons. In animadversions upon authors, I have in no instance indulged in captious criticism or any unfairness. I have not attempted to re-state the opinions of others in terms of my own, and thus put them in false positions—a very common and a very despicable procedure. On the contrary, I have allowed every man to state his own position in his own words. On controverted questions I have expressed my opinions freely, *pro* and *con.*, and the reasons of them, leaving the reader to judge for himself.

INTRODUCTION.

Our word ethics (from the word *ethika* and this from *ethos*) means in its literal sense manners, customs, usages. The word morals (from *moralis*, from *mores*) expresses the same idea. Hence, ethics and morals, ethical philosophy and moral philosophy, ethical science and moral science, are interchangeably used as expressive of the same general subject. These words, *ethics* and *morals*, have by usage come to express far more than manners or customs or habits of individuals and are made to include the whole range of human actions, viewed in relation to their motives, rightness and wrongness, and also their natural or necessary consequences. A moral act is in no respect a unique or peculiar act. In fact morality is not properly predicable of the act, as such, at all, but is predicable rather of the motives of the actor as conformable or non-conformable to the rule of right. Of course individuals, or families, or communities may propose to themselves certain rules of conduct for certain secular ends; such as the preservation of health, or the improvement of their physical condition, the acquisition of wealth, the promotion of purely secular interests or pleasure, without any reference to the rectitude of their motives or intentions to conform their conduct to any rule of right, either objective or subjective. Almost every man proposes to himself certain rules of conduct for the

management of his secular business. These, if they are not formed with bad intention and are not in conflict with the fundamental principles of right, are commendable. But these rules can be observed or set aside at will, and do not form any authoritative code of morals. If, however, such rules of conduct are formed for unjust ends, all action in conformity with them is necessarily immoral. Such was the rule of conduct proposed to himself by the unjust steward. He was commended, not for his purpose which was flagrantly unjust, but for the sagacity, the worldly wisdom which he displayed in the means he adopted for its accomplishment.

Almost every vocation and every profession has its ethical codes devised for the good of the craft or brotherhood. Hence, we often speak of commercial ethics, medical ethics, legal ethics, military ethics, and clerical ethics. These may be highly promotive of the interests, and conservative of the rights, of the brotherhood. They may also be in full harmony with the requirements of a sound morality. Even the devotees of pleasure, sportsmen and gamblers, have their ethical codes. These, too, may be commended for their wisdom as means to an end, however unworthy that end may be. In all such cases the pertinency of acts as means to secular ends, is chiefly considered. They are schemes of secular ~~prevalence~~ ^{precedence} or policy rather than of morality. They contemplate the improvement of our worldly circumstances rather than that of the man himself. In fact while they may increase our sensual pleasures, or improve our worldly condition, they do in many instances actually degrade the man and sink him to deeper depths of moral corruption.

The value of such ethical rules consists chiefly in their adequacy to serve their respective secular ends, and are deemed right or wrong only in the sense of pertinent or proper as means to secular ends, and not in any power to improve the moral nature. The schemes of ethics that are intended to accomplish this higher and nobler end, relate not to human actions, but relate chiefly to actions that are right in their motives, intentions, and that conform to an authoritative standard of moral rectitude. Ethics in this higher sense concerns itself with the motives of action rather than with actions themselves; inquires after an authoritative rule of action, conformity to which shall improve the moral state of the actor. Such is the mission of ethical science.

ACTION IN GENERAL.

We predicate action of some kind of every thing ; or rather things are known to exist only by some form of action and can be known in no other way. The modes of action are as diverse as are the things that act. The modes of action with which observation and experience have made us familiar may be classified as mechanical, chemical, spontaneous, instinctive, and voluntary. That kind of action with which we are now concerned is the voluntary; for of such actions alone do we venture to predicate morality, and when we do this, we by metonymy predicate of the act what is true only of the actor, for the act is only the expression of the intention of the actor, and this intention is determinative of the morality of the actor.

No one would think of affirming morality of mechanical, or chemical, or spontaneous, or instinctive action. Not until we reach voluntary action does any

one think of predicating morality and accountability of the actor. Voluntary action is unique. It differs the breadth of the heavens from every other kind of action. All other acts are *caused* acts; are consequently not free; all alternatives are absolutely excluded. But voluntary acts, though conditioned, are *not* caused, but are themselves causative and therefore free. The sum of the differences between voluntary actions and all other actions may be stated thus: the first are *uncaused causative* acts; the second are effects of causes, and therefore are without alternatives. The concomitants of a voluntary act are as follows:

1. It is put forth in the light of intelligence, or reason, or is the act of a rational agent.
2. It is conditioned upon motive, or a desire for that which the act is intended to secure.
3. It is put forth with a sense of a right or wrong, a good or bad intention.

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF A VOLUNTARY ACT.

Almost every voluntary act has various phases or qualities which may be considered apart from the act itself, as we often consider a property or quality apart from that of which it is a property. We accordingly may consider an act as reasonable or unreasonable; as prudent or imprudent; as moral or immoral, right or wrong; and as religious or irreligious. The act itself, let it not be forgotten, is the authoritative expression or revelation of these qualities, as the properties of the actor. Hence, it is the actor and not his acts that is intelligent, or prudent, or moral, or religious.

The reasonableness of an agent in relation to any given act is determined by the discursive judgment;

his prudence by the pertinency of acts to the end intended; his morality is determined by his sense of good or bad intention—this gives subjective morality only; and also by intelligent conformity to an authoritative or accepted standard of moral rectitude—this gives objective morality. The knowledge of right and wrong in the abstract is given by the intuitive reason, which is as infallible and trustworthy in relation to morality as it is in relation to causation, or any other subject. The knowledge of right and wrong in the concrete, or in relation to individual acts, is given by the discursive reason which is as fallible in relation to morality as it is in relation to the causes of events or other truths not intuitively known.

The intuitive sense of the rightness and wrongness of our motives and our personal accountability presupposes the existence of a rule or law of right written upon the heart of every man. Hence, comes the universal idea of right and wrong; or of moral distinctions. This capacity of moral distinctions to affirm some things right and some things wrong—is what should be called the moral sense. This is not conscience, as it is generally improperly assumed to be, but gives the possibility of conscience, as thought gives the possibility of feeling. This moral sense is the invariable concomitant of reason, is as natural to man as is the reason, and equally as necessary to the well-being of man individually and collectively as the reason. Without this moral sense and conscience, which is its emotional complement, men would be capable of government only by their fear of physical punishments, much as the animals are governed, so far as they are governed at all. All religion in any proper sense would be impossible. All rewards and

punishments would be objective, arbitrary, physical, and temporary as the physical nature itself. This moral faculty is as truly indigenous to the mind as is the faculty of the intelligence or any other faculty of the mind. As an exposition of the intellective powers and systematic explanation and adjustment of all phenomena pertaining to cognition, memory and imagination constitute intellectual science; so the exposition of the moral faculty—the systematic explanation and adjustment of all the phenomena pertaining to man's moral nature—constitutes moral or ethical science. Ethical science consequently deals with all questions pertaining to moral law, to motives of human action, to personal accountability and to subjective rewards and punishments as distinguished from the awards of physical and civil laws.

Ethics is essentially a psychological science; is in fact one department of the philosophy of mind, as truly so as the science of intellect, or the science of feelings, or science of volition. Or rather it is the intelligence, sensibilities, and will in the exercise of their appropriate functions concerning moral, as distinguished from secular, subjects.

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL FACULTY.

The power of cognizing moral distinctions is the supreme function of human reason. A being capable of reasoning, feeling, and willing in reference to sensuous and secular matters, but utterly incapable of perceiving a difference in motives, as right or wrong, and of feeling the force of an obligation, would be neither man nor animal; but a thing intermediate between them. Knowledge, or rather reason, is power, and the power is proportionate to the reason.

Hence, a rational being possessed of the appetites and passions common to men, but as destitute of all moral restraint as the brute, would be an engine of destruction and an object of terror, more to be dreaded than the most powerful and ferocious wild beasts. Suppose the various species of the animal world were suddenly invested with all the passions and aspirations and all the intelligence and inventive powers of the human mind, how speedily would they destroy each other? Suppose humanity was suddenly bereft of all sense of right and wrong and all sense of moral obligation, how soon would the human race experience a similar fate? Happily, no such a race of beings exists. The Creator, in a most wonderful manner, displayed both his wisdom and his beneficence in that when he withholds from his creatures the moral faculty, he also withholds the faculty of reason, and when he bestows the power of reason he also invariably gives along with it, as an indispensable concomitant the moral faculty. To creatures void of the moral sense, bare instinct is more appropriate than reason. To beings endowed with reason the moral sense is simply indispensable; for it alone renders the perpetuity of the race possible. It, and it alone, gives the possibility of security, of law and order, of domestic and civil government.

A moral sense without reason, if such a thing is conceivable, would make its subject a monster; and reason without a moral sense would make its subject not only a monster, but worse than Beelzebub—worse because by creation and constitutionally a devil. If reason is a priceless jewel, if being is desirable, if life is worth living, it is only because the moral sense makes them so. It is better to be a mere animal

under the absolute dominion of blind, unreasoning instinct, than to be endowed with reason without the faculty of knowing the ends for which reason is given. Certainly those that undervalue the moral faculty have sadly mistaken the capacities of their own nature, the purposes of their Creator, and their own highest good.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY.

That a subject, involving so vitally and so generally the well-being of the individual, the family, the State, in all material and social and religious interests, should receive the patient and careful attention of philanthropists, who are capable of presenting a logical statement of the fundamental principles of the science and of giving a lucid and intelligible exposition of these principles, is a fact too nearly self-evident to require elaborate argument. No teachers are greater benefactors to the human race than those that teach and enforce by sound reasoning the principles of a sound and Christian morality. For it is easy of demonstration that these principles vitally affect every interest of the individual and of every association whether social, civil, or religious. Other things being equal, the man of correct ideas of morality, of the duties due to himself, to his neighbor, to humanity, to God, and who deports himself accordingly, will be a more prosperous, a more respected, a more useful, and far happier man than the man who is ignorant of these obligations, and consequently, practically regardless of them. Observation thoroughly establishes this fact. What is true in this regard of individuals is literally true of families, communities, and nations.

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES.

Psychology, Ethics, and Theology, though different sciences, are most intimately related. Without Psychology, Ethics is impossible, having no basis upon which to rest; and without Ethics, Theology would have no more interest to men than it has to irrational animals. The interdependence of these sciences is so complete that a radical error in one leads to a corresponding error in the other; for example, if I in my Psychology assert the doctrine of philosophical necessity, then consistency imperatively requires me to teach Necessitarian Ethics, and the absolute predestination of all things. Or, if I teach the theological dogma of universal predestination, then sheer consistency requires me to teach Necessitarian Ethics, and also to put Philosophical necessity in my scheme of Psychology.

Again, the denial of Philosophical necessity requires a libertarian scheme of Ethics, and also a denial of the corresponding theological dogma of universal predestination.

Hence, we have the general maxim that as is an author's philosophy of the will so is his theology, and as is his theology, so his philosophy. Authors that depart from this maxim necessarily involve themselves in contradiction; for the same doctrine can not be true in one science and false in another. Some authors hold that the natural order of these kindred subjects is, first, philosophy, including Psychology and Ethics; and secondly, Theology. This would be true if Philosophy, Psychology, Ethics, and Theology were all derivable from the same source. This, however, is not true. Philosophy claims to be the

product of human reason, dealing with known facts and expounding them in the light of metaphysics or necessary truths.

Psychological science is an enumeration and logical classification and exposition of the faculties of the mind, as given in consciousness.

Christian Ethics is the interpretation and adjustment of the contents of consciousness concerning moral distinctions studied in the light of the Christian Scriptures. Theological science is derived from the sacred Scriptures. This is the Science of sciences to which all other sciences must conform.

A scheme of speculative ethics is chiefly valuable only so far as it is productive of sound practical morality. In part first of this work, the earnest endeavor of the author has been to present a scheme which is in harmony with the teachings of the Holy Scriptures, the testimony of consciousness and observation. In the second part, Practical Ethics, an attempt is made to expound the Decalogue in the light of the truths taught in Speculative Ethics.

PART I.

Studies in Moral Science.

Studies in Moral Science.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE SUBJECT.

SECTION I.—*Terms and Definitions:*

I. Moral Science is a systematic statement pertaining to human conduct, variously denominated Moral Philosophy, Ethics, Casuistry, and Natural Law. The subject of which it treats is variously defined by different authors, as: "The science which treats of Morals; the science of right"—*Haven*; "The science of moral law"—*Wayland*; "The systematic application of the ultimate rules of right to all conceptions of moral conduct"—*Hicok*; "The science which teaches men their supreme end and how to attain it"—*Hopkins*; "The science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it"—*Paley*; "A code of rules for the regulation of conduct among men, as they should be"—*Herbert Spencer*; "The science which proposes to direct and regulate human actions, as right and wrong"—*Fleming*; "The science of morals"—*Wuttke*; "The scientific presentation of human action"—*Schleiermacher*; "The rational explanation of our moral actions, moral nature, and moral relations"—*Calderwood*. Dr

Gregory defines Ethics to be "The science of man's life of duty, or of what man ought to do in this present world."

Each of these definitions presents that aspect of the subject that its author deemed the governing characteristic of the science, and each may be accepted as a sufficiently correct presentation of some particular phase of the subject. No one of them, however, is sufficiently comprehensive to include every fundamental characteristic of the science.

(1) The definitions of Haven, Wayland, and Herbert Spencer make prominent the rule of human conduct.

(2) The definitions of Hicok and Fleming make prominent the application of the rule of right.

(3) The definitions of Paley and Gregory make prominent the obligatory character of the rule of right.

(4) The definitions of ^W~~W~~atke and Calderwood make prominent the philosophy of morals.

(5) The definition of Hopkins makes prominent the supreme good of the moral agent, and the means of attaining it.

2. Moral science might very well be termed the science of moral government, for such it really is; or, the science that makes known to men their duty to their Creator, to their neighbor, and to themselves, and the reason of their duties. Or it might be called the philosophy of human blessedness, because it

teaches men how to attain the highest good of which they are capable and for which they are created. But no one definition is broad enough to include every essential characteristic of the subject.

3. Correct terminology is always advantageous in the discussion of a subject, especially in the discussion of one intricate in itself, and in reference to which men are quite liable to differ.

4. But the subject of morality has so many sides, and may be looked at from so many different points of view that the merit of no particular scheme can be determined from the name or definition a writer may chance to prefer.

5. If he chooses to call it Moral Philosophy, or Ethics, or Moral Science, or Casuistry, or Natural Law, and then defines it according to some one of its characteristics, we can form no correct idea of the merits of his scheme except by an examination of its method of disposing of the facts that lie at the foundation of the subject. For as is the conception of the end of ethics, so will be the writer's disposition of the facts which require to be explained and arranged.

6. The misconception of the true end of morality will, by a sort of necessity, lead to a false or defective theory. All rational creatures who have learned by experience that their own actions affect in some form their own interests and the interests of others, form for themselves some rules of conduct by which their action is more or less governed.

7. The atheist, the positivist, the agnostic, and all schools of infidelity have some maxims or rules which they have formed or adopted, and by which they propose to govern themselves, for their own physical, secular, domestic, and social advantage. Their maxims may be wisely correlated to the ends they are intended to serve. They may be the means of preventing disease, premature decay, and death; of preserving character and domestic peace and pleasant society. They may be suited to the wants of men as social animals who have no existence beyond their physical life and who have no need of a code of laws that looks to an endless existence. We may call these rules a code of morals, if we choose, but they can not be harmonized with the facts of human nature, or give a rational account of these facts.

8. All codes or maxims that look only to the secular or temporal have in them nothing that deserves the name of true morality. They, at best, are only in a narrow sense, rules of prudence or worldly wisdom. They may be valuable in their place, but the ends which they serve are not those of man's highest good. Such are the chief characteristics of the morality of the most enlightened nations of the earth in both ancient and modern times that have been or now are destitute of the light of divine revelation.

9. Christian morality is the outgrowth of a revealed religion. It has its spring in regenerated human nature. Its fundamental basis is in love to our

Creator and to our fellow-men. Its imperative requirement is supreme love to the former and co-equal love to the latter. Its practical rule is, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." It assumes the perfectibility of human nature and contemplates the attainment of completeness of virtue and blessedness in the history of the individual.

10. It pretermits no interest of humanity but is intended as a conservator of every interest, secular and sacred, present and future. It does not disparage secular good for the sake of the spiritual, nor the spiritual for the sake of the secular; but putting the proper estimate upon both according to their respective value, it seeks the highest well-being of its subject. This is the Bible idea of Christian morality, its standard, its possibility, and its end. Any theory constructed from a different ideal has no right to be considered Christian in character, nor can it be adequate to the demands of humanity.

SECTION 2.—*Speculative Ethics.*

The subject of ethics is ordinarily treated under two general divisions, Speculative and Practical. These departments of the science are related as theory and practice, as the foundation and the building reared upon it. The first gives the theory, the philosophy of the science, defines its terminology, and classifies and adjusts the facts that lie at the foundation of the subject, so as to set every impor-

tant fact in its proper place, and give harmony and self-consistency to the whole. This is sometimes called speculative ethics, not because the mind deals with fiction as facts, but because it deals with admitted or probable facts, as the builder constructs an edifice out of material previously prepared, giving to each part its proper position.

SECTION 3.—*Method or Plan.*

Different writers adopt different methods in constructing their schemes of speculative ethics. No subject, perhaps, aspiring to the dignity of a science, is discussed in a greater variety of methods. In fact, writers are not well agreed as to what facts are really requisite to a full presentation of the subject, hence some include in their works the doctrine of the will, or human freedom, while others omit it. Others omit all reference to the purpose of the Deity in the creation and government of the moral world, thinking that the less that is said of the Deity in connection with the subject, the less objectionable it will be to students who may happen to entertain prejudices against the Bible.

1. To exclude the doctrine of the will or human freedom from a general discussion is to omit the most vital part; for without freedom there can be no moral action, consequently no morality.

2. To omit all reference to the divine purpose in the administration of the moral government, is scarcely less improper. Every act and every process

and plan of action becomes more intelligible if studied in the light of the purpose or end intended to be secured. To know the purpose or design of the Creator in regard to moral action, sheds a flood of light upon the whole question of Christian morals, which can be acquired from no other source.

SECTION 4.—*Natural, Christian, and Theological Ethics.*

Dr. Gregory says, "In man's present condition a complete system of ethics can not be constructed from the light of nature alone. It is therefore proposed to construct a system of Christian ethics as distinguished from natural ethics on the one hand and theological ethics on the other. Christian ethics is the system of morals reached by the scientific investigation of the moral consciousness of man as enlightened, elevated, and purified by the Christian religion."

Remarks. 1. Dr. Gregory speaks of natural ethics, Christian ethics, theological ethics, and ethics drawn directly from the sacred Scriptures. By natural ethics, I suppose, is intended ethics as taught by the light of nature. By Christian ethics is meant ethics as revealed in the consciousness of enlightened Christian men, and by theological ethics is intended the ethics taught in the Bible. These distinctions are valid as illustrative of the necessity of revelation as a supplement of the light of nature, or of human reason, in the construction of a true scheme of mor-

als. But this does not seem to be the purpose for which Dr. Gregory makes the distinction. On the contrary he speaks of these different systems of ethics as if they differed in kind and not in degree of fullness or completeness only. Such at least is the impression his statements must make upon the reader. This is manifestly an erroneous view of the subject. Natural ethics and Bible ethics differ, not in kind but in degree of fullness or completeness, or as the science of chemistry of to-day differs from that of fifty years ago. The facts with which chemistry deals, remain ever the same. The chemist changes but the law or principles of the science changes not. So it is of ethics. The principles, within themselves, are immutable. Moralists change in their views of morality, but morality itself remains ever the same. Natural ethics and Bible ethics are the same in every particular. Otherwise the Deity has taught one thing in nature and a contradictory thing in revelation. Revelation does not contradict but supplements the light of nature.

2. Dr. Gregory proposes to construct a system of Christian ethics as distinguished from both natural and Bible ethics, and to take his facts from the consciousness of the enlightened Christian man. It has been said, natural and Bible ethics can be distinguished only as to degree of completeness. But why take the facts from the enlightened Christian man? There is absolutely nothing in consciousness except

what is put into it by the intuitive judgment, the intelligence, the sensibility, and will. Intuition puts the same thing into the pagan and the Christian consciousness. Of course, then, there can be no difference on this ground between natural and Christian ethics. The enlightened Christian man, of course, knows more than the non-Christian man, and feels and acts differently in regard to morals.

The contents of the consciousness of the former would afford better material for the construction of a scheme of ethics than that of the latter. Still these materials would be necessarily defective, unless we could find a man absolutely perfect in knowledge, etc. But no man is perfect. "There is none good, no, not one." "If we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us." Any scheme of morals constructed from human consciousness must be radically defective.

3. Whose consciousness is to furnish the facts for a scheme of ethics? Thousands of men, all claiming to be "enlightened, elevated, and purified by the Christian religion" differ very materially as to the contents of their consciousness. To say which particular one, or which particular class, shall be taken as the standard of morality is very difficult of determination. Dr. Gregory, of course, would admit as an authoritative standard no man's consciousness that might happen to differ from his own. This would be equivalent to making himself his own standard. The

same is true of every other man. This, as is very apparent, destroys all objective imperatives, and leaves every man to determine for himself what is right and what is wrong, and makes morality exclusively subjective.

4. To take our material facts from the consciousness of man, is simply to make the opinions of the individual and fallible man, the woof and warp of our schemes of ethics. On the contrary, the only possible method of constructing a theory of Christian ethics is to make the sacred Scriptures the standard. To do this is to make, not enlightened Christian men but Christ himself, the standard. In him we have the sinless and the perfect—the perfect in knowledge and in every moral excellence. He not only knew and taught the only true scheme of ethics, but illustrated it most beautifully in his life, and therefore is the only perfect model.

5. The title, "Christian Ethics," as applied by Dr. Gregory to a system of ethics constructed from human consciousness is a misnomer. It indicates that the system is taken from the teachings of Christ or from the Holy Scriptures, and the reader is quite surprised to find that Dr. Gregory's scheme is distinguished from a system of morals drawn directly from the sacred Scriptures. He ought to have selected a different name for his book.

6. But Dr. Gregory of course, had a reason for what he did. He says :

"THEOLOGICAL ETHICS NOT ADVISABLE.—A system of theological ethics is, of course possible, but for the purpose of the ordinary instruction of the class-room, it is not advisable. Many minds are open to the reception of Christian ethics that may be closed against a system of morals drawn directly from the sacred Scriptures. Christian ethics is fitted, moreover, to strengthen and to give a more practical bent to those who already accept revealed ethics." Pp. 18, 19.

Remarks. By theological ethics our author means "revealed ethics." If "Christian Ethics" differs in any respect from "revealed ethics" it will certainly be false, and if false ought not to be taught in the class-room or anywhere else. If they do agree, as the names fairly indicate, why affect a difference where none exists? If they agree, will not the student that rejects one of necessity reject the other? Or if the student is prejudiced against the name "revealed ethics," or "ethics drawn from the sacred Scriptures," will he not be also prejudiced against the name "Christian Ethics," since every body except Dr. Gregory understands all these names to mean substantially the same thing?

7. Our author's policy seems not very good. If the student accepts Christian ethics as true and sufficient, with the distinct understanding that it is in some way distinguished from revealed ethics, could he not very reasonably infer that revealed ethics is untrue,

or at least unnecessary, and the Bible a useless book? All attempts to construct a system of Christian ethics as distinguished from natural ethics, on the one hand, and theological ("revealed") ethics, on the other are necessarily abortive.

8. I know of no sufficient reason for emphasizing the distinction between what is called natural ethics and revealed ethics. Except in relation to the individual, there is no fixed or immovable line between them. Natural ethics is taken to mean the moral truths which the individual may learn independently of revelation. Some men may learn more and some less in this way; some nations more and some less; some ages more and some less. What to one man may be a part of natural ethics would to another be revealed ethics. So of nations, and so of the same nations in different ages.

9. Some things in revealed ethics are common to almost all forms and grades of natural ethics; and, on the other hand, some things in revealed ethics are unknown to any form of natural ethics; are in fact so contrary to the selfishness and general perverse proclivities of human nature that they probably never would have been conceived of as imperative duties but for revelation, such as "Love thy neighbor as thyself," "Love your enemies," "Whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek turn to him the other also."

10. In the light of these facts it is sufficiently apparent that natural and revealed ethics differ, not in

kind, but in degree of fullness only. The simplest maxims of morals may have primarily been given by revelation, though they are now claimed as the outcome of human reason; for we know the marvelous of one age may become the commonplace of another. All the facts of revealed ethics are natural truths. The revelation was miraculous or supernatural, but the matter revealed is natural just as truly as the so-called maxims of natural ethics. Both have the same immutable foundation in the purpose of God as expressed in the economy of the moral world. Hence, all attempts to discriminate between them, as things differing in kind, is to make a distinction without a difference. This unavoidably leads to confusion in thought and perhaps error in practice.

II. Still more objectionable, if possible, is the attempted distinction between "theological" or "revealed ethics," or "ethics drawn directly from the sacred Scriptures," and "Christian Ethics." The distinction is without sufficient reason, is withal perplexing to the mind of the reader. Dr. Gregory himself, though he makes this distinction and evidently attaches much importance to it, can, I presume, draw no intelligible line between the things indicated by the words without either making the line purely formal and artificial, or convicting his Christian ethics of error.

Rejecting these and all other profitless distinctions, and assuming that the Book of revelation

is never contradictory of the book of nature, but supplementary to it, I propose an earnest inquiry into the fundamental principles of the science of morals. Ethics I conceive to be the science of moral government, and from this point of view I propose to discuss the subject. I prefer this method, (1) because it is the most natural method. The natural order is, Being, Law, Action, and End. (2) Because it is more favorable to unity in the discussion of the general subject; (3) because this method embraces within it every thing requisite to a full discussion of the subject. It excludes nothing, and lacks nothing, pertinent to the subject. There is, of course, nothing inherent in the subject itself that imperatively requires one method and not another; nor does the value of a work depend chiefly upon its general method. Still, that method which commends itself to the writer is the best method for him. Whether it is best for the reader is another question.

CHAPTER II.

GOVERNMENT AND LAW.

SECTION I.—*Government.*

All government implies four things: first, a governor or administrator; second, subjects or something governed; third, a law or rule of administration; fourth, object or end to be secured. These are the essential characteristics of all possible forms of government. It will be sufficient for the present purpose to classify all governments under two general heads, physical and moral.

1. A physical government is a government by the stern rule of necessity. Physical law, the law of physical causation, reigns supreme. This law has its origin in the divine will, and whatever transpires in this government is in all cases, except when the laws of nature are modified or conditioned by extrinsic agency, in accordance with the divine will. The idea of morality and accountability is excluded by the terms *physical* and *causative*.

The subjects of this government by physical or non-moral force, may be inorganic, as the heavenly bodies, rocks, air, etc.; or organic vegetable matter, as trees and plants; or organic animal bodies, as all animal creation; or rational creatures, such as man.

Whether rational creatures are invariably so governed or only rarely, for exceptional purposes, is a question not settled to the satisfaction of all men. That they have been so governed in some cases must be admitted by all who concede the truth of the sacred Scriptures, as in the case of the prophets, notably of Balaam, Saul and his soldiers, and Caiaphas. These cases, however, should be regarded as notable exceptions.

2. A moral government is a government of mind by mind, or a government of ^{moral}natural creatures by the force of truth, the power of facts appealing to the intelligence, or government by moral suasion. There are two fundamental differences between a physical and a moral government.

(1) They differ fundamentally in the subjects, the things governed; viz., matter and mind. To confound these is to confound things essentially different, independent, and distinct. This destroys the possibility of a moral government. All schemes of materialism exclude the possibility of a moral government, or of a government by suasive power. Mind, according to materialistic theories being only a function of the material organism, not an actual entity, is of necessity governed by the material organism of which it is a phenomenon. As natural substances, whether organic or inorganic, animate or inanimate, are under the dominion of absolute physical causation, their functions are, of course, under

the same power. Hence, all thought, all feeling, all action, are just what the physical organism, acted upon by natural forces, determined them to be. All true freedom being excluded, possibilities of virtue and vice are, of course, excluded. He that does well is fortunate, not virtuous nor rewardable; he that does ill is unfortunate, not vicious nor punishable.

(2) They differ not less fundamentally in the modes of their government than in the character of their subjects. In one we have physical force, relentless necessity, inevitably—no liberty. No event has any alternative, or could possibly be different. In the other we have liberty, alternative, contingency.

These distinctions are vital, the latter not less so than the former. The materialistic necessitarian denies the former, and hence denies all moral distinctions and all accountability. The philosophical necessitarian (so-called) denies the latter, but inconsistently holds to the doctrine of moral distinctions and accountability.

(3) All men admit—in fact it is an intuition of reason—that natural necessity excludes the idea of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, and excuses from all moral accountability. In philosophical or moral necessity events are not less inevitable, not less under the dominion of the laws of causation, than in natural necessity, and therefore ought to excuse from all accountability. Natural necessity excuses on the ground of the inevitability of the event. But inevi-

tability in moral necessity is no less a sufficient ground for irresponsibility. Whenever an event is clearly necessary or inevitable, from whatever cause, or whether the cause may arise in the realm of matter or mind, it clearly excludes the possibility of accountability and morality. Any government, by whatever name it may be designated, that excludes the contingent and admits of no alternative is not in fact a moral government, and can be called moral only by courtesy.

SECTION 2.—*Moral Government.*

1. In a moral government God is, of course, the Supreme Legislator and Governor. The subjects of the government are rational creatures capable of moral action. The words "moral action," as used by ethical writers, do not always mean right action, but acts having moral qualities, as good or bad. A moral action, in distinction from a physical action, is a free or voluntary act, the manifestation of a causative will, and not the effect of a volition which is itself the effect of a prior cause.

2. In contradistinction from moral action, we sometimes speak of physical action. The expression is ambiguous. By it we may mean a free action of the will producing physical effects in relation to either matter or mind as in the creation of the world or the creation of man out of the dust of the ground. The act considered in relation to the Creator was a moral act, because it was a free act; but considered in rela-

tion of an effect it was a physical act, the dust having no power of itself either to participate in or resist the creative act. If a powerful will so act upon a feeble will as to be irresistible, or as to cause the feeble will to put forth abnormal action, then the act of the powerful will is a moral act because free. But considered in relation to the effects it is physical, because, though the person of the feeble will is a moral being, yet having no power to resist the stronger power, is in no sense responsible for the act or its effects. This last named fact finds apt illustration in the case of the oracles of divine revelation, also in the case of wicked prophets, as Saul and his messengers; also in necessitated virtue, if there is any such thing.

3. By physical action is sometimes meant nothing more than physical force acting upon natural substance, as the action of the sun upon the earth, or of heat upon water in the production of steam, or of steam upon the piston rod, or of the piston rod upon the wheel. This action is not moral, of course, in any sense, because there is no freedom. The requisite condition given, the action, if we call it action, must be exactly as it is. An alternative is impossible. But back of all this physical action, and perfectly independent of it, there is a moral power, a will—action or volition that is itself not an effect but a cause. These facts force upon the mind a clear perception of the ambiguity of the word action, as ex-

pressive sometimes of necessary or inevitable movement, and sometimes of free or contingent movement. The child of five years old, though it may not be able to give an intelligible account of the matter, knows very well the difference between the action of its will upon its arm and the action of its arm upon the hammer, or the action of the hammer upon the nail, or the action of the nail upon the wood. One moral act—act of will—may give rise to a series of necessary physical and non-moral acts. This diversity of meaning given by usage to this word *action* suggests whether this ambiguity could not be avoided by using the term to express moral agency or action alone, and by using some other word to express what is called physical action. But no unobjectionable word suggests itself. The word *effect* might be adopted perhaps with some advantages. Instead of saying the action of the sun, say the effect of the sun. This, however, could be done only by writers on philosophical subjects. As the matter now stands we must be content to indicate the difference between moral action and physical action by qualifying words or some form of circumlocution.

4. A similar confusion arises out of the use of the word *power*. By its indiscriminate application to moral agency and physical agency, so-called, confusion arises from seeming to confound or identify things essentially distinct. The word is sometimes used in the sense of causative agency, and sometimes

in the sense of passive instrumentality, as the power of the will and the power of the arm, the first meaning causative power, the second, only passive instrumentality. Strictly speaking, in a philosophical sense, all power is resident in will, all else relating to events is instrumentality and conditionality.

5. On this ambiguity of the word power is grounded the much vaunted distinction between natural and moral ability, denying to men the latter in relation to the highest imperatives of morality, and making the former a sufficient ground of accountability. The student, however, should not be misled by a mere play upon words, however adroitly they may be used. He should hold fast by the self-evident fact that the power of the will is one thing, and the power of the arm quite a different thing; and that one can not be a substitute for the other; that the power of the arm and all other physical powers are mere instrumentalities, and not powers in a philosophical sense.

6. A moral agent must be a rational creature capable of discriminating between right and wrong, or capable of knowing the rule of duty; must be capable of motives of action, or of feeling the force of obligation; must be free to act without constraint or restraint from physical or moral causes.

SECTION 3.—*The Law or Rule of Government.*

1. The law is presumed to be a complete expression or revelation of the will of the sovereign or ruler in regard to the subjects; though the sovereign may

have in his mind other and higher intentions than those revealed in the law; yet these intentions are not presumed to be in conflict in any sense with what is revealed in the law.

2. To assume that the sovereign has revealed a law and enjoined obedience under the sanction of appropriate penalties, entertaining at the same time innumerable purposes in direct conflict with the intentions revealed in the law, is as derogatory to the character of the sovereign as it is unjust and cruel to the subject. Such an assumption either makes the sovereign a monster, having two wills in conflict or two antagonistic purposes concerning the same thing, or else imputes to him duplicity or a settled purpose to deceive his subjects.

3. If this assumption is true the sovereign is cruelly unjust to the subjects. Such a purpose on the part of a civil ruler, invested with absolute sovereignty, would not only justify, but would require in self-defense, rebellion at the earliest moment possible and at all hazards. Such a double purpose or duplicity on the part of the sovereign of the moral world, if it were possible, would render all moral government an unmitigated fraud, an impossible sham. This assumption, monstrously preposterous as it appears, is an indispensable adjunct of necessitarian ethics. No scheme of morals so absurd in itself and so revolting to the natural instincts of humanity can be true.

4. The law as revealed must be the rule of adminis-

tration. At least no administrative acts are admissible which are not in accordance with revealed law. Otherwise the rule of administration on the part of the ruler would not be the rule of obedience on the part of the subject. But unless the rule for the administrator is the rule for the subject no moral government, in fact nothing that could be called government, is possible. It would be just as possible for the heavenly bodies to obey the law of gravity and to obey at the same time some other law in conflict with it. But if the law as revealed truly expresses the will of the administrator then there can be no conflict between the rule of administration and the rule of obedience, for the ruler can not act contrary to his own will, or violate his own law as revealed. The subject, consequently, has every assurance that in obeying the law he is truly doing the will of the Supreme Ruler; nor can he, without the utmost perversion of the principles of common sense, persuade himself that in disobeying the law as revealed to him he is actually doing the will of the Supreme Ruler. This absurdity, monstrous as it is, necessitarian ethics requires us to believe.

SECTION 4.—*The rule of duty, or of right action, must be known in some form to the subject.*

1. A law unknown to the subject is to him no law at all. In civil law there may be exceptions, but in morals there are no exceptions. "For where no law is, there is no transgression," or known and in-

tentional transgression. It is possible to do, through ignorance, also unintentionally, what the law formally forbids, or not to do what the law formally requires. In civil law ignorance does not excuse. If it did it would furnish an incentive to lawlessness. The citizen is always presumed to know the law, and his lawless acts, whether committed knowingly or ignorantly are held to be inexcusable.

2. In morals the case is different. Ignorance excuses only when the requisite knowledge is impossible, or when its attainment, under the circumstances, could not be reasonably expected. To be ignorant of a law excludes the possibility of an intentional violation of the law, and in morals the intention of an act is the essential part of the act. But where there is no law there can be no intentional violation of the law. A moral law, however, may be revealed to the individual objectively or subjectively, or in both forms. The objective law is a revelation of the rule of right by extrinsic agency to the human mind. The subjective law is a revelation to the mind through the intuitions and activities of the mind itself; or it is rudimentally a pure concreation with the mind, as is the natural reason. It as surely and inevitably develops as does the reason. Though distinct they are inseparable. If one fails of development, so also does the other fail. If one is impaired or obliterated from the mind so is the other.

3. This subjective rule of right is, in fact, an unfaill-

ing product of intuitive reason, nothing more and nothing less. As the intuitive deals only with the abstract, and not with the concrete, it of course gives the perception of right and wrong only in the abstract and not in the concrete form. The intuitive reason readily affirms the abstract law of causality but does not of itself determine the cause of any particular phenomenon. In like manner it affirms the abstract law of moral distinctions, but does not of itself, determine the rightness or wrongness of any particular act. In both cases, as in others that might be named, the determination of the concrete is left to the discursive judgment. As out of the intuition concerning the law of causation, very naturally arises the desire to know and the effort to ascertain the cause of any particular phenomenon; so out of the intuitions concerning moral distinctions very naturally arises the desire to know and the effort to ascertain what may be the right in any particular act. In this way men come to have judgments or opinions concerning the rightness or wrongness of most of the acts with which they are familiar. The discursive judgments thus formed concerning the rightness or wrongness of any particular acts, may be correct or incorrect, true or false. They become the law or rule of action to the individual and to them the collateral intuition of accountability gives imperative authority.

4. The mind, in the meantime, is perfectly con-

scious of its motives or intentions as in harmony or disharmony with these discursive judgments. If there is harmony the act is considered right, virtuous, meritorious, and a good conscience results. If there is disharmony, the act is considered wrong, vicious, demeritorious, and a bad conscience is the result.

5. In this way in the absence of the objective or written law every man by virtue of his mental constitution becomes a law unto himself. This subjective law is adequate only as to individual motives or intentions. By it the individual may know whether his intention is right or wrong. It is, however, quite inadequate to determine whether the act is formally right or wrong, or wrong in itself, considered apart from its intention. Hence, different individuals of equally good intentions may sadly disagree as to whether a particular act is right or wrong. It is also from necessity defective as to any general code of morals, and is therefore inadequate for the general wants of society.

SECTION 5.—*The relation of the objective law to the subjective.*

1. The defect of the subjective law lies in the defect of the discursive judgment in making the application of the abstract principle of right as given by the intuitive reason. This may be made plain by an illustration. All know intuitively that there is a cause why the sun and the stars rise and set, but none know intuitively *why* they rise and set. This

can be determined neither by the intuitions of sense nor of reason, but by the discursive judgment alone. But the world was for thousands of years in gross error of the cause of this event. The error was not in the fact given by the intuitive judgment that this phenomenon had a cause but in the discursive judgment in making the application of the abstract law of causation. So it is in regard to the abstract law of right. The fatal error is in the application of the law to concrete cases by the discursive judgment.

2. Now it is the purpose of the objective or revealed law not to abrogate or in any way modify the abstract law of right, but to enlighten the discursive judgment and thus assist it in making the application of the general principle to every possible case.

3. As by the demonstration of the Copernican theory of astronomy the erroneous assumption of the Ptolemaic theory was swept away, so by the divine teaching of the revealed law the errors of the subjective law may be corrected, and a true code of morality of universal pertinency and obligation, which is adequate for all men and all rational creatures in all possible modes of existence, may be given.

4. The subjective law is in the absence of the objective law variable. It may advance or degenerate in the purity of its maxims and in its power over its subjects. It is however a noteworthy and remarkable fact that it does not always keep pace as might be expected with the advancement of other

sciences. A man well instructed in other sciences may be a poor moralist, both practically and theoretically. The converse is also true. Unchristianized nations, however, generally remain nearly stationary in morals until favored with the superior ethical code of the Bible.

5. If these statements are true, even substantially so, it is sufficiently manifest that every rational creature has an intelligible rule of moral action available at all times and under all circumstances, namely the objective or the subjective; the first revealed by extrinsic agency and given in the sacred Scriptures; the second revealed in consciousness by intuitive reason and the activities of the mind. All are therefore responsible for their moral action.

SECTION 6.—*As a rule of moral government the law must be adapted in its requirements to the capacity of its subjects.*

1. All rational creatures are truly the subjects of the law, but all do not possess equal ability. If the law required every subject to render an equal amount of service, it would be neither just nor truly beneficent. If it required of all service commensurate with the capacity of those possessed with the highest ability it would of necessity be both unjust and unbeneficent to those of less ability, because to them obedience would be simply impossible and the law instead of being administrative of good would be an instrument of evil. If it required service com-

measurable with the capacity of those of average ability, it would be to those possessed of less than average ability both unjust and unbeneficent for reasons just given. To those possessed of more than average ability it would be unbeneficent because the blessedness consequent upon obedience, being commensurate with the obedience required, would be less than the capacity for enjoyment. The creature, man or angel, would have a capacity for blessedness which there would be no means of attaining. This would render a superior capacity a calamity instead of a blessing. If the law required obedience commensurate only with the capacity of the lowest in the scale of rational creatures, the same state of things, but in a more aggravated form, would surely follow. To require of a child what only a man can render, or of a man what only a superior being can render, is neither beneficent nor just. To require of a superior being what only a man can render, or of a man what only a child can render, and make the blessedness proportionate to the requirement, would be unkindness, cruelty, to the man and the superior being.

2. It is quite evident that a law possessed of any of these hypothetical characteristics would be radically defective. On the contrary law, to be perfect, must require of each of its subjects obedience exactly proportionate to ability. Such a law is both just and beneficent. It is just because it gives to the governor all he can reasonably require and requires of

the subject no more than he can render. It is beneficent or good because it secures to the subject a measure of blessedness exactly proportionate to the measure of obedience rendered. Every one is rewarded according to his works. This is the ethical law given in the Scriptures and given nowhere else.

3. Imperfect obedience secures only partial blessedness. Perfect obedience alone insures perfect happiness. The obedience required is proportionate to the ability; but the blessedness enjoyed is proportionate to the obedience rendered. This is the perfection of moral law.

SECTION 7.—*The penalty.*

1. The object of the law is *good* not *evil*. It exists for the good of the subject and not for the sake of the governor, unless he is both governor and subject, which ought always to be the case in human governments. To the divine Governor the law is useless except as a means to an end. To the subject it is the conservator of all moral good.

2. No divine or natural law is without penalty. The penalty of these laws is the forfeiture and actual loss of the good that the law is intended to conserve.

3. Partial disobedience is partial ruin; utter disobedience is utter ruin or wretchedness. This penalty is the greatest possible dissuasive from disobedience.

SECTION 8.—*The penalty inevitable.*

1. It is the natural effect of disobedience. The cause given the effect necessarily follows. In this

respect it is strictly analogous to physical law. To violate the law is to incur the penalty. In this respect it is unlike human laws. These are often violated with impunity. The penalty in its purely civil aspect may never be inflicted. In its moral aspect, if it has any, the penalty is inevitable. The murderer may never be hanged, but he will not escape moral retribution except by supernatural power, or purification of the conscience.

2. The infliction of the penalties of all divine laws, whether physical or moral, is immediate. The transgression and the penalty are logically distinct, but chronologically inseparable. The inception of one is the inception of the other. The transgressor may not always be conscious of this immediate visitation of the penalty, for the penalty and the consciousness of it are distinct things. The transgressor is of course conscious of the act, but may not be so of the consequences of the act. A man may shoot himself, and may for a time survive the act without knowing he has killed himself. The girdled tree may remain green and beautiful for months, and still it may be true that the girdling killed it. It is dead though it seems to live. So in morals the act of transgression is the exclusion of the good that comes from obedience whether we are immediately conscious of the consequences of the act or not. In this again moral law differs from civil law. In respect to the latter, the criminal may never be detected, and, of course,

never punished; or if detected and convicted may be respited, or the penalty may be indefinitely postponed.

3. Moral law requires personal obedience. One person can not obey for another. None except the obedient can possibly enjoy the blessedness conditioned upon obedience. This blessedness sustains to personal obedience the relation of sequence to its antecedent: no antecedent no sequence; no cause no effect. It is just as possible for a man to be continuously healthy and strong without the use of food as to enjoy the award of virtue without being personally virtuous.

4. If this is true, it fairly follows that substitutionary obedience, either as to the precept or penalty of moral law is impossible. A can not obey for B. One can not love God or his fellow-man as a substitute, or in the place of another. He that obeys or loves, and he alone, has a blessedness that comes of obeying or loving. In this respect civil laws differ slightly from the moral. One man may pay a debt in the place of another, or perform military duty for another, or act in various ways as another's representative. This fact superficially considered has favored, or perhaps suggested, the idea of vicariousness in the sphere of morals which absolutely excludes all moral representation. If moral law excludes substitutionary obedience it of necessity excludes substitutionary penalty.

5. No law, criminal, physical, or moral, human or divine, admits of substitutionary penalty or punishment. The offender alone can be rightfully punished. One man can not be deprived of his natural liberty in the place of another, put in the stocks or prison, or be hanged, or in any way punished as a criminal in the place of another. Penal substitution is equally abhorrent to physical law. Here, too, as everywhere else, the maxim stands unimpeachable, *He that offends must suffer, and none can take his place*. If one man puts his hand into a red-hot stove he must suffer the pain. Another, however willing, can not take it and bear it in his stead. If one has palsy, plague, or fever, no substitute is possible. The reason of this impossibility is sufficiently apparent. It is simply for the reason that the cause of suffering is in the body, and an exchange of bodies is impossible.

6. For similar reasons the penalty of moral law admits of no substitution. The maxim still holds good: He that offends must suffer whatever penal consequence actually results from the offense. If A should be willing to bear the suffering due to B's offense, and if it were quite compatible with justice and governmental policy for him to do so, still such a thing is made impossible by the constitution of the human mind. It would separate the effect from the cause. It supposes a cause in one personality or agent and the effect of that cause in another personality. It requires a complete change of personality

and the substitution of the consciousness of the innocent for that of the guilty, of a self-complacent conscience for a remorseful one. This would be equivalent to the utter obliteration of all distinctions both of personalities and events. No code of morals, natural or revealed, pagan or Christian, tolerates the idea of a vicarious obedience or vicarious penalty in the realm of criminality.

SECTION 9.—*No commutation.*

1. Nor does moral law admit of commutation either of obedience or of penalty. What is not required by the law can not be commuted or substituted for what is required. The requirements, to love our neighbor, to visit the sick, to pay our debts, or to obey the civil law, can not be met by performing ^{other} another's specific acts. This is a clear inference from the fact that the law requires all that is for the good of the subject, hence what the law does not require, it, by implication, prohibits. Hence, nothing not required by the law can be substituted for what is required.

2. The same is true in regard to the penalties of the law. One penalty can not be commuted into another. In this regard moral law differs from criminal law. The penalty by imprisonment is sometimes commuted into a fine, or a penalty by death into life imprisonment. The reason of this commutability of penalty in criminal law is the simple fact that these penalties are arbitrary depending alone on the will of the human law-maker. They do not have their

ground in the nature of things as do the penalties of physical and moral laws. In one case the penalty is inflicted by an external agent or officer; in the other it is inflicted by an agent or power inherent in the transgressor himself; and he can no more avoid these penalties or commute them than he can avoid himself or get away from himself or change himself into another self.

3. Nor can the penalty be set aside or in any way modified by any external power, even by Omnipotence, except by changing the moral state of the offender. In morals the penalty is the natural correlative of the offense and its commutation is as impossible as the exchange of the effect of one cause for the effect of another and wholly different cause. We might as truthfully say that a specific effect of heat can be commuted into the effect of cold, or that of strychnine into that of common bread. This is to say that the penalties of moral law are strictly natural, and are of necessity incapable of commutation.

SECTION 10.—*Sin against God a sin against our neighbor.*

1. All violations of moral law are offenses against the moral Governor and injustice to our fellow-men. It is generally conceded that an offense against our fellow-man is an offense against the Creator, because the moral code requires us to do good unto all men; and not to do this when possible is insubordination to the Supreme Will. But whether every offense

against the Creator is an offense against our neighbor is not so manifest, and would probably be controverted by many shrewd casuists.

2. But in view of the fact that the law requires us to do unto others as we would have others do unto us and to do good unto all men; and in view of the additional fact that every offense against the Creator so affects the moral state of the offender as to disqualify him more or less for doing good unto others, we must conclude that every offense against the Creator is an offense against the creature, or is at least an irreparable injustice to him who violates the law.

Illustrations: The citizen who shows himself a rebel against authority does a positive injustice to his fellow-citizens by increasing their burdens and thus diminishing their happiness. A soldier in battle who refuses to obey lawful orders, by his rebellion increases the burthens and the danger of his comrades and thus does them a positive injustice. The member of the family who shirks duty or in any way transgresses the rules intended for the good of all not only rebels against rightful authority but becomes a source of affliction to the orderly and well-disposed. The same is true, though perhaps less obviously so, in the moral government of the world. Every offense against the moral government is an offense or injustice to all the members of the government. He alone is true to his kindred, to his country, to humanity, who is true to his Creator. This is manifestly a

wise provision of nature, for in it every member of the great brotherhood is presented not only with a powerful incentive to do right himself but also to induce others to do right. He that does right not only does the best thing possible for himself but is a true benefactor to others.

Though moral law admits of no substitution, either as to obedience or penalty, and no commutation as to either, there is nevertheless nothing incompatible with the remission of penalty.

3. The infliction of penalty is no reparation of the injury done, either to the governor or to the subject. This is universally true in human, criminal, and moral law. To hang or imprison a man for murder does not restore the murdered man to life, or prevent other evil consequences of the murderous act. Penalties of human laws are inflicted only as deterrents from crime. They vindicate the authority of law but make no reparation for injustice done, and may be remitted only when it is apparent that the infliction of it is a greater evil than the remission. In moral law also the penalty repairs no injury, and, though the penalty grows naturally and necessarily out of the offense it may be remitted when the remission will be a less evil to the government than its non-remission. But while these analogies between the human and moral law are obvious enough, there are some points of radical difference.

(1) The moral criminal, as has been seen, is natu-

rally under penalty from the moment of his transgression. His case is somewhat analogous to that of the murderer imprisoned for life—he is already suffering the penalty.

(2) The offense against human law may be pardoned at the will of the pardoning power without any change of the moral state of the criminal. But the offense against moral law can be pardoned only on condition of a change of mind or a change in the moral state of the criminal. (a) In the human aspect of the case it may be forgiven on condition of a full and honest confession. This is the natural and only possible propitiation or atonement among men. The offender must be in fact his own atoner though he may have the friendly mediation of others. "If thy brother offend against thee and repent, forgive him." This is the law of human forgiveness. (b) The offender against the Divine Governor may also be forgiven on condition of a radical change of mind through repentance and contrition. But in this case he can not, as in the others, be his own atoner. But the question very naturally arises, why can the offender make atonement for himself in one case and not in the other? The answer to this question belongs to soteriology rather than to ethics. [It may however be here pertinently suggested that the change of mind upon which all forgiveness, both human and divine, is conditioned is in relation to the Creator, simply impossible without the offices of a mediator.

Without these offices, the offender, though he may have subjective evidence of his guilt, does not know against whom he has offended or on what condition he can be forgiven, or if forgiveness is possible on any ground at all. Under such a state of things, a change of mind, repentance, or contrition, etc., is impossible. Of course an offender could not be a mediator, or a pacificator for another, nor could any other being discharge this office except one possessed of the attributes both of the offended Creator and the offending creature.]

4. This capacity of the moral law for the remission of its penalties avouches to humanity in its present state the only possible ground of a pure morality and a present and future state of blessedness. Of course it is not meant that the Creator unconditionally purposes the happiness of all. Such a purpose would be utterly subversive of all morality.

CHAPTER III.

GOVERNMENT AND MAN.

SECTION I.—*The object or end of moral government.*

1. The object of all reasonable human governments is the good of the subjects. Human governments, when instituted by communities or States, are created in the interest of those who create them—that is, for their good, and should be administered with reference to this end. All governments of whatever form administered in the interest of officials are a moral abomination and ought to be revolutionized. The moral government, however, is not of human but of divine institution. It is not instituted by creatures for themselves or to answer their ends, but by the Creator to answer his ends.

2. The moral government is not an end to itself, does not exist for its own sake, but as a means for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Creator. To this some object; at least some ethical writers of distinction assert principles that logically imply that the moral government is an end to itself. These principles will be subsequently noticed. The purpose of God is the end to be secured by the government, the end for which it exists. What then is the purpose of God in respect to the subjects of the government?

(1) God is infinitely perfect and consequently infinitely happy in himself. His works manifest his perfections, but can not add anything to them. Infinity admits of no additions. We, hence, conclude that he was as self-complacent in the contemplation of this completeness and infinite potentialities as he could be if he should actualize any or all of these potentialities. Self-complacent consciousness of what he is, of what he can do, is to him the same felicity as the complacent contemplation of what he has done. The ideal universe and the real universe are to him equal sources of complacency. We dare not, therefore, attribute selfishness in its ordinary, offensive sense, to him as the motive for creating the moral world.

(2) But God is love, not the abstract principle of love personified or deified, but an eternal, self-conscious personality whose very nature is love. His motive for the creation of beings in his own image could not be less or other than the dissemination of his own excellence or felicity, ^{and} the joy of pure benevolence. A motive higher or more noble than this is inconceivable. A motive lower than this or other than this is unworthy of an infinitely perfect Creator. It is inconceivable that God whose very nature is love and who stands in no need of any creature or any thing external to himself should conceive the thought or purpose of creating any sensitive thing with the intention that it should suffer. Still more

unreasonable is it that he should create immortal spirits in his own image and likeness with the intent that they should be miserable. The bare idea shocks the reason and horrifies the instinctive feeling of the heart. Every possible deduction from the character of God justifies the assertion that the purpose of God in the creation of the moral world is the revelation of his glory in the dissemination of his own excellence and felicity. Such being the divine purpose in creation, such must be also the end of the divine government. Every rational creature is from necessity a subject of this moral government, or the government of the individual is in its principles and ends the government of all rational creatures. The whole is as its parts. Man, the individual man and the collective man, was made like God, and was made to be happy.

(3) The intuitions of the human mind protest against the idea that the Creator designs the unhappiness of his creatures. The voice of nature, speaking through the unsophisticated souls of men, vindicates the Creator from all such unworthy imputations. No man, in the unsophisticated state of his mind, and heeding only the voice of nature—call it the voice of God revealed in nature if you choose—ever conceived, much less believed that his Creator made him for misery. This is alike true of all men, of all religions, of all codes of morals, of every degree of culture, and of all ages of the world.

3. The theory that men—that any man—was created to be unhappy was born not of nature within us nor of nature without us, but of a false philosophy. It is the logical correlate of a false theory and not of the heart. It satisfies neither reason nor human instinct. It satisfies nothing but the hard demands of remorseless logic founded upon a false premise. Even the debauchee, whose excess has made him an impersonation of misery, rarely ever thinks that he was made for this end. Such persons do not ordinarily attribute their wretchedness to their Creator but to their own faults.

4. The apparent exceptions to this rule are such only as have had their consciences and reason debauched by gross immoralities, and who, in their powerlessness to free themselves from their misery while they yet hold on to vices which produce them, blasphemously charge their hopeless wretchedness upon their Creator. But this charge is not less a slander upon their former unsophisticated minds than upon their Creator. All necessitarians who believe that the event is an infallible index of the purpose of the Creator, are required by their theory to believe that the Creator does not desire the happiness of all. But why do such persons generally reckon themselves to be exceptions to all ungracious divine purposes? The only conceivable answer to this question is, that the voice of nature within them is a protest against their philosophy. The intuitions of their

own minds contradict their own theory, at least in relation to themselves. Their theory requires them to believe of other men what their intuition will not allow them to believe of themselves. Remembering that all men have the same intuitive convictions, we have the universal testimony of human nature in favor of the idea that the Creator desires the happiness of all men.

5. If "contrivance proves design and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the designer" then I see no possible method by which the conclusion can be avoided that the Creator designed, purposed, intended, the happiness of his creatures. Archbishop Paley has so forcibly put this argument that nothing seems wanting to its completeness. He says, "When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both. If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose by forming our senses to be so many sources of pain to us as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment, or by placing us amidst objects so ill suited to our perceptions as to have continually offended us instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight; for example, he might have made every thing we tasted bitter, every thing we saw loathsome, every thing we touched a sting, every thing we smelt a stench, every sound a discord. If he had been indif-

ferent about our happiness or misery we must impute to our good fortune (as all design by this supposition is excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it. But either of these (and still more both of them) being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, that God when he created the human species wished their happiness, and made for them that provision which he has made with that view and for that purpose." The hypothesis of indifference is excluded by the law of chance; the hypothesis of malevolence is excluded by the facts; and the hypothesis of benevolence is thus proven. The general or prevailing tendency of the contrivance proves the design. The end may not always be secured. This may result from some defect in the contrivance, but this does not disprove the design.

SECTION 2.—*Objections to this view of the subject.*

1. It will be readily granted that the Creator purposes the happiness of all that are happy; but that he purposes in any sense, or in truth desires the happiness of those that are not happy, will not be readily admitted by any school of necessitarians nor can it be consistently admitted by any such. To concede that characters, human action or any events could possibly be otherwise than as they are, would be to surrender their philosophy. The necessitarian, therefore, with true fidelity to his philosophy, insists

that if the Creator did truly purpose or desire the happiness of all, then all would certainly be happy. But all are not happy, therefore, all were never intended to be happy.

2. This philosophy, however plausible it may appear, assumes far too much to be satisfactory. (1) It assumes the necessity of human action, or that the human will is an instrument and not an agent, that volition itself is an effect and not causative of effects except in a secondary sense; or that it transmits action, does not originate it. (2) It assumes that *necessity* and a true *morality* are compatible things; or that an act can be necessary or inevitable and at the same time be moral—that is, virtuous or vicious. This is the essence of necessitated virtue, which I hesitate not to say is a contradiction in terms, as really so as it would be to talk of a necessary freedom. Such freedom is predicable only of such things as a germinating acorn or the hatching egg or the falling water or the revolving planet. To predicate it of rational creatures is to practice upon the world a fraud which allures thousands to destruction.

3. It is objected that if all things are not as they were really intended to be, then the Creator can not in the true sense of the word be the ruler or governor of the world; that only so far as he governs the thoughts, motives, actions, and destinies of men is he in fact their ruler, that if he does not thus rule, then men rule themselves, or are ruled by some power

other than the Creator. It is a sufficiently practical reply that if their philosophy is true, then there is no good sense or reason why persons should concern themselves about themselves or any one else in reference to secular or sacred things, in respect to the present or future, for means and ends are equally inevitable. It is hardly necessary to say that the objection requires an unprecedented use of the word governor or ruler. The word is never used in such a sense in relation to civil government or family government or in relation to any thing else except irrational and inanimate things. It is safe to say that no rational being governs another by producing all his thoughts, emotions, and volitions. If the Creator governs all rational creatures in this way, then it follows that every such creature's life is a section or portion or phase of the divine life. This degrades the divine to the level of the human.

4. It is objected that as a matter of fact all men are not happy and that if the Creator really desires the happiness of all, and all are not happy, then, as happiness consists in the gratification of the desires, the Creator must be the most unhappy of all rational beings. Edwards and others ply this argument with great plausibility and force. It has in fact often puzzled some who do not believe it, and is by others considered unanswerable.

(1) The argument is fallacious. It may be conceded that happiness consists in the gratification of

the desires; still it will not follow that the Creator is exceedingly unhappy because his desire for the happiness of all is not gratified. The argument assumes that he is unhappy because he can not make all men happy. If human unhappiness were the result of a want of power on the part of the Creator, then there would be some ground for unhappiness on his part. But he has never purposed to make all unconditionally happy. Such a purpose would imply the possibility of necessitated virtue and a necessitated happiness. The Creator does not purpose any such absurd and impossible things.

(2) He desires all to be happy, not in some impossible way, but in the only way possible—that is, through right or virtuous action. An attempt to make them happy in any other way would, of necessity, be either to subvert the very foundation of all morals, or to make those whose happiness he desires, very unhappy. He desires the happiness of all, but he does not desire impossible things. The governor of a State may truly desire the happiness of all his people, but he does not desire their happiness at the sacrifice of the laws upon obedience to which their happiness is conditioned. To do this would be at one and the same time to desire their happiness and the impossibility of their happiness. So for the Creator to desire the happiness of his creatures, irrespective of their voluntary obedience or virtue, would be at the same time to desire their happiness and the

impossibility of that happiness, which, of course, would be a contradiction. It is, hence, sufficiently manifest that the purpose and desire of the Creator must be limited to the sphere of possibility. He does not desire impossible things.

(3) This objection is so easily answered that it is a matter of surprise that Edwards and other necessitarians ever obtrude it upon their readers. If the non-gratification of the desire for the happiness of all men is a source of unhappiness to the moral Governor, of how much greater unhappiness would be his consciousness of having purposely necessitated all the unhappiness in the moral world. I would infinitely prefer the pain consequent upon looking upon a suffering immortal spirit, whose happiness I truly desired, than to suffer the pain consequent upon the consciousness of having intentionally caused all that suffering. The suffering in the former case is that of unavailing regret; in the latter it is of the nature of remorse.

(4) If libertarian philosophy raises the question whether the moral Governor may not be subject to sympathetic suffering, necessitarian philosophy obtrudes the question upon us whether the moral Governor may not be the subject of remorse. According to one philosophy the moral Governor desires the happiness of all, amply provides the means of happiness for all, and presses these means to the utmost extent of morality and accountability; and if any are

not happy it is only because they prefer disobedience to compliance with the necessary conditions. According to necessitarianism only those are happy that the Creator designed to be so, and all others are miserable because he desired them to be so.

(5) Sympathy for the suffering, or desire for the happiness of those whose happiness we believe impossible is not inconsistent with the self-complacency consequent upon having done every thing possible or proper for the happiness of the suffering. This is a fundamental fact so fully verified by consciousness that it needs no further consideration. What is true in this respect of the creature mind must be true of the creative mind.

(6) Having done so much for the happiness of the moral world that to do more would be to do wrong, his suffering on account of the unhappiness of the incorrigible can not be of any grave importance. Whether the Deity is or whether he is not capable of suffering in this regard, and if he is how much, it is not very safe to assert. There is nothing absurd or unphilosophical in the idea. Some facts seem to favor the notion. It is safe to say that if the Deity sympathizes with those who have made themselves unhappy, this does not militate against his own essential happiness nor derogate from his moral excellence.

5. Another form of objection involving substantially the same principle, is that if the Creator desired the happiness of his creatures, he is abundantly able

to make them happy; that he is omnipotent and all-wise and therefore to him all things are possible. But all are not happy, therefore he does not desire the happiness of all.

(1) It is readily conceded that the Creator is omnipotent, and that he does all his pleasure in the realm of matter and mind. But the objection assumes that happiness is conditioned upon the good pleasure of the Creator alone, and in no respect whatever upon the action of the creature. This assumption not only can not be proved, but is demonstrably false. The hypothesis is more or less common to atheists and Christian theists that if the Creator is infinite in wisdom and in power, then he could create a world of intelligent beings utterly incapable of moral defection and consequently incapable of unhappiness in any possible form. Hence, the inference that if unhappiness exists at all it can only be because the Creator willed its existence. The atheist revolts at the idea that an infinitely perfect Being could will the existence of moral evil and the consequent unhappiness of his creatures. He assumes that if unhappiness exists in the world, it must, of logical necessity, be because the Creator is either unable or unwilling to prevent it, and that if he is either unable or unwilling to prevent it, then the Creator is not infinitely perfect and if not thus perfect then he is not God at all; for the very idea of God presupposes an infinitely perfect being. But unhappiness, it is universally

conceded, does actually exist, hence there is no such being as he whom the world calls God. The theist of the necessitarian school, holds that the Creator could exclude the possibility of moral evil, and thus exclude the possibility of all unhappiness from the moral world; that moral evil, therefore, and its fearful consequences exist by the divine will. He seeks to escape the conclusion of the atheist by asserting a disposing or *decretive* will and also a *pleasurable* or revealed will in the Creator. The procuring of the existence of sin is the work of the decretive will. The condemnation and punishment of sin is the work of the pleasurable will. The Creator, it is alleged, procures the existence of sin, not for its own sake, but as a means to good and happy ends. The existence of moral evil and all its fearful consequences, is thus referred to the will of the Creator, and this act of the divine will is justified by the most odious of all maxims, "The end justifies the means." [See Edwards Inquiry on the Will, pp. 162-164. For a full exposure of this stupendous error, see Dr. Bledsoe's Theodicy.]

(2) That the happiness of all sensitive creatures is conditioned upon the will of the Creator, or upon the divine beneficence is certainly true, otherwise the creature would be independent and self-existent. The Creator of course furnishes the capacity for happiness and makes it attainable, but it by no means follows that the actual attainment depends in no

sense upon the endeavors of the creature. This is true neither of animals nor of human beings. In every case the acquisition is conditioned upon the activity of the creature. Appropriate means must be used, and if properly used the happiness ordinarily follows. If they are not so used unhappiness generally follows.

(3) If it should be said that while it is certainly true that the end will not be attained unless the appropriate means are used, yet, whether the means will be used depends exclusively upon the will of the Creator, it is sufficient here to say, in answer that this is an assumption without proof, an assumption, too, that contradicts the universal consciousness of mankind. No man in his normal state is conscious of performing any act from any irresistible power from within or from without. If impelled by an irresistible force the movement is not his act at all. We are conscious of the necessity of respiration and other bodily functions. We have in such cases the power of only a limited repression but we are not conscious of an irresistible power forcing us to will or to use means for the attainment of ends. We are also conscious of a sense of approval or disapproval of our own acts. The non-consciousness of acting from necessity and the consequent consciousness of a sense of self-approval or disapproval doubly avouch our freedom from necessitation in the use of means for the attainment of happiness. Common sense and the

common practice of men avouch the same truth. Whatever theory men may profess, all are practically libertarians.

(4) That our happiness or unhappiness is affected by our own acts is a matter of every-day experience. We are conscious of acting for certain ends. We know the effect of those actions upon our happiness in gratifying our desires or in the accomplishment of our ends. We are equally certain that our own acts often cause our own unhappiness. We also believe with the utmost confidence that we could have done many things which, if done, would have contributed to our happiness; also that we could have done many things which, if done, would contribute to our unhappiness. In fact, if our happiness is not in a large measure conditioned upon our own actions, then it is true beyond all question that human consciousness is a false witness, human freedom a mockery, human experience an illusion, morality an impossibility. This is a sufficient reply to the objection that the Creator does not desire the happiness of all his rational creatures.

SECTION 3:—*The problem of unhappiness not satisfactorily solved by attributing it to the divine will.*

1. A man would have to be much wiser than the wisest of men to be able to comprehend to perfection the counsels and works of the all-wise Creator and Governor of the world. The finite can not comprehend the infinite. A part of his way only may be

known to us. "Who by searching can find him out unto perfection?" Our inability to comprehend his ways is a sufficient ground for our humility and self-distrust, but is no reason why we should not use our feeble abilities to the best possible advantage, since to know him and ourselves in relation to him, and our duties and interests is the object for which he has given us our abilities, however humble they may be.

2. The facts which he has been pleased to make known to us through his word and works authorize us to assert his infinite perfection and self-sufficiency; but they do not authorize us to assert as does necessitarianism his dependence upon moral evil for the manifestation of that perfection and self-sufficiency. They authorize us to assert him to be in the highest sense free and to be the author of his own acts; but they do not authorize us as necessitarianism demands of us to believe that human freedom is a sham, or that the human will is only the instrument of the divine, and not in its sphere the cause of its own acts, or that human actions are human actions only because, originating in the divine mind, they pass through the human mind and receive its cordial but necessary concurrence.

3. They authorize us to say that the all-wise Creator hates sin—hates it with a perfect abhorrence; that it, in fact, is the only thing in the universe that he does hate; yet they do not authorize us to say, as Edwards boldly says, and as necessitarianism requires

all its votaries to say, that he intentionally procured its existence among men, and all the unhappiness consequent upon it. They authorize us to say with the fullest possible assurance that God is love, but they do not authorize us to say that while he desires the happiness of a part of mankind he does not desire the happiness of others as necessitarianism teaches.

4. They authorize us to say that the revealed will of the Creator is the rule and the only rule of his administration among men; but they do not authorize us to allege that back of this revealed will there is a secret will which impels the human mind to transgress the revealed will and thereby incur the utmost unhappiness. These are a part only of the contradictions perpetrated by necessitarians in their earnest endeavor to solve the problem of moral evil and the source of human misery. Of all the schemes ever propounded it seems to me the most absurd, the most superficial, the most dishonoring to the Creator, and the most unsatisfactory to men.

5. Two postulates may here be laid down as fundamental conditions of morality.

(1) If the human mind is not free, if it is not in the true sense causative of its own acts, then no morality, no virtue, no vice, no accountability, and no retribution is possible.

(2) If the purpose of the divine administration is not the good of the subjects—the happiness of the mor-

al world—then no obedience to the rule of administration is possible, and if obedience is impossible then, of course, morality is impossible. The human mind is so constituted, designedly, of course, that its action is conditioned upon motive. It is just as impossible to act—every act is a choice—without a motive, as it is to walk without legs or speak without the organs of speech. But a motive that does not in some way appeal to the good of the agent is no motive at all; hence, obedience, from the nature of the case is impossible. But the impossibility of obedience on the part of an agent in his normal state is the impossibility of morality.

Remark: Necessitarianism in every form is incompatible with morality. A necessitated act has no moral quality. This is a self-evident proposition.

SECTION 4.—*Only rational creatures capable of a moral government.*

1. Man is a complex being. He is truly an animal, but he is more than an animal. As other animals he has an organic body furnished with five senses. He, like the other animals, is subject to fatigue from exercise, requires rest, sleep and food. He is subject to disease and death from numerous causes. He has the affections, passions, and appetites common to the animal world; also many of the instincts; is capable of anger, hatred, suffering from the apprehension of personal injury. In fact whatever is common to animals is common to man.

As an animal he in some important respects ranks first in the scale of animated nature. His erect form, his large head and expressive face distinguish him from all other animals and yet in many respects, he, as an animal, is inferior to others. His senses, unless taste is excepted, are less acute if not less discriminating. His instincts are less powerful. His infancy is more helpless and much more protracted. But whatever diversities may exist between him and other orders of animated creatures, still he is truly an animal, and as such subject to all the laws that govern animals.

2. But he is more than animal. He is a spirit incarnated, intelligent, environed with a physical organism, reason individualized and embodied, matter and pure spirit in harmonious union, hence two distinct natures united in one personality.

3. Animals, as such, know all that is necessary for the ends of their creation. To suppose otherwise is to disparage the wisdom of their Creator; but the measure of this knowledge is comparatively limited. This clearly indicates the inferiority of their destiny. Their knowledge, however, is unerring, because it is a concreation of the animal nature, is perfect from the creation of being, hence admits of no radical improvement. The young bird knows how to build her nest and feed her young as well as the old one. The young bee knows how to construct its cell as well as the old one. If an animal could live through ages, it

could no more know or do or covet or enjoy in a rational sense at the close of its life than at the beginning.

4. Some animals, principally the domestic, are tuitive or educable in a slight degree. Their acquired knowledge is manifestly not the result of ratiocination, but purely of the power of association. "The ox knoweth his owner and the ass his master's crib." A man, by various devices, may cause an animal to do certain things, and by repeated efforts may cause it to know by signs, gestures, sounds, and the like, what he wishes it to do, and by this means a habit is established which renders the animal readily subservient to the wishes of the owner.

5. The lower animals possess, however, only in a limited degree the power of adapting means to ends. In rare instances they do this outside of their ordinary instinctive power. If not reason it seems a near approximation to it. It, however, I suppose, should be considered only an approximation. Not so with man. He, while favored with a few feeble instincts, which are adequate to his necessities, is also favored with faculties capable of endless improvement in knowledge. Had Abraham lived to the present hour the patriarch would be a pupil and a learner still. Of the possibilities of human knowledge we can truthfully say, they are only less than infinite.

6. The animal desires are comparatively limited both in their number and in their range. They re-

late exclusively to sensuous gratification and present enjoyment. Animals live exclusively in the present. They experience no pleasure, no pain, no regrets on account of the experience of the past, and no hopes or apprehensions for the future. If their present wants are fully supplied they are content and in their sphere are as happy as exclusively sentient creatures can be. Their limited and non-rational capacities and the exclusively sensuous character of their enjoyments indicate pretty clearly their utter extinction ^{at} and death.

7. Many learned and good men, however, believe them to possess immortal spirits, which survive the destruction of their bodies. The notion is, perhaps, born of a generous sympathy for useful domestic animals, rather than a careful examination of the essential characteristics of the animal nature. As their enjoyment seems to consist exclusively in the gratification of sensual instinct, the destruction of their animal organism would of necessity, it seems, deprive them of all capacity for enjoyment. The existence of the (supposed) animal spirit, disconnected from a material animal organization, whence animal enjoyment could be derived, would be a calamity rather than a blessing. To be without the possibility of enjoyment is a far greater evil than not to be at all.

8. As to the idea that their utter extinction excludes the possibility of just compensation for services rendered in life, it may be suggested that perhaps

life itself, with even very meager means of gratification, may be sufficient compensation. If one is immortal, all must be so, even the most insignificant animalcule. They seem to exist one for another, mediately or immediately, largely the lower for the higher orders and all ultimately for man. With rare exceptions all seem to be happy and have full compensation for services rendered in their own enjoyments. The subject is difficult and where little is known much need not be said.

9. The superiority of the man over the mere animal consists not in physical strength nor fleetness of movement, not in power of instinct nor in accuracy of sense intuition, but alone in the faculty of reason and its correlative functions. Because of his superiority, to man is accorded the prerogative of dominion over all other animals. This right of dominion implies the right of use for his own benefit. It, however, does not imply the right of abuse or wanton destruction of them. In truth they were all made for his sake and service, as he himself was made for the service of his Creator.

10. It would be a reflection either upon the wisdom or beneficence of the Creator to suppose that any of these animals are incapable of answering the ends of their creation or that they do not in some way serve the interests of mankind. The world is not sufficiently familiar with natural history to know all their uses or how they all can possibly serve the interests

of men ; but our ignorance of their uses or how they actually serve men is not even presumptive, much less is it conclusive evidence, that they are really useless. But while it is worthy of notice that they are intended for man's good and actually render valuable service, they are also, at least many of them, capable of doing him serious injury in person or property. They, however, upon the whole are less destructive of human life and human happiness than are mankind themselves of the happiness and lives of one another. It is also noticeable that they become injurious or dangerous only when they or those injured by them are in the wrong place. It no doubt is true that the harm they may happen to do, is often occasioned by human indiscretion or carelessness. By the moral rule, however, men have full right of dominion to use them for human advantage when possible and to destroy them when necessary, being in the meantime, in this case as in all others, responsible for the manner in which they use this high prerogative.

II. Because of the difference in the man and the mere animal, what is a crime in man is not a crime in the animal. For animals to destroy property of any kind as poultry or flocks and herds, or fruits, or crops of any sort is a calamity to the owner, but not a crime in the animal ; but for a human being to destroy the property of another or steal, or get it by force or by fraud is of course a calamity to the owner and a

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crime to the perpetrator. For an animal to destroy human life is a calamity but not a crime in the animal. But for a human being to destroy with forethought and intention such a life is murder, one of the highest offenses known to criminal and moral law. In the light of these facts it is not difficult to understand why moral quality is predicable of the actions of rational creatures and why it is not predicable of those of irrational creatures; why a man is accountable for his acts and why his horse is not; why the former is a proper subject of moral retribution and why the latter is not.*

* We observe great differences among animals of the same species and even of the same varieties. These differences relate not only to form, size, color, and symmetry but also to temper, disposition, tractability, natural courage, ferociousness, cunning, cautiousness, etc. These variations are all the product of adequate causes. Some of these causes are natural, among which are the wonderful laws of heredity, often differentiating progeny from the immediate ancestry, now improving and now deteriorating it. Some of these causes are artificial or the result of culture and skill, especially in taking advantage of the laws of heredity. Strictly analogous to these diversities in the animal world are the differences among men, the causes being in many respects the same, in other respects analogous, for man possesses a veritable animal nature, and as such is affected by the same influences such as climate, altitude, location, the laws of heredity, etc., that modify and produce differences in the irrational animal world. Hence, the marvelous difference between different nationalities and families of men. But we also observe marked physical differences among men of the same nationality, of the same community, and even of the same family; and, of course, under the same natural agencies. These differences

are referable chiefly, perhaps exclusively, to vocation, heredity, physical, and moral habits.

1. Heredity deals with the intellectual, æsthetical, and the moral, as well and as inevitably as it does with the physical. The same invincible law that reproduces in a form more or less modified the physical likeness of the progenitor in the progeny, also reproduces with similar modifications the intellectual, the æsthetical, and the moral likeness. These modifications may be for the better or for the worse. If persistently for the worse, a few generations will blot the family from the earth. If these modifications are uniformly or even generally for the better there will be a corresponding improvement physically, intellectually, æsthetically, and morally, in the posterity. Occupation and amount and character of exercise, physical and mental, exert a modifying power over the laws of heredity, and produce good or bad effects upon the man.

2. Moral habits exert a still more powerful influence upon these hereditary laws. Correct moral habits give in the progeny a nobler type of manhood, physically, intellectually, and morally than was in the ancestor; but bad moral habits disparage in the child the manhood of its ancestor, desymmetrize, deface, and brutalize, dwarf the intellect, pervert the taste, vitiate the already vicious moral nature. These are God's inexorable laws, written all over human nature and revealed in his word—God in nature visiting the iniquities of the father upon the children, and showing mercy to thousands of generations of them that love him and keep his commandments.

CHAPTER IV.

NO ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT FREEDOM.

[PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.—The doctrine of human accountability presupposes the freedom of the will, but the doctrine of the will has been previously discussed at length in the author's work on Psychology, and is therefore here omitted, except in so far as it is necessarily involved in the discussion of accountability.]

1. The freedom of the human mind is generally regarded as the ground, and as the only sufficient ground, of accountability. Hence, all who deny accountability do not hesitate to deny freedom in every form; and generally those who deny freedom in every sense of the word most vehemently deny all accountability; and if freedom is the only conceivable ground of accountability, then denial of all accountability seems to be logical and in every way proper. But Luther, Calvin, and many others persistently deny the freedom of the will, yet hold fast to the doctrine of accountability. They held that Adam was created both free and accountable, but by disobedience lost his freedom; but was not on this account released from his accountability.

2. It certainly is absurd to say that any rational creature can, by any voluntary act, especially an act

of rebellion, release himself from accountability. This would be equivalent to saying that accountability is purely a voluntary matter, or that it is a matter of choice as to whether or not we shall be accountable for any thing. Such a doctrine would nullify all obligation and render all government, both human and divine, impossible. On the contrary to say that man is not free, that his volitions are inevitable to him, and yet that he is accountable—is rewardable or punishable for his acts—as some of the reformers said, seems to be no less absurd.

3. The chief difficulty in the case results from the confounding of two ideas essentially distinct, viz., *freedom* and *ability*. If Luther and others had said that Adam was created free and accountable and by disobedience lost, not his freedom, but his ability to love God, and his neighbor as himself, they would have stated a simple, common-sense truth, and the absurdity of their position would have been avoided. We know that a man can not, by a voluntary act, make void an obligation, and we know with equal certainty that he can by such an act, destroy his ability to discharge an obligation. A man by dissipation, or otherwise, can not make void his obligation to provide for his family; yet he may by such a course, destroy his ability to do so. Here we have obligation but no ability. But this is a voluntary or self-originated inability—an ability destroyed by the necessary effects of a voluntary act or series of acts.

4. The act does not destroy the freedom of the agent, for he is just as free to act after having destroyed his ability as before, otherwise he could not even repeat the act by which he destroyed his own ability. To say that such a one is free to choose evil but not good is a contradiction, for it confounds freedom and necessity, and requires a choice without an alternative, which is a contradiction. We therefore conclude that to destroy our ability to discharge a given obligation by our own voluntary action does not destroy our freedom, nor does it release us from accountability.

5. But while voluntary or self-originated inability can not release us from obligation, involuntary inability does excuse. The only rational and defensible rule of morality seems to be this, that freedom is the only basis of accountability, hence no freedom no accountability, and the measure of ability is the measure of accountability. All rational creatures are equally free and consequently are accountable. But all have not the same measure of ability, hence all have not the same measure of accountability. The man of one talent is as truly accountable as is the man of five talents, but not to the same extent. Each is required to render according to what he has—that is, according to his ability—and not according to what he has not. Freedom, then, it is very clear, gives the only ground, and ability, except when it is destroyed by an abuse of freedom, gives the measure,

of accountability. This principle is contravened by those who deny freedom and ability and yet assert responsibility. But how can any creature be held responsible for not doing what he never had either freedom or ability to perform? Physical inability, it is universally admitted, excuses from all responsibility and from all guilt. Why moral inability, so-called, which is no less fatal in its results, should not excuse can not be satisfactorily explained.

6. The doctrine of accountability without freedom and ability, is not a dictum of the intuitive reason or common sense, but is a logical inference from the assumption that a rational creature can be made, without his own consent, to participate in the criminality of another; hence it is maintained that all men, without their own voluntary consent, are involved in guilt and are justly denied the freedom and ability with which the first man was endowed. The argument relied upon in support of the doctrine is substantially this: all evil, both physical and moral, all suffering, is penal and implies guilt in the sufferer, but all human beings are subject to both physical and moral evil, therefore all are guilty. But moral inability is itself an evil and is the inevitable consequence of guilt, hence we have accountability without any freedom or ability. Whatever plausibility there may be in the argument, arises out of the assumption, that all suffering of every kind implies guilt in the sufferer. This assumption is demonstrably false. Suf-

fering and innocence are not incompatible things. The doctrine fails to discriminate between participation in the merit or demerit of another's act and participation in the possible consequences of such an act. If we can not participate in the evil consequences of the wrong act of another, without also participating in the guilt or demerit of that act, then we, of course, can not participate in the good consequences of another's right or virtuous act without participating in the right or virtuous act itself. If one member of this proposition is true, the other is necessarily true. But this confounds acts and their consequences. It also confounds different individualities, and makes the act of one man equally the act of all that are affected for good or for evil by it; but this, it is manifest, would render all equitable governments, both human and divine, impossible.

7. No fact is more fully established by observation and experience than that the innocent do suffer on account of the guilty. If all suffering is penal and implies guilt as the theory assumes then when one man commits a murder all those affected by sympathy or otherwise are equally guilty, equally deserve to be punished. On the contrary we know with absolute certainty that much of our comfort and happiness consist in participation in the good consequences of the right and virtuous acts of others, without our participating in any sense in the merit of these acts. If this is not so, then every man is from necessity, the

author, at least in part, of every blessing that he enjoys, and, at the same time, the author in part of every evil he suffers; or, which is the same thing, it confounds the benefactor and the beneficiary and makes man equally his own destroyer and his own deliverer, than which nothing can be more absurd. In the light of the theory in hand, our relation to the disobedience of the first man is utterly unintelligible and inexplicable, also our relation to the second Adam, for it inevitably follows that if we are in any sense participants in the demerit of the first, then we are equally participants in the merits of the second.

8. But if we discard the absurd figment that all suffering is penal and implies guilt in the sufferer, and admit that under the wise and beneficent administration of the Creator one man may be affected for good or ill by the virtuous or vicious acts of another, we can then find some intelligible ground for accountability and a true morality; we can then see how all men can be involved in the fearful consequences of the first Adam's disobedience, without being actual participants in his guilt, and on the other hand, how all men can be and are participants in the consequences of the second Adam's obedience without being participants in that obedience.

9. Another question in this connection deserves a brief notice. Are not all men so involved in the evil consequences of the first man's disobedience as to be destitute of all ability to love their neighbor as them-

selves? This is certainly true, but it should never be forgotten that their relation to the second Adam was synchronal to that of the first; and while they lose ability to good by virtue of their relation to the first, they also receive a more than compensating ability from the second. This was certainly true even of the first man himself, who had forfeited his natural or concreated ability by his own voluntary action; and was, at least, equally true of his posterity who were deprived of ability without their own consent. This gracious ability given in the second Adam is not so complete in its conceptions, as is the natural or concreated ability, but is capable of enlargement and not so liable to forfeiture, and is therefore far more valuable than the natural and gives as valid grounds for responsibility.

10. In the light of these facts it is sufficiently evident that there can be no such thing as responsibility for human action, without a corresponding ability except where the latter is destroyed by our own voluntary action, in which case there can be no charge of injustice against the divine government. Responsibility without ability is in such cases, and in such cases only, perfectly compatible with justice and morality. The debauchee, who has voluntarily destroyed his ability to resist evil, is justly responsible for his vices. Hence, we see a man may suffer greatly and in various ways by the acts of others but can never suffer as a criminal by such acts. He may also

be greatly blessed in various ways by the acts of others, but the fact that such blessings are the product of other wills than his own excludes from him the merit of their authorship.

There seems, in view of all these facts, no reasonable ground for the singular position assumed by Luther, Calvin, and many others, that men have neither freedom nor ability to any thing good, and yet are truly and justly accountable.*

* Two points deserve to be noticed :

1. Practically and theologically it is a matter of no consequence whether we say that men inherit both guilt and depravity from the first man, or that they inherit depravity only, for depravity leads to guilt, but no man is responsible for Adam's disobedience and no man perishes because of it. If any perish, it is simply because they reject overtures of life. Theoretically it is important to discriminate between guilt and depravity, because if we predicate guilt without voluntary action, we destroy the possibility of accountability and morality, and impute injustice to the divine administration.

2. The second fact to be noticed is this. If all men are denied freedom and ability because of the disobedience of the first man, only a part receive compensating ability because of the obedience of the second Adam. Then injustice is done to the part not provided for. This would be to subject an innumerable multitude to hopeless perdition not for any guilt of their own, but for that of one man. No theory of morality can possibly justify such a procedure.

CHAPTER V.

THE MORAL FACULTY.

SECTION I.—*Terms employed.*

1. As there can be no morality without freedom, so there can be none without the power of discriminating between what is right and what is wrong. Such a faculty is attributed to men by all who admit the doctrine of moral distinction. It is variously called the "moral sense," "moral faculty," "moral judgment," "faculty of moral perception," "susceptibility of moral emotions," and "conscience."

2. These different terms are indiscriminately used to express the power of discriminating between rightness and wrongness in moral agency. The existence of such a faculty scarcely admits of a rational doubt but, as will be seen, this faculty is not appropriately called conscience, nor susceptibility of moral emotion. The moral sense, the moral faculty, the moral judgment, the moral perception, are forms expressive of the same faculty; so the form "susceptibility of moral emotion" and the word conscience express exactly the same thing; viz., the emotional concomitant of the judgment in its affirmations of right and wrong. What will be said in this connection, together with what has been said of consciousness and

intuition of moral distinctions in the author's work on Psychology, will, it is hoped, set this question in a light sufficiently clear.

3. Some writers speak of the moral sense as if it were something adventitious, or something added to the mind for special purposes. We, however, should regard it as something indigenous to mind, without which mind ceases to be mind. The moral faculty is, therefore, not something different from the natural judgment, but simply the natural judgment concerned with moral questions. The word moral is applied to the word faculty not to distinguish it from some other faculty, but to designate the character of the subject with which it is concerned.

SECTION 2.—*Different theories.*

Those who choose to deny all moral distinctions find no place in their schemes of psychology for a conscience, but finding the word, and having in their philosophy nothing to which to apply it, they generally persuade themselves that it must mean some *indefinable sort of sympathy* of which men in society are susceptible. Among those who assert the reality of moral distinctions the following theories are the more prominent:

I.—*The educational theory.*

1. Archbishop Paley and many others assert the educational theory, and support it with some specious arguments. The theory may be very briefly stated thus: A son without provocation betrayed his father

to his enemies and thus occasioned his death. "Now," says Paley, "the question is whether, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage and without experience and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and consequently under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, whether, I say, such a one would feel, upon the relation, any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of the son's conduct which we feel, or not. They who maintain the existence of a moral sense of innate maxims, of a natural conscience, that the love of virtue and the hatred of vice are instinctive, or the perception of right and wrong intuitive (all of which are only different ways of expressing the same truth), affirm that he would. They who deny the existence of a moral sense, etc., affirm that he would not; and upon this, issue is joined."

2. Denying the doctrine of innate ideas, Paley could not admit an intuitive conscience or moral sense. Hence, he could refer our sense of right and wrong to education alone. He supports his position with an array of facts and cogent reasoning which his opponents have often replied to but never fully answered. The invulnerable part of his argument is found in what he says against the intuitional theory as it is generally asserted. What he says in support of his own theory is specious but essentially fallacious.

(1) The radical errors in the theory are, first, the assumption that because men are not born with innate ideas, or the knowledge of fundamental truths, they are destitute of all susceptibility of such knowledge except by education; hence, that the knowledge of right and wrong is not intuitively given in any sense. It does not follow that, because a child is born without innate ideas, it may not when reason is developed, intuitively know that every effect must have a cause, or that the whole is equal to its parts, or that human motives have moral qualities, as right or wrong. Such intuition, however, relates only to abstract truth and never to truth in the concrete. We intuitively know that every effect has a cause, but we can not intuitively know the cause of every particular effect.

The radical error of the opposite theory consists in the assumption that the intuition of right and wrong includes equally and alike the knowledge of the right, both in the abstract and in the concrete, which is just as absurd as it would be to hold that because we know that all effects have causes, then we must intuitively know the causes of all the effects that come within our knowledge.

(2) A second defect in Paley's argument is the assumption that education, etc., can, in some way, originate a new faculty or susceptibility in the mind. Education may develop the potentialities of the mind, but can originate no new faculties. This is self-evident.

(3) Thirdly, the theory presupposes the very thing, in one form, to which it is opposed; viz., the existence of intuitive knowledge. The discursive—that which is acquired by the reason—always, both in the realms of matter and mind, presupposes the intuitive. We reason from the known to the unknown, and not from the unknown to the known.

(4) Fourthly, if the knowledge of right is given primarily by education, who was the first teacher, and where or how did he get his knowledge? The theory, as we have seen, comprises some truth and some error, but as a theory is essentially false.

II.—*The intuitive theory.*

Intuition is an act of the mind by which a truth is immediately or directly known, without reflection or reasoning or inference, as we know natural things by sense perception, as that the grass is green or the honey sweet. Those that hold that the mind thus directly cognizes right and wrong, are called intuitionists. While they agree as to the fact or principle of intuition, they disagree as to what faculty of the mind it is that thus directly gives the knowledge of right and wrong; as to whether it is the work of a simple faculty or two or more faculties acting conjunctly.

1. Some allege that this knowledge of moral distinctions is an intuition of intellect alone. This, as we shall see, is with a certain limitation, evidently the true theory.

2. Others assert that the cognition of right and wrong is an intuitive function of the sensibilities. This theory attributes to the sensibilities the functions of intellect, or the power of cognition. It also reverses the relation between knowledge and feeling. We know, if we know any thing of the laws of mind, that knowledge conditions feeling and feeling never conditions knowledge. If I say that I feel that I know, I mean that my feeling bears witness to my knowledge, or proves its existence.

3. A third class assert that the cognition of right and wrong is a function of the will. This attributes cognate power to the will whose activities are exclusively volitional—never intellective or emotional.

4. A fourth class make the moral judgment, improperly called conscience, a complex faculty, comprising intellect and sensibility. This involves the absurdity of complex faculties. It makes sensibility which is the psychological sequence of intellect, a co-ordinate factor of intellect itself. This destroys the faculty itself, for confessedly there can be no feeling, or thought, or intellect, and no knowledge of right and wrong without prior feeling.

5. Other intuitionists make the moral faculty triplex, comprising intellect, sensibility, and will. This theory blots out all distinctions between the radical faculties of the mind. Its extravagance is sufficiently apparent from the generally admitted fact that though these faculties act simultaneously,

yet they are distinct, and sustain to each other the relation of antecedent and sequence. If this is true, then of course no moral judgment is possible, because no mental act can be conditioned upon its consequences, sensibility and the will both being the sequences of the judgment.

Leaving these palpable discrepancies in these intuitionist theories to the tender mercies of their respective supporters, let us briefly consider the intuitional scheme of morals as it is generally presented by its stanchest advocates.

III.—*Dr. Alexander's opinions.*

1. He says (*Moral Science*, p. 19), "As all men when reason is developed have a faculty by which they can discern objects of sight which are beautiful and those which are deformed, so all men possess the power of discerning a difference between actions as to their moral quality. The judgment thus formed is immediate and has no relation to the usefulness or injuriousness to human happiness, of the objects contemplated." He says (p. 20), "In cases of flagrant injustice or ingratitude all men of every country and every age agree in their judgment of their moral evil. There is in regard to such actions no more difference in the judgment of men than respecting the color of grass and the taste of honey." In these quotations, the instinctive knowledge of right and wrong is very strongly asserted and illustrated by the sense intuition of color and taste. I intuitively know that the

grass is green and the honey sweet, so I intuitively know that this act is right and that one wrong. This is the intuitive theory as generally held.

2. Dr. Alexander attempts a reply to Archbishop Paley which is wholly inadequate. He says (p. 23), "A human being, arrived at adult age, without instruction or communication with others, would be—as it relates to the mind—in a state differing very little from that of infancy. It is not held that the moral sense will be exercised without the usual means by which human faculties are developed. . . . If a human being were brought up from early infancy in a dark dungeon and if no information were communicated to him, the mental faculties would not be developed, and it would be absurd to have recourse to such a one to ascertain what faculties belong to the human mind." I have not made these quotations to controvert their truth, but only to show how completely intuitionists of this school shift position when confronted by the solid facts of their opponents. Dr. Alexander here fairly surrenders the fundamental principle in his theory. He undertakes to prove intuitive knowledge, but when confronted by a formidable difficulty, sets it aside by conceding it—that is, the mind must be cultivated, taught; information must be communicated. This is every thing for which Paley contended.

3. Again, says Dr. Alexander (p. 24), "Another objection to the historical fact adduced by Dr. Paley is

that it presents to the mind, not a case of simple unmixed good or evil, but a complex case in which, before a judgment can be formed of the action of the son, it must be decided whether a man ought to be governed by a regard to the welfare of a parent or to the public good." Here again Dr. Alexander makes the tuitive judgment take the place of the intuitive. Does intuition reach its conclusions by investigation or reasoning? If so then it is no longer intuitive but ratiocinative.

The characteristical difference between tuitive and intuitive knowledge I have elsewhere given, and more need not be said.

IV.—*Dr. Dabney's notion of conscience.*

1. He asks (page 111): "Are moral distinctions intrinsic, and are they intuitively perceived? We have now passed in review all the several theories which answer no, and found them untenable, hence, alone, we derive a strong probability that the affirmative is the true answer. . . . So if the idea of rightness in acts is not identical with that of truth, nor utility, nor benevolence, nor self-love, nor love of applause, nor sympathetic harmony, nor any other original sentiment, it must be received directly by an original moral power in the soul."

2. These statements seem to assert that the knowledge of right and wrong is both intuitive and universal, or universally intuitive. But our author elsewhere tells us he does not mean to be so under-

stood. He says (page 112): "But understand me, I do not assert that all moral distinctions in particular acts are intuitively seen or necessarily seen. As in propositions, some have primary and deductive truths, some seem to be true without premises, and some by the help of premises, so in acts having moral qualities, the rightness or wrongness of some is seen immediately, and of some deductively."

3. Of course some truths may be known intuitively, as that two and two make four, and other truths, deductively, as that all men are mortal. The particular point of noteworthiness is the adroitness with which our author puts himself on both sides of the issue between the educationalists and the intuitionists. This unique position suggests the question, Is Dr. Dabney an intuitionist or an educationalist? The exact disagreement from Paley seems to be this: Paley denies all intuition; Dabney denies some intuition and asserts some. Similar is his agreement and disagreement with Alexander, who asserts universal intuition, which Dabney denies. He being judge, Alexander is as far wrong as Paley. Why is he so severe on Paley's shortcomings and so charitable to those of Alexander? May it not be so that while his heart is really with Alexander, the exigencies of the intuitive theory compel him to concede that the knowledge of the rightness of some particular acts is deductive, not intuitive? If this is so of some acts, why not so of all? If not so of all, why so of some?

To say there are different modes of knowing the moral qualities of particular actions is simply unscientific and illogical, violating the law of parsimony. If our author had attempted to specify those moral truths which may be known "*deductively*" as distinguished from those known intuitively, or "*immediately*," I think he would have withdrawn from his unique position, and put himself squarely either with Paley or Alexander.

4. Paley was oppressed with a similar difficulty. He clearly saw that if the moral quality of every act is intuitively known, then it necessarily follows (1) that every man would have in his own intuition an infallible standard of moral rectitudes, and (2) that as all men have the same intuitive faculties, all would have exactly the same opinions of what is right and wrong. He knew that neither of these propositions is true, and he was too logical to allow different modes of knowing the qualities of acts. Hence, he rejected *in toto* the intuitionist theory and advocated the educational scheme very much to the prejudice of the truth.

5. The fatal error in both schemes consists in making the intuitive judgment include the knowledge of right both in the abstract and in the concrete, as elsewhere seen. The intuitive judgment gives the concrete in relation to no other subject; why, then, should it be assumed to do so in relation to morals, especially where the assumption involves interminable contradictions?

6. Dr. Dabney makes conscience a composite faculty including judgment and feeling. Whether he means the tuitive or intuitive judgment he does not tell us. Consistency, however, would require him to say sometimes the one and sometimes the other judgment is intended, according as the perception of the right is mediate or immediate. The subject of composite faculties is elsewhere considered.

V. *Dr. Gregory's views of conscience.*

1. He, like most others, uses the words "conscience," "moral faculty," "moral nature" interchangeably. This seems to make conscience include the functions of intellect, sensibility, and will, or to be the conjoint action of all the mental faculties in relation to moral questions. This assumes it to be a triplex faculty which, we have seen, involves an absurdity.

2. Dr. Gregory proclaims himself an uncompromising intuitionist, having no patience with any other school. He says (Christian Ethics, page 86): "*These moral judgments intuitive and permanent.*—These moral judgments are not mere uncertain generalizations from experience, but intuitive and self-evident principles. The moral agent, in his normal condition, immediately and intuitively discerns the rightness of them and their binding force on himself and all other like agents, now and always, in this world and in all worlds."

(1) This is the most extravagant view of conscience

I have ever seen. It "discerns the rightness" of actions and principles *intuitively*—that is, directly, without reflection or discursive thought, as a man knows white from black, or a pleasant from a painful sensation. This is contradicted by universal experience.

(2) "These moral judgments," it is said, are "permanent." Did any sane man ever live who did not find it necessary to change his opinions of the rightness of particular acts and principles?

(3) "The moral agent immediately and intuitively discerns their binding force on himself." If a man either intuitively or intuitively discerns a thing to be right, he feels himself bound to do that thing, otherwise human nature would be a contradiction in itself. But to know what is right in any given case, and to feel bound to do the right are radically different things.

(4) The supreme extravagance of the doctrine appears in the following statements: "The moral agent immediately and intuitively discerns their [moral judgments'] binding force on . . . all other like agents, now and always, in this world and in all worlds." If all this is true then no man can be in a state of uncertainty as to what is right in any possible case, or in a state of doubt in reference to any duty; hence, all revelation and all tuition—all reasoning and investigation—concerning right and duty are simply useless; for certainly all tuition, all reason-

ing, is superfluous in regard to things immediately or intuitively known.

3. Dr. Gregory, however, seems to think that the intuitive needs to be supplemented by the intuitive, the direct by the indirect, the immediate by mediate, the self-evident by the non-self-evident. He says (page 87): "*These moral judgments made clearer with man's elevation.*—It is obvious . . . that these moral principles will be clear to the agent in proportion to his moral enlightenment. Accordingly, it is found that there are vestiges of these principles found in all men who are at all developed morally. . . . In proportion as the agent reaches a more complete moral development, these principles are always more clearly and fully recognized." In these and many other statements that might be cited, Dr. Gregory as distinctly affirms the educational and non-intuitional nature of the moral sense as he, on page 86, asserts the intuitive theory. The two statements are just as contradictory as are the words tuitional and intuitional, direct and indirect, self-evident and non-self-evident; for the expressions "made clearer with man's elevation," "clear to the agent in proportion to his moral enlightenment," "developed morally," "as the agent reaches a more complete moral development," all logically deny intuitive knowledge and involve the idea of knowledge intuitively acquired.

4. Dr. Gregory evidently involves himself in these palpable contradictions by failing to apprehend pre-

cisely what is given by intuition and what is given by intuition. Both are the knowledge of moral distinctions, but in essentially different senses—the former in the abstract alone, and the latter in the concrete alone. Had he made this distinction and adhered to it, he would have avoided his contradictions. He then would have truthfully said, We intuitively know that all acts are either right or wrong, but know only intuitively what particular acts are right and what wrong.

5. Dr. Gregory improperly confounds development and education, or what he calls development is properly education. Being in fact a necessitarian, he may believe every thought, feeling, and act to be simply a development of an inlaid germ; but we accept no such philosophy. These terms are sometimes loosely used as interchangeable. In philosophical discussions, they should be discriminated. Development is simply the unfolding of what is infolded. The acorn develops into the oak; the child, into the man. The process is a growth, an enlargement of capacity, by expanding germinal forces, native to the mind. The mind of the infant is undeveloped, but the adult mind, whether educated or uneducated, is a developed mind. The difference between a savage and a civilized man is a difference, not of development, but of culture or education. Development gives capacity to the mind, but puts nothing into it except its rational intuitions. Cultivation, education, or the

tuitive reason, furnishes us with the sum of its knowledge, other than that given it by intuition. The knowledge given by the intuitive reason is as perfect and reliable when we first become conscious of it as it ever is. Culture, education, development, in Dr. Gregory's misuse of the terms, can not increase, or lessen, or in any way modify it. It neither admits of proof, nor requires any. It is as perfect in the savage as in the civilized man, in the five-year-old boy as in the philosopher. One knows just as well as the other that a part is less than the whole, or that the whole includes all the parts. Dr. Gregory certainly contradicts the fundamental principle of the intuitive theory when he conditions the intuitions of moral distinctions upon culture, education, or his wrong use of the word development.

6. Dr. Gregory is unmercifully severe on Archbishop Paley because he asserted educationalism. He says (page 75): "Paley, in putting his famous case of the wild boy, has shown either an utter ignorance of the structure of man's nature, or an utter regardlessness for truth." Paley certainly was no ignoramus, and Dr. Gregory has no right to attribute to him either ignorance or knavery. Though wrong in his general theory, he has the merit of self-consistency, which Dr. Gregory mercilessly sacrifices. If the knowledge of moral distinctions is purely educational, then, of course, the wild boy did not have it. Paley's argument does not prove that a savage, such as he

describes, has no idea of moral distinctions in any sense. He might have such an idea without being able to say what act is right and what wrong; or, possibly, such a person might live and die without even being conscious of such an idea; for it is possibly true that an intuitive judgment is never formed except some sense of perception furnishes the occasion of formation. The child, perhaps, might never have an idea of causation, or regard its acts as causative, did it not perceive their effects. Probably no intuitive judgment on any subject ever is formed, unless some event furnishes an occasion for it. A son's treachery to a father might prove that the son did not cognize right in the concrete or that he did not know that treachery is wrong; but this would not prove that he had no intuitive perception in the abstract, any more than would his ignorance of a particular sound prove that he does not know that all effects have causes.

7. Dr. Gregory in his reply to Paley's argument, logically surrenders his own theory, and by fair implication, concedes the educational. He says: "Such a being [as Paley's savage] would be little if any above an idiot unable to follow the plainest steps of reasoning, or to discern in the simplest cases between right and wrong." If savages are "little, if any, above idiots—unable to reason and to discern in the simplest cases between right and wrong," then they are, confessedly, incapable of morality and moral retribu-

tion. If they ever become able to discern in the simplest cases between right and wrong, it must be by education, or influence from without, for manifestly there is no other method by which the adult savage could become able to discern between right and wrong. This is exactly the doctrine for which Paley contends, and, strange to say, is also the doctrine which Dr. Gregory formally denies, but here logically concedes. To affirm that right and wrong are intuitively known, and also affirm that an adult savage can not discern between right and wrong in any sense, even in the simplest cases, is to affirm and deny the same thing. Again and again does Dr. Gregory put himself in this humiliating position. He seems to lose sight of the antagonism or difference between the deductive and intuitive, the direct and the indirect, and actually conditions the intuitive. We intuitively know the right, but we must first be developed intellectually, cultivated, instructed, educated, more or less, in order to know the right intuitively. We might just as well say a man must first be taught how to use his eyes or ears in order to see the sun or hear the thunder.

8. After all, what is the precise point of difference between Paley and Gregory? It seems to be chiefly this: Paley makes the actual cognition of moral distinctions the result of education, or of influences exerted upon the rational mind, while Gregory makes the actual cognition of right the act of the intuitive

reason conditioned upon the enlightened reason, upon culture or education. Practically, there seems to be, so far as this particular point is concerned, no difference. Both practically put the savage in the same condition. Both are fundamentally wrong, but Paley the more self-consistent.

SECTION 7.—*Dr. Haven's theory of the moral sense.*

1. Haven is a decided intuitionist. Having denied to the sensibilities, and also to the discursive judgment, the capacity of cognizing right and wrong, he is pleased to find it in intuition. He says (*Mental Philosophy*, page 312): "The ideas in question are *intuitive* suggestions or perceptions of the *reason*. The view now proposed may be thus stated: It is the office of reason to discern the right and wrong as well as the true and false, the beautiful and the reverse." This statement is clear enough, and substantially true, so far as right and wrong are concerned. When we witness an act of a rational being, we intuitively conceive the act to be either right or wrong, but we do not intuitively know whether it is right or wrong. It is the office of the intuitive faculties of the judgment alone to discriminate between the right and wrong, to affirm this act right and that one wrong.

2. This fact Dr. Haven seems, in some of his statements, fully to recognize, but in other statements he makes the whole mental process intuitive, and by so doing involves his whole theory in obscurity. He

says: "In like circumstances they [the civilized and the uncivilized] recognize the same distinctions and exhibit the same emotions. At the story or the sight of some flagrant injustice and wrong, the child and the savage are not less indignant than the philosopher." Here Dr. Haven makes the whole mental process purely intuitive, no part of it ratiocinative. He seems, withal, to be quite unconscious of begging the whole question in the interest of intuition and, consequently, of uniformity of judgment. This he does by the use of the words, "in like circumstances," and "some flagrant injustice and wrong." Of course the child and the savage as well as the philosopher would be indignant at a flagrant (flaming, notorious) injustice and wrong; but all this has nothing to do with the question whether the child and the savage know as well as the philosopher what is a "flagrant injustice and wrong." This is the question which Dr. Haven has here in hand and to which he ought to have addressed himself; but he proves in lieu of it the simple fact that the generic idea of right is intuitively given and is therefore universal. To attempt to prove one thing and prove something like it or something inseparable from it, is a very common method of deceiving one's self and others. I do not know exactly what is intended by the adjunct "in like circumstances." Truly like circumstances are favorable to uniformity of judgment concerning the right and wrong of individual acts. But I do not perceive how the child, the savage,

and the philosopher, can be "in like circumstances" in relation to "some flagrant injustice and wrong."

3. Dr. Haven, in common with his school of intuitionists generally, proves very fully and satisfactorily the universality of the idea of right and wrong, and then takes it for granted that he has proved that the mind intuitively discriminates between the right and the wrong. In other words, he confounds intuition and ratiocination.

4. Dr. Haven has proven in a most satisfactory manner "that we have a moral faculty" which he identifies with conscience. This is the vice of the whole intuitionist school to which he belongs, as will be shown elsewhere. One instance of this vice I will briefly notice. In his "Analysis of an Act of Conscience," he finds the following elements: "(1) The mental perception that a given act is right or wrong; (2) the perception of obligation with respect to the same as right or wrong; (3) the perception of merit or demerit and the consequent approbation or censure of the agent as doing the right or the wrong thus perceived; (4) accompanying these intellectual perceptions and based upon them, certain corresponding emotions varying in intensity according to the clearness of the mental perception and the purity of the moral nature."

(1) Of course all these elements of conscience concur in what our author terms an act of conscience in approving a right act and condemning a wrong one.

Now, where does conscience register its decisions? Somewhere in the mind, of necessity. It is not upon the intellect nor upon the will, for these respectively give and execute the judgments. Then it must be upon the sensibility. But the sensibility is, according to the analysis, an element in the judgment. This clearly confounds an element of conscience with the effect of an act of conscience, or, which is the same thing, an element of the faculty is the effect of its action. If (a) represent the intellect, and (b) the sensibility, and (c) the conscience, then the action of (c) in approving and condemning is an effect upon (b); an element of conscience acts upon itself, ^{on} of sensibility upon the sensibility. This shows the absurdity of Dr. Haven's analysis.

(2) We moreover know that emotion or feeling is the philosophical result of intellection, or thought, alone; is neither in whole or in part the sequence of emotion. Dr. Haven distinctly recognizes this fact, and yet a false theory compels him to make feeling a factor in the antecedent of feeling. This vice is inherent in his theory of conscience. If he will distinguish between the moral faculty and conscience, and posit conscience in the sensibilities, as a natural and necessary sequence of intellection, thought, or judgment, on moral questions, he will free his theory from this and other absurdities.

(3) Our author in his "Analysis of an Act of Conscience," makes it consist simply in the mind's dealing

with the question of right and wrong. If he had called his analysis an analysis of the moral faculty, he would have been substantially right; but to confound conscience and the moral faculty is to make a part equal to the whole. Judas betrayed innocent blood. His judgment condemned the act, remorse of conscience was the natural and inevitable sequence, but remorse is a feeling, an emotion, an impression upon the sensibilities. This is easy of comprehension and as such commends itself to the intelligence. Judas did what his judgment affirmed to be an enormous sin, and the terrible shock upon his sensibilities killed him, or conscience killed him.

(4) Another defect of Dr. Haven's analysis is its artificiality. The analysis comprises six distinct elements or factors. Three are perceptions or judgments, and three different emotions, or kinds of emotions:

1. The perception that a given act is right or wrong.
2. The corresponding emotion.
3. The perception of obligation.
4. The emotion arising out of this perception.
5. The perception of merit and demerit.
6. The emotion arising out of this perception.

a. This is fine system-building; but where did Dr. Haven get his materials? From his imagination or from his consciousness? From his imagination, I think. Does any man's consciousness discriminatively avouch the presence and distinct character of every one of these elements in an act of consciousness,

so-called? Some persons may be more expert than others in reading consciousness. But I think consciousness reveals to most persons only the perception that this act is right, that one wrong; and along with this and inseparable from it, the perception of duty.

b. Right and duty are correlatives and as inseparable as cause and effect. Duty implies the right and right inevitably suggests duty. They are not distinguishable in consciousness, nor are their emotional responses. Would any man say that he is conscious of a difference between the emotions that arise respectively out of the perception of right and the perception of duty?

c. Again, what is the difference between right and merit, or between wrong and demerit? Is not the right of necessity the meritorious, and the wrong the demeritorious? If I should say an act is right because it is meritorious, who could disprove the proposition? Or if I should say an act is meritorious because it is right, who could deny it? These propositions are in fact truisms and unify the right and meritorious and their contraries. If they are identical then of course the mind can not perceive a difference between them. This would be to perceive what does not exist.

d. This may seem a small matter. Be it so. My reason for noticing it is the important fact that the more the questions of right and conscience are in-

cumbered with the pure creations of the imagination, the more difficult are they of comprehension and a satisfactory statement. And it is certainly true that no subjects have been more abused by the inventions of the imagination than have those in question.

c. Dr. Haven's three distinct perceptions as elements of an act of conscience are fairly reducible to one, and his three distinct emotions, of course, all resolve themselves into one.

5. Dr. Haven expressly concedes the fallibility of his intuitive conscience. He says, "It does not follow from this, however, nor do we affirm that conscience is infallible, that she [?] never errs. . . . There is not one of the faculties of the human mind that is not liable to err. Not one of its activities is infallible. The reasoning power sometimes errs; the judgment errs; the memory errs. The moral faculty is on the same footing in this respect with any and all other faculties." (Mental Philosophy, p. 326.) If an intuitive faculty is on the same footing in regard to liability to err with any and all other faculties then what is the difference between an intuitive and an educable faculty, both being equally liable to error? If this is true, what ground have we for confidence in primitive truths? How do I know that I am to-day the same person that I was yesterday? And after all that has been said about the reliability of intuitive judgments, may it not be true that effects produce themselves? Dr. Haven elsewhere fully recognizes

the distinction between an intuitive faculty and an educable one. Then he was pleading for the reliability of primitive truths, the foundation of human knowledge. But now he is apologizing for the blank incongruities of his hypothetical conscience. He here either logically surrenders the intuitional element in his scheme of conscience or else flatly contradicts himself. This tergiversation in the interest of a false theory leaves the reader in very great doubt as to what his theory really is; for now it is this, and now that. A child of ten years old knows that there is a difference between an intuitive and an acquired truth. The child intuitively knows that the sun shines, but does not know intuitively why it rises and sets. The first truth is given by intuition; the second, is given by the reasoning faculty. Yet Dr. Haven tells us that these distinct faculties are on the same footing—equally liable to error.

6. Dr. Haven says, "The truth is conscience is no more infallible than any other mental faculty. It is simply, as we have seen, a power of perceiving and judging, and its operations, like all other perceptions and judgments are liable to error." (pp.321, 322.) This is a full surrender of conscience *as an intuitive faculty*. It is now put on an equality with all other mental faculties, is equally liable to error. But our author does not mean to deny that conscience is intuitive. Precisely what he does mean is not clear. He seems, however, to hold to his intuitive theory and at the

same time strives to paralyze objections to it by conceding them and thus fairly puts himself on both sides of the question.

7. Under the head of "Diversity of Judgment" he assumes conscience to be intuitive, and gives a very strong statement of the objection that if it is intuitive then its judgments ought to be uniform, that "eyes and ears [intuitive organs] do not give essentially conflicting testimony at different times and in different countries with respect to the same object. . . . But not so, it is said, with respect to the moral judgments of men. What one approves another condemns." Dr. Haven puts this objection to an intuitional conscience pretty fairly, and attempts to answer it. He says our ideas of right and wrong "are not irrespective of opportunity. Education, habits, laws, customs, while they do not originate, still have much to do with the development and modification of these ideas. They may be by their influence aided or retarded in their growth, or even quite misdirected, just as a tree may be, by unfavorable influences, hindered and thwarted in its growth, be made to turn and twist and put forth abnormal and monstrous developments." This is the common reply to the objection in question and is skillfully made. It however is not by any means satisfactory.

(1) It adroitly slips the intuitional faculty quite out of sight and deals only with the tuitional faculties. Of course it is easy to show that education, custom,

and other circumstances have much to do with forming and modifying the decisions of tuitional or educational judgment. But this has not a particle of pertinency to the subject. The question is not why men differ in their opinions, but whether men differ in their intuitive judgments. It is hardly necessary to say that they do not. The child five years old knows as well as the philosopher of fifty that it requires all the pieces of an apple to make the whole of it; and the philosopher can not deceive it and make it believe the contrary. The child and the savage know as well as the sage the difference between white and black. These are intuitive judgments. They are absolutely independent of circumstances. Education, laws, and customs have no power over them. Intuition is uniform in its judgments. It renders the same verdict in every man and in every age. The exceptions, owing to some abnormality, are not one in a million.

(2) Dr. Haven in the quotation above confounds development with education and culture. Development comes from nature, from forces within. Education comes from art, from forces without. Development is inevitable; education contingent. The savage is as truly a developed man physically and mentally as the philosopher. Education, not development, makes the difference between the savage and the civilized man. Dr. Haven confounds these two essentially distinct processes, and thereby makes a plausible but deceptive argument in favor of his theory.

(3) His illustration drawn from the tree is also illusory. The tree, like the child, has an intuitive and also an educable faculty. The latter makes it trainable. It may be made to turn and twist and put forth monstrous shapes but not abnormal and monstrous developments. Art or education may disguise the normal, but can never convert the normal into the abnormal. Dr. Haven adroitly leaves out of view the instinctive faculty of the tree, and deals only with the educable faculty, and thus makes it appear to the careless reader that what is natural in the tree has become the unnatural; but it is an illusion. The intuitive faculty of the tree is absolutely incapable of modification or change of any sort. The horticulturist may work upon it for a life-time, but a change of it in this regard is impossible. Dr. Haven's whole argument on the question in hand, is nothing more than plausible illusion. He undertakes to explain why an intuitive faculty does not give uniform judgments, and explains why a tuitional or educable faculty does not give uniform judgments; and seems to think that he has triumphantly accomplished his undertaking when in fact he has not touched it.

8. What to me is most marvelous is that our author, after giving a false reason for diversity of opinions on moral questions, then under the head of "*Precisely in What the Diversity Consists,*" gives the true analysis of the moral faculty so far as the intelligence is concerned, and points out with the utmost precision the

true and only cause of diversity of views on moral questions. He makes the "distinction between the idea of right, in itself considered, and the perception of a given act as right; the one a simple [intuitive] perception, the other an act of the [tuitional] judgment; the one an idea derived from the constitution of the mind, connate if not innate; the other, and application of that idea by the understanding to particular instances of conduct. The former. . . . may be [is] universal, necessary, absolute, unerring; the latter, the application of the idea to particular instances may be altogether an incorrect and mistaken judgment." This is a full surrender of the intuitional theory of conscience as it is generally held.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INTUITIONAL THEORY AS GENERALLY HELD UNSATISFACTORY.

The very able and popular authors whose views have just been considered, are representative men and have presumably presented the generally accepted intuitional theory with as much precision and force as is possible. They however have signally failed to establish it on impregnable or even plausible ground.

1. They have failed to give such harmony or congruity of facts as to entitle it to rational acceptance. This want of harmony or congruity of parts has been sufficiently indicated in the examinations of leading positions and explanations. Two facts only will be here noticed; one very briefly.

(1) They have failed to give to the theory what its terms imperatively and unconditionally require—viz.: uniformity of judgments as to what is right and what is wrong. If right and wrong are intuitively cognized in the concrete, as the theory teaches, then there ought to be absolute uniformity in the judgments as to what is right and what wrong. But we know there is no such uniformity. The plainest and most indubitable facts of human life consequently contradict the theory. Of course no theory can be true whose

necessary correlates are palpably contradicted by actual and universal experience.

(2) To explain this diversity of judgment, the champions of the theory have found it necessary to supplement the intuitive judgment with the tuitive, or rather to condition the intuitive upon the tuitive or educable judgment, and thus eviscerate their own favorite word *intuitive* of its inherent meaning, or make the intuitive *not* the intuitive, the direct *not* the direct, the self-evident *not* the self-evident. This is a virtual surrender of the theory, for a theory surrendered in its fundamental principles, is logically surrendered *in toto*. What is intuitively known is known independently of all conditions—all tuition, education, culture, all action of the discursive judgment—and admits of no increase or improvement from any after-thought or culture.

Dr. Calderwood is literally exact when he says, "An erring conscience [Intuitive Moral Sense] is a chimera. Conscience is a faculty which, from its very nature, can not be educated. Education, either in the sense of instruction or of training, is impossible. As well propose to teach the eye how and what to see, and the ear how and what to hear, as to teach the reason how to perceive the self-evident and what truths are of this nature. All these have been provided for in the human constitution."

2. Another fundamental error and source of confusion in this theory, is that it identifies the moral

sense or moral judgment with conscience or the "susceptibility of moral emotions." This requires conscience to be accepted as a cognitive faculty; and this is boldly assumed to be its character, and it is accordingly called the faculty that cognizes moral distinction, whose high prerogative is to discriminate between the right and the wrong. Long usage, it is true, favors this use of the term. Its etymology also favors it if it does not absolutely require this use. Usage, it is admitted, gives law to language and determines the sense in which terms must be taken. Abiding this rule, the question arises in relation to Christianity whether a term should be taken according to what may happen to be modern usage or according to Bible usage! This admits of only one answer, and to this authority the final appeal must be made. As to the etymology of the word it is sufficient to say it proves nothing. It perhaps favors one view no more than the other. Latin *con*, with, and *scientia*, knowledge; Greek *sun*, with, *eidesis*, knowledge. No one, I suppose, would say that the composite word means simply ordinary knowledge. The prefix, no doubt, is intended to express some deflection from the common meaning of *scientia* or *eidesis*. If we translate it *a knowing with*, or a community of knowledge, this would disfavor the intuitionists, for intuition is a simple personal act, which is in no way dependent on other individuals. But if we translate *with knowledge*, or *that which accompanies knowledge*,

we have, I think, a more literal translation, and put the meaning of the word in exact harmony with Bible usage.

Now, this is the exact relation of conscience to the moral sense or moral judgment. It is not knowledge, but the sure sequence of knowledge, and bears witness to knowledge, as the impression upon wax bears witness to the action of the seal that makes it. If intuitionists will make rational intuition cognitive of moral distinctions in the abstract, and rational tuition cognitive of moral distinctions in the concrete, and then make conscience the effect of the cognition upon the sensibility, they will free themselves from the humiliating necessity of supplementing the intuitive reason with the tuitive reason, also from the equally disagreeable necessity of making conscience both a cognitive and emotional faculty, or partly one and partly the other.

CHAPTER VII.

THE TRUE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENSE AND CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.—*Fundamental facts.*

1. It is a fact that the human mind in its adult state has the capacity of intuitively perceiving moral distinctions. This capacity is not inappropriately called the faculty of intuitive moral cognition. Right and obligation are correlatives. One involves the other. The intuition of one is the intuition of both. The reason persistently affirms obligation to do the right and avoid the wrong. It does not give the law or rule of right, but the obligation to obey it. It does not say to us, Do this, or that, but persistently says, Do the right, avoid the wrong. This intuition of right and obligation is natural to man, is a function of the intuitive reason, is co-extensive with it, and, of course, common alike to the savage and the sage.

2. It is a fact that the intuitive reason, recognizing the universal obligation to do the right as affirmed by the intuitive reason, affirms *this* to be right or *that* wrong. Instead of saying, Do the right, it says, This is right; do it, if a good conscience is desired. Hence, while the intuitive reason or judgment affirms the right and gives the obligation to it in the abstract,

the tuitive judgment gives the duty or obligation in its concrete form.

3. It is a fact that doing what the tuitive judgment affirms to be right is followed with complacent, agreeable feelings, which is appropriatly expressed according to Bible usage, by the words, *a good conscience*. The converse of this course, gives a state of feeling appropriately called *a bad conscience*.

SECTION 2.—*Characteristics of these powers.*

1. The intuitive reason or judgment is infallible. Intuition never errs. To say that it can err is to say that it is not intuitive. Instinct with its own light, it apprehends its objects immediately without ratiocination or investigation, just as we perceive the sun in the heavens, or that the sum of the parts is equal to the whole, or that effects must have causes, or that two and two make four. A truth intuitively perceived neither admits of proof nor requires it. It is self-evident and fundamental.

2. The tuitive reason or judgment is the natural judgment which investigates, reasons, compares, classifies, and discriminates, and determines whether a given act is right or wrong. It is no more infallible in its decisions of moral than it is in its decisions of secular questions. Hence, the great diversity of judgments concerning the rightness or wrongness of particular things. The conscience being the emotional response to the affirmations of the judgment, is always, according to the mental law which conditions

feeling upon intellection, in exact accord with the affirmation of the judgment. If the judgment is right the conscience is right and the sensation a happy one. If the judgment is wrong the conscience is wrong and the sensation a disagreeable one.

3. It is a law of the sensibilities that their character is always determined by the character of the intellection of which they are the sequence. Thoughts on different subjects give rise to different emotions.

RECAPITULATION.

1. The idea intuitively given of the morality of the human action as right or wrong.

2. The affirmation of the natural judgment that a given act is right or wrong.

3. A sensation of pleasure and satisfaction, when the action is affirmed to be right; and a sensation of pain or remorse, when the action is affirmed to be wrong.

Conscience is the susceptibility of pleasure or of pain arising out of the affirmation of the natural judgment concerning right and wrong.

SECTION 3.—*Proof of the correctness of this statement of the moral faculty and conscience.*

1. It is in every particular avouched by consciousness. We are distinctly conscious of the morality of our acts; also of an exercise of the mind in determining the rightness and wrongness of a particular act; also of pleasant or painful emotions according to

the affirmed rightness or wrongness of the particular act. No one accustomed to observe the operations of his own mind can doubt the correctness of these statements. That the order of these elements is the true and logical one is manifest, first, from the fact that the judgment can make no affirmation concerning the moral quality of a particular act without the existence in the mind of the idea of the morality of human actions. To affirm that a particular act is right or wrong presupposes the existence in the mind of the idea of right and wrong, just as the affirmation that a given event is produced by a particular cause presupposes in the mind the idea of causation.

Secondly, there can be no sensation, pleasant or painful, in relation to the morality of a given act until the judgment has affirmed that act to be right or wrong.

2. A further evidence of the correctness is its self-consistency. It avoids the absurdity of attributing to the mind two distinct intellective or discriminating faculties, viz., the natural judgment and the conscience. This is the vice of all theories that make conscience a discriminating faculty. It affirms that there is no difference in the action of the mind in relation to a secular question and an action in relation to a moral question; that it is the object of the action and not the manner of the action that gives rise to all the differences in the sensibilities. This view of the subject renders a moral action as easy of comprehension as any other action.

3. It readily accounts for all the facts and phenomena connected with a moral action, while no other hypothesis that I have seen can account for them. This is as near a demonstration as is possible in the case.

4. This account of the moral faculty is substantially the same as that given by St. Paul, Rom. ii. 14, 15, in his account of the mind's being a law unto itself: "For when the Gentiles, which have no [written] law, do by nature the things of the law, these, having no law, are a law unto themselves, in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts or reasonings one with another accusing or excusing *them*." Here we have (1) a marked distinction between the intellectual faculty and the conscience; (2) all intellectual and judicial functions are excluded from the conscience; (3) conscience is a witness and not a judge; (4) intelligence reaches a conclusion or judgment, not by intuition, but by ratiocination. These facts are clearly comprised in Paul's statements concerning the mind as a law unto itself; and they comprise the web and woof of this theory of the moral faculty. The Scriptures never attribute to conscience a discriminating or judicial power, and every hypothesis that does so is fundamentally false.

SECTION 4.—*Objections to this view of the moral faculty.*

1. It will be objected to this view that it deprives conscience of all judicial functions, and in opposition

it will be asserted that conscience approves or disapproves, justifies or condemns, our acts as right or wrong, and that these facts are clearly revealed in consciousness; that when we do a right act, we are conscious of an agreeable sensation, and when we do a wrong act, we are conscious of a disagreeable sensation; hence we often say, Conscience approves my conduct or Conscience condemns me.

(1) This is a plausible vindication of the idea that conscience is invested with judicial functions; and if the facts could be explained on no other hypothesis, the argument might be accepted as conclusive. But the facts previously stated prove unanswerably that conscience is not invested with any such functions; that it lies not in the domain of intelligence, but in the domain of the sensibilities; that it is, in fact, a form or state of the sensibility.

(2) But if it is proven by consciousness that conscience does really acquit and condemn, then we have both the affirmative and negative of the same proposition proven to be true. But this is absurd, and demonstrates that there is on one side, or the other a misreading of consciousness. This misreading is in saying that we are conscious that conscience acquits us or condemns us. We are distinctly conscious of a perception, an idea, or a judgment. We are equally conscious of sensation and readily distinguish between the two. But we are not conscious of the sources of these mental phenomena—from what department of the

mind they come, whether both from one, or from different departments, or whether they are related as antecedent and consequent. Whether they are related at all, except chronologically, conscience does not tell us. These facts are revealed by the judgment and not in consciousness.

(3) Finding them both present in the mind at the same instant, and not being conscious of their source, nor of their psychological relations, it is very easy, perhaps I should say not unnatural, to refer them both to the same source. In relation to morals a false psychology has referred them to a moral faculty, and called it conscience, which is conceived to be added to or superimposed upon the mind for moral purposes, or to constitute man a moral and accountable being, capable of rewards and punishments.

(4) The precise error in this case consists in attributing both the judgment and its corresponding emotions to the same mental faculty, whereas they are in fact not logically related as co-ordinate phenomena, but as causes and effects, or antecedent and sequence. To say that intellect or thought ever feels, or that feeling ever thinks, or judges, or reasons, is a contradiction in terms, and confounds things radically distinct. To attribute to the same faculty both the functions of thought and the perception of feeling is an absurdity, for the very terms of the proposition assume the existence of two faculties instead of one.

It is thus seen to be an absurdity to attribute to con-

science the double capacity of cognizing the right or the dutiful, and rewarding the obedient and of punishing the disobedient.

(5) If we will purge our minds of the illusion that the moral faculty is any thing less or more than, or different from, our natural faculties, intelligence, sensibility and will performing their respective functions in relation to moral questions, and place conscience wholly within the sphere of the sensibilities and make it the inevitable sequence of an act of the judgment in regard to what is right and wrong, we will be relieved of the interminable confusion and perplexity of thought which are consequent upon every other known hypothesis. On this hypothesis it is as easy to understand why I have cheerful and happy feelings when I have done what I believe is right, and why I experience painful, remorseful feelings when I have done what I believe to be wrong, as it is to understand why I have gay and lively feelings when I think on light and agreeable themes, or why I experience happy emotions when thinking of loved ones who are well and happy; or experience deep sorrow when thinking of children or friends in a state of deep affliction; or why emotions of anger or revenge arise in the mind when thinking of those who have done me irreparable and intentional injury.

(6) The mind is so constituted that the emotions, by a law as remorseless as fate, follow the thoughts, the judgments, the faith, as effect follows cause. To

feel without thought is as impossible as for an effect to produce itself. To think attentively and persistently on grave subjects without corresponding feeling is impossible.*

(7) Thoughts, faith, judgment, in reference to questions of a moral character—right and duty—form no exception to this universal law. They have their response in the sensibilities. The behests of duty done give a happy state of the sensibilities. This is a good conscience. Duty recognized but not done, gives a painful state of the sensibilities—feeling of remorse. This is a bad conscience.

(8) In the light of these facts it becomes quite manifest that conscience is not in any sense a judicial faculty, but is the natural and inevitable sequence of such a faculty, just as emotion is the necessary sequence of perception. If I say, My conscience acquits me, or My conscience condemns me, I utter a distorted truth, but a distorted truth is, in fact, an error. I have radically misconceived and misstated the functions of conscience. If I say, My conscience annoys me, hurts me, pains me, torments me, tortures me, I approximate the truth much more nearly, but I have not yet stated literally the whole truth; for it is not literally the conscience, or sensibilities, that hurt me, but something in the sensibilities that hurts them.

* All thought has its corresponding emotion, but the will has the power of disguising or even of repressing emotion to a limited extent.

(9) It is very common and natural, and in a sense true, to say of a burned hand, or of a fevered brow, or of an inflamed eye, My hand, or head, or eye, pains or troubles me. The language is very expressive and easily understood; but to say my head, or hand, or eye, condemns me, would be meaningless or unintelligible. But there is a subtle solecism in the proposition, My hand hurts me. It confounds the subject and the object, that is, the subject that does the hurting is the object hurt—the hand hurts the hand. Now, we all know that there is something abnormal in the eye, or hand, or head, that hurts the eye, etc. This intruder and pain-producer is the burn or inflammation. The literal truth is that the fire or inflammation hurts the hand.

(10) These examples are, of course, in the sphere of physical sensation, but they are exactly analogous to the moral phenomena pertaining to the conscience in the sphere of mental sensibility. My conscience does not condemn me nor literally hurt me, but something hurts my conscience; something alien and ungracious has been thrust or infused into the sensibilities or conscience and hurts them, pains them, torments them. That alien and ungracious something, it is hardly necessary to say, is sin, rebellion of the will against the affirmations of judgment.

(11) This state of the sensibility is what the Bible recognizes as a bad conscience, antithetical to a good conscience (Acts xxiii. 1); as an offended conscience,

antithetical to a conscience void of offense toward God and man; as a defiled conscience, antithetical to a pure conscience (1 Cor. viii. 7, Titus i. 15, Tim. iii. 9); as a seared conscience, antithetical to a tender, susceptible conscience (Tim. iv. 2); as a polluted conscience, antithetical to a conscience purged, sprinkled with the blood of Jesus Christ (Heb. x. 9, 22). I repeat, it is not the conscience that judges—acquits, or condemns, or hurts, or torments; but is itself hurt, tormented by the insubordination of the will to the imperatives of intelligence, faith or judgment; and is thus made *bad, offended, defiled, is seared, is polluted.*

This presentation of the subject is strictly logical, and so completely in accord with the ascertained laws of physical sensation, of mental sensibility, so satisfactorily explains and adjusts all the phenomena pertaining to conscience, and, above all, is so fully supported by the psychology of the New Testament, that I see not how any discriminating and unprejudiced mind can reject it.

2. It may be objected that this view of the subject degrades the conscience into a mere state of the sensibilities, weakens the behests, the imperatives of conscience, so called; diminishes its persuasive power to virtue, its dissuasive power from immorality and irreligion. The very reverse, I am persuaded, is true, for the following reasons.

(1) According to the theory here advocated, conscience is not imperator and has no imperatives to

give. It neither gives nor obeys commands. The judgment is imperator and lays its injunctions and interdictions upon the will, and conscience is the executive, not of the commands but of the awards of obedience and disobedience. A command is not less efficient or worthy because it proceeds from the intelligence, the judgment, than it would be if it proceeded from blind sensibility or from the conscience.

(2) Any truth or doctrine clearly and intelligently stated and apprehensible by the mind, has a far greater practical influence in securing obedience and respect, than the same truth or doctrine when it is falsely stated, and is of course unintelligible and unsatisfactory, leaving us in doubt as to its truth. Now, I claim exactly this advantage for the theory in hand over all theories that deem conscience a complex faculty lying partly in the domain of the intelligence and partly in that of the sensibilities.

(3) Now I claim that the theory here presented is taken from the facts of consciousness, is in full accord with the ascertained laws that control intellection and sensibility in reference to non-moral subjects, that it is strictly analogued by the phenomena of physical sensation, and, above all, is in strict harmony with the psychology of the New Testament, while all theories that make conscience a cognitive faculty, are in palpable contravention of New Testament psychology.

If this is true, then surely the theory can not

paralyze the doctrine of moral obligation, or deprive conscience of one iota of its power as a persuasive to virtue and a dissuasive from immorality and irreligion.

3. As to the objection that this theory reduces conscience to an emotion, or a mere state of the sensibilities, much need not be said. It is not only admitted but avowed that conscience is an emotion or a given form or state of the sensibilities, conditioned always and necessarily upon the intelligence, perception, thought, or faith, or judgment. But I am unable to see why or how this fact should disparage the theory, or diminish the power of conscience; for it is easily made apparent that the sole value of man, soul and body, is merged in the sensibilities.

(1) All sensuous pleasure comes to the animal world, and to man as an animal, through the sensation, and all mental pleasure comes to all rational beings, on earth and in heaven, through the sensibilities. Happiness through any other source is simply impossible. The same is true of all suffering, and is so from a necessity arising out of the constitution of the mind itself.

(2) The end of rational action is enjoyment, happiness, and whatever does not contribute to that end is useless, or worse, is a nuisance in the rational world. Intellect is a sparkling endowment, but only so far as it conditions emotion—plays upon, modifies, excites the sensibilities—does it contribute to the end of rational being. Because, while it and it alone, thinks,

reasons, knows, it does not feel or enjoy. A being possessed of the intelligence of the Deity, but void of sensibility, would of necessity be as immobile and as incapable of happiness as a stone.

(3) The will, too, is a magnificent endowment, a noble characteristic of the divine image. It is invested with high executive power; it is, consequently, wholly distinct from the intelligence both in its functions and in its relation to the sensibilities. But only so far as its executive acts accord with the decision or judgments of the intelligence, and thus insures a state of tranquillity and complacency, is it of any value.

It is thus made manifest that the entire value of man is concentrated in the sensibilities (see the author's work on Psychology). This being true, we do not disparage the dignity, or value, or power, of conscience, when we relegate it to the sensibilities.

4. Another objection will probably arise in the minds of some against the emotional theory of conscience from the word conscience itself, which, it is claimed, is expressive of cognition and not of feeling.

(1) In reply, it is sufficient here to say that, as has been stated, the prefix to the word denotes some kind of deflection from the ordinary meaning of the word *eidesis*. The verb *eido*, from which comes *eideo* and *eidesis*, sometimes means *to feel*. *Suneidesis*, conscience, certainly does not express ordinary knowledge, but may very legitimately express that feeling that accompanies knowledge. These facts show that

the objection, founded upon the etymology of the word conscience, has no valid foundation. This might also be shown from other considerations but need not.

(2) Paul, as we have seen, in his analysis of the law of the mind, sharply discriminates between *suneidesis* and *logismos*, the latter of which expresses not an act of intuition but of ratiocination, and thus excludes conscience from the sphere of the intelligence and of course relegates it to the sphere of the sensibilities. Of the thirty-one instances of its use in the New Testament, not in a single instance is it intended to express the idea of cognition or judgment, but to express the emotion or feeling arising out of cognition. When we, therefore, make it cognitive, we confound the sequence with its antecedent, and, of course, involve ourselves in confusion.

CHAPTER VIII.

NEW TESTAMENT USAGE OF THE WORD CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.—*Preliminary explanations.*

1. Words which apply primarily to the temporal and secular things, when applied to sacred and spiritual things, are of necessity to be taken in a tropical and different sense. We have no right to assume, therefore, without proof that any Greek word is used in the New Testament exactly in the same sense as where it is used in the Greek classics. The precise meaning must be determined in every given instance by the context and by the usage of the particular writer.

2. The Hebrew has no word corresponding to conscience. (This statement to the English reader seems to be contradicted by Ecc. x. 20, "Curse not the king, no, not in thy conscience." But this Hebrew word here means properly *secret thought*, and not what, in the New Testament is meant by conscience.) This, of course, was not because the Hebrew-speaking people did not have this attribute of human nature, for it is common to all rational creatures.

3. Again, the word is nowhere attributed to Christ and is not used in any of the Gospels. (John viii. 9 being an interpolation.)

4. The word occurs twenty-nine times in the New Testament: in Acts twice; in Romans three times; in 1 Corinthians seven times; in 2 Corinthians three times; in 1 Timothy four times; in 2 Timothy once; in Titus once; in Hebrew five times; in 1 Peter three times. It is observable that no New Testament writer (if Paul wrote Hebrews) uses the word except Paul and Peter; and the latter uses it only three times. The word is used in various verbal combinations, some of which may shed some light on the character of this faculty. The popular theory of conscience is that it is a cognitive faculty, a function of the intellect, an intellective intuition of the mind, discriminating between the right and the wrong, the virtuous and the vicious. From its supposed characteristics it ought to be unerring in its utterances, and therefore an infallible guide to human conduct.

5. Let us see whether this view of the subject is supported by the word as used in the sacred Scriptures. The simple and the single question is, Do the Scriptures recognize conscience as a function of the intelligence or reason or judgment? Let us address ourselves to this one point.

6. I have elsewhere shown beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt that Paul in Romans ii. 15, sharply discriminates between thoughts, intellections, or functions of the intellect and conscience. Does Paul or Peter in the twenty-eight other instances of the use of the word, set aside this distinction between

intellection and conscience; or do they ever use the word with such qualification as to attribute to the faculty an intellective quality? The word is sometimes used without any qualification. Such instances, of course, can throw no light on the subject, as to the point in hand; as "For conscience sake," etc. In some instances, however, what is said of conscience indicates its character as a faculty of the mind. These instances do not, I think, in any case, intimate or presuppose that it is intellective or cognitive in character; but instead presuppose the contrary.

SECTION 2.—*Examples testing the question.*

I. Acts xxiii. 1: "I have lived in all good conscience before God until this day."

(1) Cognition as the essence of conscience, or even as an element of it, is here utterly excluded by the logical predicate of the proposition. To say that a man has lived in all good knowledge, or judgment, is a verbal solecism—words without any intelligible idea—which no intelligent writer would so use.

(2) If conscience is an intellectual faculty, especially if it is intuitive as the theory claims, then Paul affirms that he had never erred in judgment or opinion on any subject; or, in fact, claims infallibility, which he himself repeatedly disclaims. We know that he did err egregiously in judgment and in practice in regard to Christ and Christianity. If conscience is in whole or in part a cognitive faculty, intuitively apprehending the right and the wrong, then

I should say, few men ever had a worse conscience than Paul; and to vindicate his claim to a good conscience is an utter impossibility.

(3) On the contrary, if conscience is the emotional response to the convictions of the intelligence, or decisions of the judgment, then his claim to have lived in all good conscience can be easily understood and vindicated. On this hypothesis we can understand how a man, acting from a wrong conviction, can have a good conscience; and acting contrary to his convictions, though his convictions may be right, will have a bad conscience. The expression, "A good conscience," occurs in five other texts, and its explanation in one text, is, of course, its explanation in all.

2. 1 Cor. viii. 10, "For if any man see thee which hast knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not the conscience of him which is weak be emboldened to eat those things which are offered to idols?"

(1) In this text Paul discriminates between intellect or knowledge and conscience. This of course he could not do logically if knowledge is identical with conscience or forms any part of it. Again, he represents the conscience of him that is weak as being emboldened by the example of the strong—that is, of those that have greater knowledge. The weak here, as the connection clearly shows, means those having less knowledge. Now, if conscience means knowledge of any kind, then Paul says, substantiantially, that the example of the knowing emboldens the

knowledge of the unknowing to commit sin. But this is a palpable contradiction. It is, moreover, an unpardonable misuse of language, to speak of emboldening knowledge. To embolden a man is to act upon his sensibilities. To embolden the conscience is to act upon his feelings by presentations through the perceptive faculty or intellect. Nor is it possible to embolden or weaken the conscience otherwise than as feelings in general are strengthened or weakened, and that is by presentations to the intellect.

(2) Again in verse 12, the writer speaks of wounding the conscience, just as we intelligently speak of wounding the feelings. But to speak of wounding the intellect or judgment would be an unmeaning solecism.

3. In 1 Tim. i. 19, the writer discriminates between faith and conscience, "holding faith and a good conscience." All know that faith is an exercise or state of the intelligence. Then, of course, conscience must be a state either of the sensibility or of the will. None, I suppose, would assert the latter. It then must be a state of feeling.

4. In 1 Tim. and 2 Tim. i. 3, the writer speaks of a "pure conscience," and in Heb. ix. 14, of a purged or purified conscience, and in Heb. x. 22, of hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience.

(1) To speak of a purified intellect or a purified judgment, is not according to usage, but if we should use such an expression, we could mean only an

enlightened intellect or judgment. But to say that an enlightened judgment is all that is meant by a purified conscience is, according to New Testament usage, a manifest perversion of the meaning of the sacred text, because it would reduce the spiritual renovation required by the gospel to illumination, and a state of guilt and condemnation to a state of ignorance; and this would be to substitute the means for the end.

(2) On the contrary by a pure conscience, a heart sprinkled from an evil conscience, and "a conscience purified from dead works to serve the living God," we must understand a heart free from a sense of condemnation, from a state of enmity against God, and brought into a state of reconciliation and peace with God. But the terms, enmity, reconciliation, peace, are all expressive of states of the feelings, and only imply intellectual states, as feeling always implies intellection as its condition.

By no method of torture, however skillful, can this class of texts be made to support the hypothesis that conscience is that faculty of the mind whose special function is to cognize the right and wrong in human action.

5. Romans ii. 15; ix. 1. These texts represent conscience as a witness-bearer. (*Marturos, martureo, sum-martureo.*)

(1) If the word conscience ever expresses intellection it must do so in these texts. Witness-bearing is often affirmed of rational creatures, and, in such cases,

denotes an exercise of the intellect rather than of feeling. But it is also affirmed of irrational beings, or of things incapable both of intellection and of feeling. Genesis xxxi. 44, 48, 52; Exodus xxii. 13; John v. 36. Rational beings bear witness by a statement of their personal experience in relation to facts. The trustworthiness of the testimony is determined by the trustworthiness of the cognitive faculties and the integrity of the witness. The inanimate object, as a stone, bears witness to a fact by serving as a memorial or remembrancer of it, so as to bring the fact previously known distinctly into the mind. It depends for its validity upon the power of the mind to recognize the suggested idea as having previously been present to the mind.

(2) Conscience differs in its mode of witness-bearing from both these cases. It does not bear witness by cognizing actions as right or wrong. If it did a wrong act and a good conscience would be irreconcilable things and there would be a perfect conformity among men as to what is right and what wrong.

(3) Nor is it like the stone, a mere remembrancer of what has previously existed in the mind. This would make it take the place of memory with which none would be willing to identify it. But conscience is the feeling of self-complacency that arises in the mind in view of duty faithfully done, and the feeling of shame, self-reproach or despair arising in the mind in view of duty not done and of the consequences.

As the absence of pain bears witness to a normal and healthy state of the body and pain bears witness to its abnormal state, so conscience bears witness to the right or wrong act of the will. It is not the arbiter of action, or the executive of action, but the feeling that comes of moral action.

6. "I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness," etc. Rom. ix. 1. How is it possible here to identify the judgment and conscience without convicting the writer of an unintelligible jumble of words? To decide what is true and what is false—to know the truth from falsehood—is a function of the judgment. But if conscience is the judgment, then the judgment bears witness with the judgment, or the conscience bears witness with the conscience, or the judgment or the conscience bears witness with itself, which is sheer nonsense, confounding as it obviously does the fact and the witness, or the event and the evidence of it. The writer certainly intended a distinction between his judgment which affirmed a fact, and his conscience which bore witness to it.

From this brief examination of the word *conscience* as used by New Testament writers, it would seem that the doctrine of conscience set forth in the preceding pages of this work has the sanction of the word of God.

CHAPTER IX.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSCIENCE.

1. As we have seen it is not the function of conscience to discover the absolute rule of right, or to affirm moral qualities in human acts. This, as we have seen, is the function of the reason. Its judgments in this regard are intuitive and absolutely infallible. Intuition reaches its conclusions immediately without reflection or discursive thought, as I intuitively know myself the same personality to-day that I was yesterday, or that two and two make four, or that events do not produce themselves. The mind never errs in these intuitive judgments. To give them is a function of the reason, and of the reason only. This is the only unerring or infallible element in the moral faculty. As the conscience follows the intuitive judgment, they both are fallible.

2. Conscience is a non-discursive or non-reflective faculty. It takes no part in determining the moral character of particular acts. It does not affirm this one right or that one wrong. It simply affirms nothing at all. To compare, discriminate, analyze, classify, and affirm of every individual act its own appropriate character, is the function neither of conscience nor of the intuitive judgment, but of the tuitive judgment, which reaches its conclusions mediately and often with great

difficulty; and after a conclusion is finally reached, still it may be incumbered with doubts. All these facts are distinctly given in consciousness.

3. If I witness a physical phenomenon with which I am not familiar, I know that it was caused by something, or did not produce itself. But I do not know by intuition what that cause is. That I do not know is distinctly revealed in consciousness. If I wish to know the cause, I must acquire it intuitively, or by investigation, ratiocination, as I investigate any other subject. Sooner or later I may reach a conclusion, or I may never reach a conclusion at all. If I do reach one that is satisfactory to me, I may afterward be convinced that my judgment was wrong, hence I know that my natural judgment is fallible. These facts are clearly made a part of the contents of consciousness.

If the question is a practical one and I act upon it, if it was right, it turns out to my advantage; if it was wrong, it turns out to my disadvantage. The advantage is a sequence, the witness and the reward of my accurate judgment and my practical fidelity to it. The disadvantage is the sequence, the witness and penalty of my false judgment, or of my want of practical fidelity to it. If we put a moral question in the place of the physical phenomenon, and substitute conscience for the advantage and disadvantage in the above-given statement, we will have the true position of conscience in the mental process in relation to questions of a moral character.

4. This prepares us the more readily to understand the functions of conscience.

(1) In the case supposed the advantages and disadvantages are the alternatives one of the other. One is inevitable. That both should result is impossible. One of necessity excludes the other. A man evidently experiences a good or a bad conscience in regard to a particular act. He can not experience both.

(2) The advantage or disadvantage in the case supposed is the natural and necessary sequence, the mere passive result of the good or bad judgment and of practical fidelity or infidelity to the judgment. As passive results, they, of course, have no power over themselves, do not produce themselves nor help to do so. Exactly the same facts are true of a good or a bad conscience, with one exception, viz., the good or bad conscience depends alone upon practical fidelity to the judgment. This judgment may be wrong and the conscience good, as was the case of Saul of Tarsus. This was because he was practically faithful to his judgment, verily believing that he was doing God's service in persecuting the church.*

* If his conscience was his judgment or a factor in his judgment, how was it possible for him to have a good conscience? His judgment was confessedly bad; his conscience avowedly good. If, therefore, his conscience was his judgment or a factor in it, then of necessity his conscience was both good and bad in relation to the same act and at the same time. This, in relation to the common theory of the conscience, is simply *reductio ad absurdum*.

The judgment may be right and the conscience bad, as was the case of Judas Iscariot. This was because he was practically unfaithful to his judgment, which he confesses in his words of bitter self-reproach, "I have sinned in that I have betrayed innocent blood." The possibility of having a wrong judgment and a good conscience, and a right judgment and a bad conscience proves conclusively that the peculiar emotion called conscience is a natural and necessary sequence of the tuitive and not of the intuitive judgment, the intuitive judgment being always right.

(3) It is a function of the conscience to bear witness to the integrity of the will to the convictions of the judgment, and also to the rightness and wrongness of our motives. If we act in full accord with our convictions of right, though the conviction itself may be wrong, the emotional response will be pleasant, agreeable, happy, or we, like Paul, will have a good conscience. If we act contrary to our convictions of right, though the convictions may be wrong, the emotional response will be painful, torturing, remorseful, or the conscience will be bad. The emotions, or feelings, or conscience, are the living witnesses of the character of these right and wrong acts. They are the indefectible witnesses in the light of whose testimony our acts stand forth as justified or condemned. That is, we have the sense or feeling of condemnation within us.

(4) Conscience is sometimes called an oracle of God in the soul, and truly it is in a sense; but it is not a

revealing or teaching oracle but a witness-bearing oracle, bearing infallible and experimental testimony to the fidelity of the will to the convictions of the judgment. It is so realized in experience and is so represented in the Holy Scriptures.

(5) The subjective rewards of virtue and the subjective punishments of vice are ministered through the conscience. The all-wise Creator has purposely so constituted the human mind as to insure appropriate rewards to virtue and punishments to vice. These awards being the inevitable sequence of right-doing and wrong-doing, the virtuous are by an infallible law of their own minds, assured of their just rewards; and the vicious by a like necessity of their nature assured of the just punishment of their vices.

(6) Such is the nature of conscience that it is a realization of human accountability. The idea of accountability is intuitively given along with the idea or judgment of right and wrong. But conscience is a full and distinct realization of that idea. It thus gives, in the most impressive manner possible, the knowledge of accountability. Every man consequently has in himself a practical and powerful persuasive to virtue and dissuasive to vice.

CHAPTER X.

THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF RIGHT.

What is the ultimate ground of right or of moral accountability? As is usual, philosophers differ. The question is vital in its bearing upon the subjects of freedom, accountability, morality, and a rational scheme of religion. The only theories that require special notice are the following :

I. The first posits the ultimate ground of right in the Eternal Nature of Things.

II. The second posits it in the Nature of God back of the Divine Will.

III. The third posits it in the Sovereign Will of God.

SECTION I.—*The eternal nature of things.*—*Haven's views.*

I. This theory is more distinctly put by Dr. Haven than by any other advocate of the theory whose writings I have examined. He says, *Moral Philosophy*, p. 47: "We seem to be driven, then, to the only remaining conclusion, that *right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things.* They are not the creations of expediency, nor of law; nor yet do they originate in ^{the} divine character. They have no origin; they are eternal as the throne of Deity. They are immutable as God himself. Nay, were God

himself to change, these distinctions would change not. Omnipotence has no power over them, whether to create or destroy. Law does not make them, but they make law. They are the source and spring of all law and all obligation. Reason points out these distinctions; the moral nature recognizes and approves them. God's law, and will, and nature, are in conformity to these distinctions; else that law were not just and right, nor that nature holy."

(1) Dr. Gregory pertinently and forcibly says: "According to this hypothesis there is something back of God which shapes all his course in spite of himself—a modern *fate*. The Deity becomes a mere figure-head in his universe. On the contrary, it is obvious that according to the Christian system, God is himself at the foundation of all things, the Creator, Orderer, and Controller of all things, material and moral." (Christian Ethics, p. 120.)

(2) According to this hypothesis the Creator has no more will and no higher prerogative in determining what shall be the law of the moral world than has the creature. Both are absolutely dependent upon the *eternal nature of things* for law, and both equally amenable to that law. The Creator and the creature, the sovereign and the subject, are bound by the same law in the same sense. What right to absolute sovereignty has the Deity according to this theory, seeing that "the eternal nature of things" is a power not only independent of him but absolutely dominant over him?

(3) The law is divine only by adoption. Did he adopt it freely or from necessity? If from necessity, then he is not free. If not free, then he is not God. If freely, then he found something already on hand better than any thing he could produce. Then he is not perfect; if not perfect, not God. Suppose God had asserted his freedom either in disobeying the dicta of the "eternal nature of things," or in refusing to adopt it as a law of Administration, what then?

(4) Suppose God had chosen never to create a moral world. Then as right and justice have only a relative existence, the law of "eternal nature of things" would have been "in a fix."

(5) But this "eternal nature of things," what of it? God alone is eternal. Hence, there are no eternal things, therefore no "eternal nature of things."

(6) Dr. Haven is sensible of the absurdity of predicated eternity of things that God created. He, therefore, attempts an explanation of the sense in which the "eternal nature of things" must be understood. He says: "But when we speak of things, and the nature of things, as applicable to this discussion, we do not, of course, refer to material objects, nor yet to spiritual intelligences; but to the actions and moral conduct of intelligent beings, created or uncreated, finite or infinite." The idea then seems to be that right is inherent in the eternal nature of "the actions and moral conduct of intelligent beings." This confounds *things* and *events* and makes the theory something less intel-

ligible, but does not remove the objection. There can be no eternal "actions and moral conduct," hence no eternal nature of such events.

(7) God having adopted this law or in some way made it his own, does he, in observing it, honor himself or the "eternal nature of things?"

(8) Do intelligent creatures in obeying this law honor God as supreme ruler or as a subordinate authority in the moral world?

The absurdities of the theory are too numerous and obvious to require much discussion. The logical bearings of the theory are to blank atheism. It undeifies the Deity and leaves the universe under the dominion of the "eternal nature of things."

2. Dr. Haven conceives that there is some sort of analogy between mathematical truths and the law of right. He says: "We say it is in the very nature of things that the whole is greater than a part; that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; that two straight lines can not inclose a space. We can not conceive the opposite to be true." (p. 49.)

These are facts, but they prove just nothing at all concerning the origin of the rule of right. Dr. Haven himself, after stating these facts, does not venture to say that his theory rests upon equally obvious ground. It is a necessary truth that the whole is greater than a part. We can not conceive a part to be equal to the whole. But his rule of right is not a self-evident proposition. The opposite is conceivable and is, we

think, true. The vice that underlies the theory in hand is the assumption that right and wrong, virtue and vice, are in themselves ends and not means to ends. Every theory of the source of right that rests upon this assumption must of necessity be involved in contradictions, and of course can not be true.

SECTION 2.—*The above theory as presented by Dr. Dabney.*

1. This vigorous writer expresses himself with sufficient decision in favor of the eternal nature of things as the ultimate ground of moral distinctions. He says:

“They [moral distinctions] are not instituted solely by the positive will of God, but are enjoined by that will, because his infinite mind saw them to be intrinsic and eternal. In a word: duties are not obligatory and right solely because God has commanded them, but he has commanded them because they are right. Hence, we confidently expect to find the natural powers of reason and conscience in man impressed with the moral distinction, and pronouncing it intuitively.

“(a) From the fact that the Scriptures represent God himself, at least in one particular, as bound by this distinction of right and wrong, ‘God can not lie’—that is, the eternal perfections of his own mind so regulate his own volitions that his will certainly, yet freely, refuses all error. See, also, 2 Tim. ii. 13.

“(b) The very nature of a creature implies rightful subjection to a Creator; its denial would be utter contradiction. Thus the law of our reason teaches us,

that the creature existing, these moral relations can not but exist, whether God has published them in positive precepts or not.

“(c) If these moral distinctions owed their origin solely to God’s positive will, no distinction could be drawn between moral and positive precepts. The prohibition, ‘Thou shalt not bear false witness,’ would be exactly like this, ‘Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk.’ But there is a distinction between the two classes recognized by God’s and our reason. ‘Judgment, mercy, and truth’ are pronounced ‘weightier matters of the law,’ compared with tithing mint, anise, and cummin.

“(d) If there were no cause, save God’s mere will, why moral distinctions were drawn as they are, he might have made treachery a virtue, and truth a crime, etc.

“Against this every moral intuition revolts. Why might not God have done this? The only answer is, that his own unchangeable moral perfection made it impossible. Just so; it is admitted that the basis of the moral distinction is *a priori* to all volition of God; which is substantially my proposition. And last, and most conclusively: If God’s mere positive volition made an act of the creature morally right, then, of course, God must be morally right in entertaining that volition. But the moral character of volitions depends wholly on that of the principles which prompt them. So that, we see, if there were

no moral distinction *a priori* to God's mere will, God could have no moral character in acts of his will." (Theology, page 352.)

[QUERIES.—1. "Positive will of God"—is there such a thing as the negative will? If so, what is it? 2. If "not instituted solely by the will of God," then how far were they instituted by something else? To institute is an act of a person. What person helped God to institute moral distinctions? 3. Can any thing "instituted" be eternal?]

2. Much that was said in opposition to Dr. Haven's views is equally conclusive against those of Dr. Dabney. But as the latter supports his views with some singular arguments, it seems proper briefly to notice some of these arguments.

"(a)" Where in the Scriptures does God represent himself "as bound by this distinction of right and wrong" as something independent of himself? To say he can not lie is nothing to the point. The logic of our author seems to run thus: God can not lie; therefore, he is bound by a law superior to himself. If this is good logic, the following is equally good: Satan can lie; therefore he is not bound by any law superior to himself. The logic binds the Almighty, and turns the devil loose. On the contrary, as is elsewhere explained, if God's will is the law, then it is easy to see why he can not lie, or violate the law, because to do so would be to act contrary to his will, which is a psychological impossibility.

“(b)” Argument “b” is no better than argument “a.” Certainly “the very nature of a creature implies rightful subjection to a creator.” But the nature of a creator does not imply his subjection to something independent of himself whose behests he is bound to obey. Again, the act of creation was either free or necessary. If necessary, then neither God nor any thing else is free from the iron rule of Fate. If free, then all existing relations and the obligations connected with them, are purely the products of the divine will and not of something back of that will.

“(c) If these moral distinctions owe their origin solely [can they have different sources?] to God’s positive will [has God any negative will?], no distinction could be drawn between moral and positive precepts.” As this distinction is current with certain writers, it may be briefly noticed.

(1) The terms, moral and positive, are not mutually exclusive of each other, but may be both predicated of the same precept; for example, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” etc.

(2) Every precept in the Bible is positive as to the duty enjoined though some are expressed in negative form; for example, “Thou shalt not kill.”

(3) Every law, moral or civil, may be broken up into distinct positive precepts; for example, the whole moral law is preceptively given in the Decalogue. The distinction, then, between the authorita-

tiveness of a moral and positive precept, or a moral and positive law, is purely chimerical.

(4) Our author's illustrations, are the moral precept, "Thou shalt not bear false witness;" the positive precept, "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk." Now, it is matter of surprise that so shrewd a philosopher as Dr. Dabney should mistake the difference in the things commanded for a difference in the authoritativeness of the commands. To do this is to limit the authoritativeness of the command by the character of the thing commanded. Hence, the greater or the more important the thing commanded, the greater the authority by which the command is given, all of which is simply absurd, for no fact is clearer than that a radical difference in the things commanded does not imply a difference in the commanding authority. The command not to bear false witness, and the command not to seethe a kid in its mother's milk, are quite different in themselves; and one may be of more vital importance than the other; but both are equally authoritative, both being given by the same will. This is so plain that illustrations would be superfluous, or, at least, the reader can readily supply them.

(5) In the light of these facts, we readily see the intrinsic worthlessness of that popular distinction between moral and positive precepts, upon which our author builds an argument to prove that divine com-

mands, at least some of them, rest upon a nondescript power back of the Creator himself.

(6) But conceding the distinction to be a valid one, it can not be made to prove what our author assumes it to prove, for every presumption is that if any one divine precept, moral or positive, receives its authoritativeness from this hypothetical, antitheistical law of right, then all divine commands receive their authority from the same source; if not all, then absolutely none.

(7) Dr. Dabney's other illustration is no better than the first. Judgment, mercy, and truth are truly weightier matters of the law than tithing mint, anise, and cummin; but this presupposes no difference in the authoritativeness of the commands respecting them; much less does it presuppose that these commands receive their authority from different sources, one from the will of God, and one from something back of and superior to that will.

(8) Dr. Dabney seems insensible of the fact that his argument degrades the Almighty to a subordinate place in the moral world, making him the mere executive of a power greater than himself. According to the argument God may be the Revealer, but not the Author, of moral precepts, such as the commands, "Thou shalt not bear false witness," or that concerning judgment, mercy, and truth, but may be the author of positive precepts, such as, "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk," or that concerning tithing mint, anise, and cummin.

“(d)” It would be easy but useless to sift this argument and point out in detail its numerous logical fallacies. It is sufficient here to notice one point only.

(1) “If there were no cause save God’s mere will why moral distinctions were drawn as they are, he might have made treachery a virtue and truth a crime.” It is a matter of regret, for the sake of philosophy itself, that an author of Dr. Dabney’s pretensions should perpetrate an argument so palpably vulnerable. If God, himself infinitely perfect, can not be trusted to do right unless he is caused to do so by a power outside of himself and wholly independent of him, what assurance can we have, or can God himself have, that this causative power that prevents him from making truth a crime, will itself do right? Clearly another power back of this cause that causes the right action of God, is required by our author’s logic. This involves the insatiable *regressus*. A might do wrong but for B, B but for C, C but for D, and so on and on to infinity.

(2) The argument involves not only a *regressus*, but also a *petitio*. It assumes that God’s will is not the prime rule of right. This is the vital point in the whole question, which is assumed, not proved.

(3) This whole paragraph “(d)” overflows with gratuitous assumptions. It assumes that God is not the author of the plan of the moral world, but merely approved and adopted it because he saw it to be in-

trinsic and eternal in the nature of things—had no existence, and of course, no nature till he created them and gave them their nature. He approved and adopted this plan born of the eternal nature of things *freely* yet it was *imposed* upon him—that is, he approved and adopted it both freely and necessarily. The logical outcome of his whole argument to prove that moral distinction is *a priori* to all volition of God, is simply masked atheism. It undeifies the Deity, and leaves God and all things else to the tender mercies of Faith. *fati*

SECTION 3. *Are things right because God commanded them, or does God command them because they are right?*

This is a question often propounded, and variously answered. Drs. Haven, Dabney, and many others say God commands things because they are right and make right independent of him. This doctrine is liable to grave objections.

1. It is certainly true that God commands things either because he wills them or from necessity. To suppose otherwise is to suppose him a monster. It may not be improper to say God commands things because they are right, but this does not imply that his purpose which is logically prior to his command, is not determinative of the right or that the right exists independent of the divine will.

2. Every command implies a purpose or act of will and that purpose originates either in the will of the

commander, or in a will or something superior to and independent of him. The latter alternative requires us to believe that right exists not only independent of God, but as something prior to him and superior to him. But whence comes this something independent of God, prior to him and superior to him?

(1) It is sometimes said that right has its source in the *eternal fitness* of things; and this seems to be the very best answer the advocates of this theory are able to give. But it may be answered that God alone is eternal. All else had a beginning. Among things that do not exist, there is no fitness, no relations, no dependencies, of any sort; and of course no "eternal fitness."

(2) If it should be said, as is sometimes done, that things existed ideally from eternity, and that right, as a principle, consequently existed ideally and independently of the divine will from eternity, it is sufficient to reply that ideals exist only as conceptions of mind and imply an idealizer. The mind creating the ideal must, of course, exist prior to any act of idealization. But antecedent to creation there existed no mind except the divine to idealize a moral world, and a rule of right for its government.

(3) It is, consequently, absolutely certain that a rule of right, either real or ideal, independent of the divine will, is simply an impossibility.

3. It is therefore absurd to suppose that God commands or wills a thing, or does any thing because he

finds himself bound by any law or principle of right independent of his own will, or that he ever acts or does any thing for reasons or motives that do not have their origin in himself.

4. If there is an eternal rule or principle of right, independent of the divine will, to which all intelligences, God not excepted, are bound to conform their actions, then this law of right is not God's law only in the sense in which it is the law of all other intelligences. God is not the author of it any more than are created beings; but both Creator and creature are subject to it, as neither the Creator nor the creature is supreme, but this law is supreme over both.

5. The highest power and authority pertaining to government is the legislative; but if God commands things only because they are right, or in conformity to a law outside of himself, then he has not supreme authority; and the highest prerogative we are authorized to attribute to him is that of the executive of a law which he did not originate. Hence, we may call this eternal rule of right the law of God only by courtesy, he being not its author but its executive.

6. If the moral law exists independent of the divine will, to whom or to what do men owe obedience? Right implies obligation or duty. Duty or obligation implies a debtor or obligor and an obligee. The obligors are the subjects of the law. The obligee is the supreme law-making authority, and the law is the rule of obedience on the part of the subjects and the

rule of administration on the part of the administrator. Now it is very clear if the law-making power is not inherent in the administrator, then all acts of obedience are not due to the administrator, but to some power outside of him and independent of him. In obeying the laws of the State, we do not obey the governor but the legislature or the law-making power, the governor being only the executive of the law and not the author of it. Hence, in rendering obedience to the rule of right, we worship not God, but something outside of him. On the contrary, if the supreme legislative and the supreme administrative authority reside in the divine will, then in rendering obedience to the law, we render obedience to God, and not to something above God.

7. The Bible, so far as I can see, gives no hint of any moral law or rule of right that imposes obligations upon men separate from the will of God. On the contrary the will of God is everywhere set forth both as the ground and rule of right and of obedience. The Savior himself recognized this as the sufficient and only rule and reason of his action.

8. I know of no instance, nor can I conceive of any, in which God commands or wills a thing to be done because it is right in itself—that is, because men are under obligations to do it independent of his will. On the contrary we have numerous instances in the Bible where the only conceivable reason or ground of obligation is the will or command of God. Note, for

illustration, the command not to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil; the command to build the ark; the command of circumcision; the command to observe the passover; the command to keep the Sabbath day holy; all the commands pertaining to the Mosaic ritual; the command to repent, believe, and be baptized, and numerous others. The ground of obligation in all these commands, and the only conceivable ground, is the will of God. We may or may not be able to see satisfactory reasons why God commanded them; but without his commands, no man, I venture to assume, ever would have conceived himself under any obligation to do them. If it should be objected, these and other similar commands are only positive precepts, and are, therefore, exceptional cases, it is sufficient to answer, Yes, truly they are only positive precepts, the ground of which is in the divine will; but exactly the same is true of the whole Decalogue. It is only a series of positive precepts, not one of which has any higher authority than those commands to which I have referred. The divine commands may differ in importance, but all have equal authority, because all are expressions of the same authoritative will.

Instead of making right absolutely independent of the will of God, I should prefer to make right relative to the divine purpose or presuppose that purpose. Hence, the divine purpose is determinative of the right as the end is determinative of the char-

acter of the means required for its accomplishment. Consequently, whatever conforms to the divine purpose and is promotive of it is right, and the contrary wrong. The divine purpose being immutable, the rule of right is necessarily so. This being true, we see why a thing is right because God determines it to be so. His commands being logically subsequent to his purposes, and subservient of these purposes, we readily see in what sense a thing is right, because he commands it. A thing is right because it conforms to God's will, and he commands it as a means of the accomplishment of that purpose.

This view makes God the Alpha as well as the Omega, and allows him to be the author of his own law.

SECTION 4.—*Nature of God.*

Most necessitarians that reject "The eternal nature of things as the ultimate ground of right," maintain that the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God.

Dr. Gregory quotes with full approbation Dr. Hodge, who says: "No higher reason can be assigned why any thing is right than that God commands it. This means (1) the divine will is the only rule for deciding what is right and what is wrong; (2) that his will is that which binds us, or that to which we are bound to be conformed. By the word *will* is not meant any arbitrary purpose, so that it were conceivable that God should will right to

be wrong, or wrong right. The will of God is the expression or revelation of his nature or is determined by it, so that his will as revealed makes known to us what his infinite wisdom and goodness demand. Sometimes things are right simply because God commands them, as circumcision and other ritual institutions were to the Jews. Other things are right because of the present constitution of things which God has ordained, such as the duties relating to property and the permanent relations of society. Others again by the immutable excellence of God. In all cases, however, so far as we are concerned, it is his will that binds us and constitutes the difference between right and wrong; his will—that is, as the expression of his infinite perfection—*so that the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God.*”

Dr. Gregory says: “The will of God, as the expression of his perfect character, is the ultimate ground or reason why the requirements of the supreme rule are right and binding. The true statement is, therefore, that the supreme rule is right and obligatory because it is the expression of God’s will, this again the expression of God’s character.” [Gregory’s *Christian Ethics*, pages 121, 122.]

1. Those that seek to find the ultimate rule of right in the eternal nature of things, earnestly protest against finding it in the divine nature. Dr. Haven says: “If right or wrong depends ultimately upon

the character of God, then we have only to suppose God to change or to have been originally other than he is, and our duties and obligations change at once. That which was a virtue becomes a crime; that which is a crime is transformed into a virtue. Had he been precisely the reverse of what he is, he had still been as now, the source of right, and his own character would have been as truly good and just and right as it is now. This is virtually to rob him of all character." This controversy between different schools of necessitarians seems to be of little theoretical or practical value. It seems to me to be as impossible for the divine nature to change as the eternal nature of things—just as impossible for a part to become equal to the whole, as for God to change his character. The first is a necessary truth, and God is a necessary Being. A necessary being, as far as I see, is as immutable as the eternal nature of things or as a necessary truth itself.

(1) Dr. Gregory charges Dr. Haven, as we have seen, with fatalism, and justly so. Dr. Haven might very properly charge Dr. Gregory and his school with the same thing, for it is very evident that if the divine will is the expression or revelation of this divine nature or is determined by it, then there is as little freedom in the divine will as there is in the eternal nature of things. It seems to be self-evident that if the divine will is an expression or revelation of the divine nature, or is determined by it, then the

divine volitions are as necessary as divine nature or the divine essence.

(2) The theory discriminates between the divine nature and the divine will, and assumes a causal or determinative relation between them; hence, action begins back of the will, and is, of course, independent of it. The will, therefore, acts only as acted upon, does not originate action, but transmits it. There is no form of fatality stronger than this, which binds the divine will and makes it, not the source of power, but the instrument through which power is transmitted. How power originates in the nature back of the will and independent of it, is inconceivable. If the will can act only as it is acted upon, and is determined by the determinative nature, how does the determinative nature originate action? Or is it, too, acted upon, or determined to action, by something back of it?

(3) This unknown determinant must have an antecedent and a cause to move it to action; and we are thus put hopelessly into the vortex of an eternal series of causes and effects. The only freedom this philosophy allows to the moral world, is the freedom of necessity. The Deity himself is bound by a power back of his nature and determinative of that nature, and this nature, in turn, binds or determines the divine will and constrains it to action.

(4) Neither Dr. Haven nor Dr. Gregory would be willing to say that the divine will is not constrained

to action by the divine nature. The only freedom they allow to God or man is freedom from restraint. This freedom Edwards called philosophical necessity; but Alexander, Hodge, Haven, Gregory, and others, by an unpardonable misnomer, call it the freedom of certainty.

The only escape from fatality is to be found, as elsewhere shown, by denying a causative or determinative relation between the divine nature and the divine will. The nature conditions but does not determine or cause volition.

2. The hypothesis that the divine nature is the ultimate source of the rule of right, is further objectionable on psychological grounds. By the divine nature is intended the divine character. Nature and character are considered the same. Hence the absurdity of a moral character independent of will. Dr. Haven says, "The will of God is the expression of his infinite being and perfect character." A thing and the expression of a thing are distinct things. This discriminates between character and will, and gives us the distorted conception of a perfect character with the will, which is the prime factor, left out. There evidently can be no "perfect character" without will.

3. Dr. Hodge and Dr. Gregory are not insensible that their hypothesis concerning the ultimate source of right is beset with some formidable objections. In disposing of these they seem not aware of the

fact that they make the ultimate source of right variable, putting it sometimes in the divine nature back of the will, and sometimes in the divine will itself.

(1) Dr. Hodge says: "Sometimes things are right simply because God has commanded them, as circumcision. . . . Other things are right because of the present constitution of things which God has ordained, such as the duty relating to property and the permanent relations of society. Others, again, are right because they are demanded by the infinite excellence of God." We have here various sources of right, (*a*) the divine nature independent of the divine will, (*b*) the will or command of God, (*c*) the constitution of things. Who can know when right has its source in the divine nature, when in the divine will or command, and when in the constitution of things?

(2) To assume different sources or grounds of right is simply absurd; for if there is only one God, there is, of necessity, only one source of moral obligation. If that source is the divine nature apart from the divine will, then it is not the divine will itself; and if it is either the divine nature or the divine will, it, of course, is not the "present constitution of things."

(3) Dr. Hodge and Dr. Gregory hesitate to say, though their theory imperatively requires them to say it, that the divine nature required circumcision and other Jewish institutions. These they felt com-

pelled to refer to the divine will, and in doing so, logically abandoned their theory. Circumcision and the Jewish institutions were special provisions for special purposes, and belong, of course, to the sphere of special providence, being out of the ordinary course of things. We must, hence, infer that all special and supernatural providences must be referred to the will and not to the nature of God.

4. All necessitarians find it necessary to their philosophy to limit, or in some manner fetter the divine will; hence, they posit divine sovereignty, not in the will itself, but in something back of the will—the nature of God, or the character of God, as it is sometimes inappropriately expressed. [The idea of a moral character without will is an impossible conceit.]

(1) “The will of God is the expression of his infinite being and perfect character.” [Gregory’s *Ethics*, page 122.] This obliterates the divine will as an attribute, and substitutes in its place the *acting* of the divine intelligence and sensibility. It is a disguised form of the old psychology which confounds sensibility and will. This is the stronghold of necessitarianism and of metaphysical infidelity as well. All necessitarians will readily concur in this view of the divine will.

(2) Dr. Haven puts it stronger than Hodge and Gregory. He says: “God’s law is but the expression of his will, and his will is but the expression and

transcript of his character. *It is his nature in action.*" (The italics are mine.) This is the doctrine of necessity in its strongest form. The divine will as an attribute is obliterated, and the *acting* of the divine nature is made to take its place. This robs God of personality and freedom and of all moral qualities, and resolves him into an omnipotent, unconscious, and purposeless force, governing all things but himself—the God, not *whom*, nor *that*, but *which*, pantheists and nature worshipers love to honor.

SECTION 5.—*The sovereign will of God.—The true theory.*

1. If we find the Ultimate Ground of Right in the "eternal nature of things," we by logical consequence undeify the Deity, and make him a sort of second link in the chain of destiny and the executive of a law not his own, but which he adopts from necessity. It, hence, follows that the universe not only exists, but exists exactly as it is from a remorseless necessity. This theory, excluding all true liberty from the divine mind, of course excludes it from all creature minds, and allows to God and men only the liberty of necessity which gives no sufficient ground of creature accountability, or a true morality, or a true religion.

2. If we find the Ultimate Ground of Right in the nature of God, we, by logical consequence, make his acts as necessary as his being and nature, and constitute him the first link in the chain of destiny. This scheme, no less than the other, excludes all true

liberty from the mind of the Creator, and, of course, from all created minds. The world exists of necessity, and could not by possibility be, either in its physical or moral aspects, in any respect different from what it is. The only liberty possible to the Creator or his creatures is the liberty of necessity. If God is free, a moral world is possible. If he is under necessity, no such world is possible. If man is free, then a true morality and a true religion are possible.

3. Hence, the highest interests of a true morality and a possible religion imperatively require us to find the ultimate rule of right in the divine will or purpose, and not in any thing back of that will or purpose. This hypothesis, I hesitate not to affirm, gives by its logical consequences the true theory and the only true theory of the moral world. This alone constitutes God a moral governor and man accountable and renders a true morality and a true religion possible.

4. *Objections to this theory.*—All necessitarians, and most predestinarians as well, quite consistently reject this theory of the ultimate rule of right. To posit divine sovereignty in the divine will would, they seem to apprehend, endanger the stability of the moral world. A will free, omnipotent, and absolute, would be, in their esteem, a dangerous thing; hence, they bind it in their philosophy—happily, only in their philosophy—either to the eternal nature of things or to the nature of God, as effect is bound to cause.

(1) Dr. Gregory, having stated the theory in an exaggerated form, proceeds to demolish it. He says: "The view [is] inconsistent. From the very nature of God as an infinitely wise and perfect being there can be no arbitrary will of God. To attribute arbitrary purposes to a being of infinite wisdom and love is to bring him down to the level of fallen humanity, and to give to him an attribute which belongs to man only, as he is a fallen being. The will of God is the expression of his infinite being and perfect character. The reasons may not always be known to us why God wills that men should do some particular act, but so far as he has seen fit to reveal the grounds of his requirements, they uniformly commend themselves to right reason. God never has done and never can do an unreasonable and arbitrary deed, and he never has made and never can make an unreasonable and arbitrary requirement." [Ethics, page 121.]

Remarks.—(a) The first thing in this remarkable argument worthy of notice is its utter irrelevancy. Those that posit the ultimate ground of right and obligation in the divine will, are as far from charging God with making unreasonable requirements as is Dr. Gregory or any one else. To prove that God's requirements are not unreasonable is not to prove that the divine will is not free from a causal and determinative connection with the divine "nature" or "character." This is the vital issue between the theory in hand and his own theory.

(b) If by an "arbitrary will" he means a will that is unconditioned, then he is simply fighting a phantom of his own creation, for no such will exists in even "fallen humanity."

(c) It is proper enough to speak of arbitrary acts, but "arbitrary will" is "jumble" in terms; about equal to *voluntary volition*. The word arbitrary is sometimes used to express a tyrannical or an unjust act, but is never so used by ethical writers in relation to the divine Creator. Its synonym is *absolute*. By the absolute, or "arbitrary will (?) of God," is meant not that the act of his will is unconditioned by his "infinite wisdom and love," but that his volitions are free, not limited by any rule or law except such as is self-imposed. He is responsible to none for what he does. None can say to him, What doest thou? This arbitrariness is compatible with the highest wisdom and benevolence. All divine purposes, both those that are and those that are not, determinative of the states of the object to which they relate, are absolute or arbitrary. Creation was an arbitrary act. God was free to create or not to create. Having determined to create, he was limited by no other will or by no rule or plan, except his own self-originated, self-imposed ideals.

The real point at issue is whether the divine will is necessitated or only conditioned by the divine intelligence. Upon this issue is staked the freedom of the moral world. The will and purpose of God, absolute

or arbitrary in character, are immutable. The ground of this immutability is not necessity, but infinite wisdom. There can be no change of will or purpose in relation to what infinite wisdom sees to be perfect. God can not change his purpose for the simple but all-sufficient reason that he has and can have no motive for changing. Even a man or an angel can not knowingly and intentionally change the better for the worse, the perfect for the imperfect.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ULTIMATE END OF RATIONAL ACTION. .

1. Every action implies both a motive and end. These are intimately related, one implying the other. Every motive consists of some form of desire, and every desire has an object. The end of an act is the object of the desire or motive of the act. Owing to this dependent relation they are often confounded without serious embarrassment.

2. While all concede that every act must have an end—must be intended to accomplish some object—yet all are by no means agreed as to what constitutes the ultimate and supreme end of action. A brief review of the principal theories will enable us the better to understand the general subject, and to form a more satisfactory scheme for ourselves.

SECTION I.—*The disinterested theory.*

I.—*Dr. Gregory's opinions.*

1. Dr. Gregory having reviewed and rejected utilitarianism and perfectionism in their various forms, says (*Ethics*, page 99): "The third general theory finds the supreme end of rightness rather in its tendency to happiness or to perfection. Rectitude is the highest good of man. That course of conduct which aims to conform to the right is so far virtuous, and

virtuous because it aims to do this. *This may be called the disinterested or unselfish theory of virtue.* It regards the right as itself the supreme end, and therefore neither needing nor admitting any end beyond itself. If any course of conduct be right, then the moral nature binds him to follow it regardless of tendencies or consequences. *Virtue consists in doing right for its own sake."*

2. This is perhaps the popular view of the subject. It seems to me defective for many reasons, only two of which will here be stated.

(1) It manifestly confounds means and ends. It makes *right*, rectitude, virtue, an end to itself, or men to do right for the sake of the right, and not for the sake of something else; for example, as a good conscience to which right action is a means and the only means. The advocates of this plausible theory, it seems to me, deceive themselves by the use of these abstract terms, right, rectitude, virtue, conceiving them to be something more than general terms which express only our conceptions of classes of objects having certain characteristics. They seem to forget that there is positively no such thing as rectitude, etc., apart from the concrete. There is such a thing as a virtuous man, but there is no such thing as virtue apart from an intelligent mind. If we will drop the abstract and use the concrete, it may to some extent dispel the fog. Then our author, instead of saying, Rectitude is the highest good of man, will

say, A right act is the highest good of man; which, as far as I can see, means nothing. Or instead of saying, "*Virtue consists in doing right for its own sake,*" he will say, Doing a right act consists in doing a right act. This is a pitiful truism which Dr. Gregory could not have perpetrated were he not misled himself by the word virtue. Nor is this truism in any way relieved by subjoining to it the adjunct, "for its own sake," for then it becomes equivalent to saying, A right action is for the sake of a right action, or an action is an end to itself, which brings the matter to an absurdity, because it confounds motive, act, and end of action. Certainly no truth in philosophy is more simple or more universally admitted in practice than that no act, human or divine, is an end to itself, or put forth for its own sake. Such a thing is simply inconceivable. On the contrary, all acts sustain to their objects the relation of means to ends. If I speak the truth to my neighbor, I do not do it for the sake of speaking the truth, but as a means of giving him information or of protecting my reputation or my conscience, and not for the sake of the act itself. The reader can, if he chooses, apply the rule to a thousand cases. He will find it invariable. Now, let it be borne in mind that right, rectitude, virtue, are nothing but general names for right acts, and he can not fail to see that these terms and their synonyms denote nothing but means, and that means can not be an end to itself. Hence, to say that "virtue consists

in doing right for its own sake," confounds means and ends, than which nothing can be more absurd.

(2) It seems supererogative to say that the testimony of consciousness does not avouch but actually crushes the theory. We are conscious of a motive and of an object and of an act; also conscious that the motive and the corresponding act both relate to the same object. But we are not conscious that we act for the sake of acting.

II.—*Dr. Gregory on end and tendency of action.*

1. Dr. Gregory having conceded that virtuous action "secures happiness because it is virtuous," feels himself under the necessity of discriminating between tendency and end, so as to make them independent of each other. Without such distinction he can not possibly escape utilitarianism. He says (page 105): "The first and second general theories [utility and perfection] confound the tendency or results or consequences of moral action with the end or aim of it. Virtue, doubtless, tends to produce both happiness and perfection, but its end or aim is the right, and not the happiness nor the completeness of being."

2. This statement is repeated in various forms, and Dr. Alexander and Dr. Newman are quoted to the same effect, but the real issue is sufficiently given in the above quotation. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of students have no doubt been made to believe that no act not done for its own sake, can be morally right

in the actor. The question is a vital one in speculative morals, and should be thoroughly sifted.

3. Let us see precisely wherein these two theories—that which makes virtue an end to itself and that which makes it a means to an end—agree and disagree on this point.

(1) They agree that obedience to the divine will secures the highest happiness.

(2) They agree that this highest happiness can be secured only by this obedience.

4. This gives authority for the general statement that obedience to the divine will is both the condition and the infallible guaranty of this happiness. Hence, obedience given, happiness necessarily follows, as effect follows cause. But, no obedience, no happiness, no cause, no effect. The theories, then, are perfectly agreed as to the tendencies, or results, or consequences of moral action, or obedience. So much for the "*tendency* of moral action" or obedience. Now the *end*.

(1) The Creator is himself the Author of this law of obedience. He alone has established this necessary relation between obedience and happiness. He then intended that obedience should necessarily secure happiness, and that this happiness should be secured in no other way. Or if he did not intend this, he did what he did not intend to do, which would not be accepted. Now then we have exactly this case. If the rectitude theory is true, then the Creator

has intentionally fixed a necessary connection between obedience and the highest happiness and, at the same time, has made it wrong, immoral, sinful, for men to seek that happiness as an ultimate end, or in fact to seek it at all. For to seek a thing is to make it an end of action. This is only one of the glaring absurdities of the theory. Again, according to the theory, God intends that the obedient shall secure happiness; but he also intends that they shall secure it by seeking something else. It is right to be happy, but it is morally wrong to desire to be so, or to seek happiness.

(2) The precise point of difference between the theories in relation to the end, is this: One makes duty, right action, obedience, the ultimate end; the other makes obedience to law a means to an ultimate end. That end is a good conscience, happiness, eternal life. According to the first, obedience is the final, ultimate, supreme end, or purpose, and to look beyond the act itself to its consequences, vitiates it, makes it utilitarian and an abomination in the sight of God. According to the second view, obedience is not an ultimate end, but if an end at all, is only an end subordinate to a higher end—that is, it is a means to something beyond itself.

5. It is certainly true that the great mass of Christians—all, I think—make duty an end in this subordinate sense, and at the instant, think only of the duty and not of the ultimate consequences of obedience at

all. But underlying this state of mind there is the deep conviction, strong as intuition itself, that obedience to God's will is the best thing possible; that the divinely established consequences of obedience will far overbalance whatever adventitious evils obedience may occasion. This obedience, too, may seem a joy and a delight to the mind, not really because of itself, but because of its immediate and happy effects upon the sensibility. It is much like food to the hungry and drink to the thirsty or rest to the weary. Such things apart from their effects are of no value, but are valuable only for their effects. We do not eat for the sake of eating, or rest for the sake of resting, but for the sake of their consequences. Hence, it is we love to eat and rest. So in reference to obedience. We render it, enjoy it, love it, for the sake of its consequences, immediate, or remote, or both.

6. The two theories, when reduced to their most simple forms stand thus: Paley desires a good conscience and makes this the end of his obedience. The result is a full realization of his end. Here the end and the result are not confounded, but philosophically related—that is, a good conscience is the divinely appointed sequence of the good intention. But Dr. Gregory does not desire a good conscience, nor does he make it an end of his obedience. Still he renders obedience for a wholly different end, from which he realizes nothing; but he does realize a good conscience, which it is wrong or unvirtuous to desire

or make an end of his obedience; or he realizes no good from his end of obedience, but realizes a good conscience which it is wrong to seek or desire. Surely this is putting the end and result of obedience far enough asunder. It makes the reward of virtue external, insequential, and adventitious, having absolutely no correlation to the states and activities of the mind.

III.—*Dr. Newman on end and tendency of moral action.*

1. Dr. Newman brings out, as an argument in favor of the rectitude scheme, a point that has not been noticed. He says (quoted by Dr. Gregory, *Ethics* p. 106): "All virtue and goodness tend to make men powerful in this world, but they who aim at the power have not the virtue."

2. It is simply marvelous that a discriminating mind should use this as an argument to prove that an act is an end to itself, and not a means to something beyond itself; or more properly, that a man acting with right intentions—a good man—acts simply for the sake of acting, and not for the sake of something beyond the action.

3. It is true that virtue and goodness tend to make men powerful in this world—that is, to give them influence over men. Other things being equal, the good man has more moral influence than a man known or believed to be bad.

4. It may be true but is not necessarily so, that

“they who aim at the power have not the virtue.” If this is necessarily and universally true, then good men can never aspire to power, for their own or their country’s sake, or for Christ’s sake, for to do so would be to prove themselves bad men. Men may aim at power for good as well as bad ends. “Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your Father which is in heaven.” Every precept in the Bible enjoining exemplary behavior authorizes men to aspire to power as a means of doing good. But the reader can not fail to see that all this has no pertinency to the simple issue as to whether a moral act—any act—is an end to itself or a means to an end.

5. Dr. Newman continues, “Again, virtue is its own reward, and brings with it the truest and highest pleasures.” The reader will not fail to observe that Dr. Newman in this brief proposition, puts himself squarely on both sides of the question. (a) “Virtue is its own reward.” (b) Virtue “brings with it the truest and highest pleasures.” The first proposition gives the essential characteristics of the rectitude theory; the second, the essential characteristics of the adverse theory. Dr. Newman contradictorily affirms both. Let us see if this is not so: A thing and what it brings, procures, produces, causes, are essentially different things, otherwise causes and their effects are identical, as the tree and its fruit. If virtue *is* its own reward then it can not bring or produce

its own reward. If it *produces* its own reward, then it is not itself its own reward. But Dr. Newman says, "It brings with it the truest and highest pleasure." This is exactly the theory of Hopkins, which is denounced not only as false but "disgusting."

6. Dr. Newman continues: "But, they who cultivate it [virtue] for pleasure's sake are selfish, not religious, and will never gain the pleasure, because they never can have the virtue."

(1) It is certainly true that, if to put forth an act for the sake of its consequences is wrong, then the act itself is wrong, because the motive is wrong. Now, I am very sure that Dr. Newman never put forth an act in his life except for the sake of its consequences. But I should hate to know that he is not both virtuous and happy. But why are such acts not virtuous? Because Dr. Newman tells us *they are selfish*, and selfishness in every possible form (it is falsely assumed) excludes the possibility of virtue.

We have already seen that this assumption is false and excludes the possibility of virtue from the world; that the moral law does not require us to love our neighbor to the exclusion of ourselves, but *as ourselves*; that Christ died, not for the sake of dying, nor only to save the world, but also for the "joy" of saving it.

(2) "Selfish, not religious," says Dr. Newman. Paul was selfish in the sense of loving *himself* as he loved others. He exercised himself "to have always

a conscience void of offense toward God and man." To have such a conscience was to his interest and a great pleasure—not to have it, a torment; hence, to have it, he labored, toiled, worked up himself; made it the *end* of his labor always. Yet he is supposed to have been a virtuous and a religious man. Now, if it is not immoral, or vicious, or irreligious, to labor for the sake of a good conscience and a conscience void of offense toward God and man, then it can not be so to labor "for the sake of everlasting life," for there is as much selfishness and utilitarianism in one case as the other.

7. To free the subject as far as possible from the mist that has been thrown around it, I will here make a few statements concerning *motivity*.

All motivity is purely subjective. It presupposes an object, but is not itself the object any more than thought and the object of thought, are the same. The motive, as I have repeatedly said, is always necessarily some form of desire. Desire is an uneasy feeling craving something which is its object. This object may be something outside of the mind, as a purse of gold, or it may be subjective, as to be free from pain or a bad conscience. This desire or feeling conditions all action, good or bad. If the end or intention of the action is in accord with the divine will, the actor is virtuous in so far as that act is concerned.

8. But in every instance the actor is in some sense selfish because he gratifies his *desire* for the object.

The act, or rather the actor, is necessarily selfish, but need not, ought not, to be criminally so, and, if he acts in accord with the will of God is not so. But in the very act of gratifying his own desire, the actor may become a benefactor to others, and thus in doing good to others, actually does good to himself. In the light of these facts, we clearly see the true philosophy of the Bible utterance which is a paradox to many, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." If selfishness in this sense is vicious, then it is demonstrably true that the Creator has so constituted the human mind as to make human virtue an impossibility. The Bible is full of this utilitarianism. It always appeals to men's interest as a motive to obedience; and it is a very significant fact that none of the advocates of the rectitude theory, so far as I know, ever appeal to Bible texts or examples to prove their doctrine.

IV.—*The practical rule of conduct.*

1. Dr. Gregory's final argument for his theory deserves brief attention. The argument is presented in three statements, which I will give consecutively. "a." He says (page 106): "To adopt either the first or second general theory of moral action, is to throw away the only plain and practical rule of life—the rule furnished by the right."

(1) These words by fair implication so essentially misrepresent the theory of Paley and Hopkins against whom he is arguing, that I can not understand how

their author could write them. The charge more than implied is that these men threw away the authorized rule of right, and adopted expediency as their standard of morality.

Such is the unavoidable impression upon the reader. In disproof of this charge, Paley distinctly says, "Virtue is doing good to mankind *in obedience to the will of God.*" Hence, he, instead of throwing away "the only plain and practical rule of life," distinctly avows the will of God as the rule. When did Paley ever withdraw this rule, or modify it, or propose to replace it by expediency?

(2) Let the reader fix it in his mind that Paley and Hopkins' rule is the will of God (of course as revealed in the Bible), this half-expressed and half-implied charge to the contrary, notwithstanding.

"*b.*" He continues: "The question asked concerning any act, Is this act right? may ordinarily be answered without difficulty by the simplest person, because right and wrong are intuitive ideas, and a standard of right and wrong has been put in men's constitution."

(1) Much need not here be said concerning the intuitive ideas of right and wrong, the subject having elsewhere been fully discussed.

(2) The doctrine distinctly avowed is that men intuitively know right and wrong in the concrete, or in every particular act. I have elsewhere shown that men have intuitive ideas in the abstract; also know

by intuition their own motives as right and wrong, but that no man knows by intuition whether any given act is right or wrong.

“c.” But the question, “What will be the tendency of this act or its results?” will often require Omniscience to answer it.”

(1) This is unmistakably true. Omniscience alone can know all the results, mediæte and immediate, of any action. But as Paley and Hopkins, no more than Gregory, make the results of an action determinative of its rightness, but only the proof of its rightness, Dr. Gregory’s argument has no force. In fact, it lies with equal or greater force against his own theory.

(2) Certainly there is an appreciable difference between the tendency or results of an act and the end of an act. The *result* is simply the *realization* of the intention or end of the act. In the Deity they are not confounded, yet they are inseparable, because he knows the proper means for every given end. But to finite minds the right means may not be known, and the result of a given action may not be the realization of the end.

2. Nearly all the unhappiness in the world results from this ignorance of the correlation of means to ends. Every rational human act is put forth in quest of happiness, gratification, satisfaction in some one of its innumerable forms. But the end of the act may fail of realization because of the inadequacy or misadjustment of means to the end. Hence, the trans-

cent value of a divine law or system of means, by true obedience to which the highest happiness—the universal end of human action—may be secured. But according to the rectitude theory, the result is never, in the creature, a realization of the intention, in fact, seems to have no psychological, but only an extraneous incidental relation to it.

V.—*Dr. Hodge on the disinterested theory.*

1. Dr. Hodge says (Theology, Vol. II., page 287): “This whole theory is founded on the assumption that happiness is the highest end, and that the desire of happiness is the ultimate spring, of all voluntary action. As both of these principles are abhorrent to the great mass of cultivated, and especially of Christian, minds; as men act from other and higher motives than a desire to promote their own happiness, there are few who, in our day, will adopt the doctrine that the will is as the greatest apparent good, as thus expounded. If, however, the word good be taken in a more comprehensive sense, including every thing that is desirable, whether as right, becoming, or useful, as well as suited to give happiness, then the doctrine is, no doubt, true. The will, in point of fact, always is determined in favor of that which, under some aspect, or for some reason, is regarded as good; otherwise, men might choose evil as evil, which would violate a fundamental law of all rational and sensuous natures.”

2. Dr. Hodge here severely denounces the theory

that "happiness is the highest [ultimate] end, and the desire of happiness is the ultimate spring of all voluntary action." He says, "Men act from other and higher motives than to promote their own happiness." He makes good the ultimate end of action, and the desire of good the ultimate spring of all volition. He does not very precisely define this "good," which is antithetical to happiness, but makes it somehow include "every thing that is desirable, whether as right, or becoming, or useful." Now, Dr. Hodge's theory is just as abhorrent to my convictions of truth as is the theory which he so vigorously opposes to him.

3. His good, it seems, includes three distinct things, not as factors of the good, but each as a good in itself.

(1) *The "right."* Dr. Hodge, like Dr. Gregory, makes right an end, and, of course, not a means to an end. The untenableness of this position is elsewhere sufficiently proved. It may not be amiss here to remind the reader that if right or virtue is an end to itself, then, of logical necessity, wrong or vice is equally an end to itself; for example, if a man steals a purse of gold, he does it for the sake of the act, not for the sake of the gold; and so of every other wrong act ever committed. The act is committed for the sake of the act, and not for something different from the act.

(2) *The "becoming"* is also a good, and as such an ultimate end of human action. This is a latitudinous word, and I do not know the precise sense here in-

tended, whether the beautiful, or the appropriate, or the fitness of things. But giving it any of these meanings, wherein is it incompatible with happiness taken in its Bible meaning? The *becoming*, in all these senses, and in every other allowed by good usage, is not only in full harmony with happiness, but is, in fact, a fruitful source of it.

(3) The "*useful*" is also a good and an ultimate end of action. But utility is the very essence of the theory which Dr. Hodge so sweepingly denounces. It is the very essence of the happiness theory in one of its numerous forms. To denounce a theory in form and admit it in principle is a very common mode of self-deception.

4. According to our author, to make the desire of happiness the spring of all volition is very "abhorrent to Christian minds," but to make what is "right, becoming, or useful," the object of supreme desire, is substantially the same thing if the terms are taken in their proper sense. But I think Dr. Hodge is more at fault in his terminology than in his real opinions as to the ultimate end of action. He means the word happiness to be taken in the sense in which it is used by certain sensualistic utilitarians—that is, to mean sensual and sensuous happiness, only. To restrict the word to this meaning is to surrender to sensualism a leading Bible word, and in this way create useless and very perplexing difficulties. The words happiness and blessedness, which some, to avoid what they

deem error, attempt to make antithetical are, in the Bible and everywhere else, except in some ethical writings, used as synonyms.

5. Who has vision keen enough to perceive a radical difference between being happy and being blessed when used as expressive of states of the human mind? To distinguish between them is to make a distinction without a difference. Happiness may be said to consist in the gratification of our desires. As we have different kinds of desires, some peculiar to our animal and some peculiar to our spiritual natures, so we are capable of happiness of different kinds. The sensualist has his sensual desires gratified and is sensually happy; the good man has his spiritual desires gratified and is spiritually happy. This is all plain enough and simplifies the whole subject of different kinds of happiness. This is the view and only view authorized by Bible terminology and Bible facts. It is observable that Dr. Hodge makes the ultimate end of action complex, the right, the becoming, and the useful. If the human mind is itself a unit, it seems to me unreasonable that it should have a diversity of ultimate ends. I can readily see how it may have a thousand subordinate ends all subservient of a supreme end; but how the same mind can, at the same time, have a multiplicity of ultimate or supreme ends, defies the power of comprehension.

6. Would it not be a good substitute for Dr. Hodge's theory and that which he opposes to say that

the ultimate or supreme end of all virtuous actions is the happiness of the moral world? This admits of an endless diversity of subordinate ends, and yet secures perfect unity in the supreme end, and in this respect is sufficiently scientific and easy of comprehension. It also secures perfect unity in the supreme end both of divine and human action. The Creator's supreme end in creation, in preservation, in redemption, is without reasonable doubt, that the world might be happy; or the ultimate end of his action is the happiness of his creatures. If this is the purpose of his action, is it not reasonable to infer that those bearing his image have the same ultimate end of action? Or is it not unreasonable, if not absurd, to suppose that God should create beings in his own image, and yet make their ultimate ends of action not only different from his own but in necessary conflict with it? God and his rational creatures form one family, he the father and they the great brotherhood. How necessary to harmony that all, the father and the brotherhood, should have the same ultimate end! Otherwise discord must inevitably follow.

7. This view, it seems to me, commends itself to right reason, or satisfies the imperative demands for unity between the purposes of the father and his household. It, moreover, is in full harmony with every thing in the Bible—is in fact taught by fair implication in the summary of the divine law, Love God, and thy neighbor as thyself.

SECTION 2.—*The Pexfection Theory.*I.—*Dr. Hickok's views.*

1. His scheme of ethics is, in some respects peculiar. He makes *reason* the ultimate rule of action. This he identifies with right and makes reason or right eternal, and of course independent of the Creator, and whose imperatives bind the Creator as they bind all other rational beings. He makes the ultimate end of virtuous action self-worthiness or rational dignity. He says (*Moral Science*, p. 39): "Nothing in this part [pure morality] acts as motive, but the sole consideration of the claims of spiritual excellency; and the obedience of the man is purely from a regard to what is due to rational dignity." Again (*ib.*): "The doing of the right, for the right's sake, is everywhere the only causality [motive] to action which is recognized in it" [pure morality].

2. If this scheme could be proven to be true, it seems to me that it would have to be supplemented by something outside of the theory itself to render it at all available for practical purposes. Reason is the rule, and "self-worthiness," "spiritual excellency," or "rational dignity," and the doing of right for right's or reason's sake is the motive. I have elsewhere sufficiently shown the absurdity of putting forth an act for the act's sake; or of confounding the motive, rule, and end of an act. But the point of special interest is, How is this scheme to be made available for the purposes of morality?

3. Reason is purely subjective. It has no existence outside of the mind itself. It is an attribute of all minds, of those fallible as well as of the infallible; as such in creatures, it is fallible. What seems reasonable to one mind, may seem unreasonable to all other minds. It may perceive truth and may discriminate between the true and the false but can not originate either one or the other. It may also fail to discriminate between them. It is infallible only in the sphere of necessary truth. In dealing with the concrete, it is liable as a faculty of finite minds, to egregious error. In any given case it may perceive or fail to perceive the truth; may pronounce the true false; or the false true. The individual may accept its dicta as his rule of right or as his rule of morality. Every other man may do the same thing; and there will be as many authoritative and ultimate rules of morality as there are individuals. Every man is a law unto himself and can be subject to no other law. Revelation is not only superceded by the natural reason, but is subordinate to the reason of the individual.

4. We certainly should not allow ourselves to undervalue the worth of this faculty, which chiefly distinguishes us from the animal world and which is the brightest lineament of the divine image. On the other hand, we should not deify it or make it supercede the supreme Governor of the moral world attributing to it functions which it does not possess. Overestimated

it is as much degraded in the ill effects which inevitably flow from this overestimation, as it could be by its underestimation and consequent neglect. Certainly a man should always follow the convictions of his individual reason; otherwise conscience (which is the emotional response of the reason) and the will necessarily come into collision, and self-degradation and remorse must follow. But this fact by no means excludes either the possibility or the necessity of an objective rule of morality, uniform in its demands and absolutely infallible and immutable.

5. This objective rule can not be the product of the finite reason, but must, of course, be the product of infinite reason, or, more properly, the product of the reason of the infinite mind. It is the prerogative of the infinite mind alone to determine this objective rule of morality and to reveal it to the finite mind. And it is the prerogative of the finite mind to interpret this objective rule in the light of its own reason, and by this means unify the objective and subjective law. Such a rule of morality is objective to the individual mind, because it is the product and the revelation of the infinite mind. It is subjective to the individual because he has interpreted it in the light of individual reason and adopted it as the standard of his morality. In this way we come to have a standard of moral rectitude which is available for all in Christianized countries; and still every man has his own reason for his guide.

6. Dr. Hickok proposes "spiritual excellency," "rational dignity," etc., as the ultimate end of right action. This is certainly a singular way of putting the awards of virtuous actions. Truly if a man does in the proper way every thing that he believes reason requires, he will experience a sense of spiritual excellency, rational dignity, self-complacency—that is, will have a good conscience as Saul of Tarsus had when he was persecuting the church. But if his reason has not correctly revealed the requirements of a true morality, he may have a sense of rational dignity, etc., even when violating fundamental principles of morality, as had Saul. The theory seems to favor the idea that whatever a man's reason indicates to be right is not only right to him but is absolutely right. This would be necessarily so only in case the individual reason is infallible.

7. The theory though ingenious is incapable of defense. But allowing it to be true, it resolves itself at last, into one form of the happiness theory which our author emphatically rejects. Let us see if this is not so. As we have seen fidelity to the behests of our reason, necessarily secures spiritual excellency, rational dignity, self-approbation; but these terms are all expressive of certain states of the sensibilities. They all denote, in fact, agreeable, happy, or joyful feelings, which is the very essence of the happiness theory in every form. Hence, if no happiness theory can be true, this can not be true.

SECTION 3.—*The True Theory.*I.—*Dr. Paley's views.*

1. He says (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 44): "Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God for the sake of everlasting happiness," according to which definition "the good of mankind is the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive, of human virtue."

2. Strong and often bitter have been the denunciations against this definition of virtue by writers of the rectitude theory generally. Dr. Gregory characterizes it as "*gross religious self-interest.*" Dr. Blakie says, "It is a definition which contains *as many errors as it contains clauses.*" Hodge, Alexander, Dabney, and many others severely denounce it. These writers, however, have found it easier to denounce the doctrine than to disprove it; hence, many of them are satisfied with bare denunciation without attempting a refutation; others hurl their dialectical missiles against it with all possible force. But after all that has been said against it, there seems to be no sufficient reason for abandoning it in the interest of the rectitude theory. If one or the other of these theories must be accepted, then Paley's is the preferable one, because less irrational and less unscriptural.

3. Dr. Gregory's argument against it is, perhaps, as sound as that of any other writer. He admits that the will of God has an important relation to virtue, but says, "Two of the clauses are certainly errone-

ous" (Ethics, p. 101); that is, the second clause is admitted but the first and the third are rejected. The definition is confessedly defective; still much might be said in its defense, enough, at least, to show that it is not the sum of all defective ethical definitions. Dr. Gregory urges against the first clause the following argument: "It can readily be seen that *the doing good to mankind* is not an essential element in the definition, for however much prominence Christianity gives to works of charity and brotherly kindness, it is certain that virtue of various kinds may be exercised where no men exist to be the objects of benevolence; as with Adam in paradise, and Robinson Crusoe in his desert island, and the poet Campbell's 'Last Man.'"

4. Is not doing good to mankind right, and does it not denote virtue in the doer? "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink." "Whoever giveth a cup of cold water to a disciple in the name of a disciple, shall not lose his reward." If doing good to men, in obedience to the will of God, does not constitute virtue in the doer, then alas! where are we to find it? But it is said, "Virtue of various kinds may be exercised where no men exist to be objects of benevolence, as Adam in paradise." Virtue of various kinds? It would have been gratifying if our author had specified some of these virtues. It might be denied whether there are any other virtues than those rendered to mankind.

5. The Scriptures, I think, recognize no other duties

than such as we owe to the Creator and to mankind. Services rendered to God might be considered acts of piety rather than acts of virtue. To render services to mankind is recognized as services rendered to God. "Inasmuch as ye have done it to one of these, the least of my brethren, ye have done it unto me." But not to do good unto man is to deny service unto God. "Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to me." Again, to discharge duty to God is to render essential service to mankind. The Creator requires the services of his creatures, not because they are of any personal advantage to him, but for the good of those who render them and of those who may be profited by the example. The Creator was not profited by the piety of Abel but Abel was profited by it; and the example lives to bless the ages. "He being dead yet speaketh."

6. It thus appears that "the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God" is well-nigh the sum of human virtue. Paley's powerful analytical mind evidently so regarded it and he was not far from the truth. But this aside, if any act is done in obedience to the will of God, is it not a virtue in the doer? If not a virtue then it must be a vice and an aggravated vice; because according to the rectitude theory, it is done for the sake of the reward; or because the deed was not done for its own sake. If this is true, Noah was sinful and not virtuous in building the ark to save himself and family. He ought to have built the

ark for its own sake and not for the sake of himself and family. Moses, in forsaking Egypt, was vicious and not virtuous because he had respect to the recompense of reward. And what of the blessed Christ, who *for the joy that was set before him*, endured the cross despising the shame?

7. But why could not Adam do good to mankind in paradise? Had his children no interest in his dressing and keeping the garden and in his naming and domesticating the animals? Do not men's acts of virtue live after them? Does not Abel's piety bless the world to-day? But if Adam could do good to no one else, could he not do good to himself and wife? or before he had a wife, then to himself, then the absolute whole of all mankind? In like manner Robinson Crusoe and the "Last Man" could do good to themselves which was the limit both of their ability and their obligation.

8. Dr. Gregory says: "Equally false is the clause that teaches that everlasting happiness is the proper motive to virtuous action." He then quotes as proof of his statement from *Four Phases of Morals*, pp. 371, 372, 373. This writer felt it necessary to set aside the force of the text, "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." He says this text "is very far from furnishing a warrant for the general proposition, that the sure expectation of an everlasting reward is a motive necessary for the existence of virtue in this mortal life."

9. The reader will note the exaggerated form in which Paley's proposition is put. Whatever else the text may authorize, it does unmistakably assure us that Paul and others voluntarily endured the hardships and privations connected with the Christian life for the sake of a better life to come, which is all that Paley asserts. It is useless, and in fact a begging of the question, to intimate that Paul's case was exceptional, for the law of right action is not one thing in one man and something else in another. The substance of Paley's proposition is that men do right for the sake of the consequences of right doing; or to avoid the ill consequences of wrong-doing. If this is not universally true, consciousness is a false witness; and a rational psychology is impossible. But, as all can readily see, this is not to do right for its own sake, but for the sake of the consequences of doing right. Our author refers to the case of Socrates to disprove Paley's theory, and asserts that, according to this theory, "either the virtue of Socrates was no virtue at all, or a virtue above the standard of any Christian virtue." The argument is that Socrates knew nothing certainly about everlasting life, and therefore could not do right in order to attain it. This is a mere play upon terms. Socrates, no doubt, like every other man, had his rule of right and obeyed its requirements for the sake of the consequences of this obedience.

9. Our author says, "But, in fact, the prospect of an external reward, is no part of any virtue." Certainly.

Nor does Paley or any other sane man say it is, and to impute this to Paley is to misrepresent him. Is eternal life an *external* reward? It is simply the divinely established sequence of obedience to the divine will, and is purely subjective, sustaining the same relation to right action that conscience sustains to acts of the will. Another irrelevant illustration, or rather caricature, of Paley's theory given by our author is in these words: "To give away ten pounds to-day with a sure expectation of getting a thousand pounds for it to-morrow would be no act of generosity." Not generosity, but commercial shrewdness, rather. God promises eternal life to those that believe. A believes and receives eternal life. He gave, not ten pounds, but only his confidence, and received much more than ten thousand pounds. Believing was an act of obedience to the divine will, and eternal life was the inevitable sequence and the supreme end of the act, without which end the act would not and could not have been put forth. So in every right moral act.

10. Our author quotes with approbation a sentence from Aristotle, who says: "A man is bound to be virtuous by the distinctive law of nature, whether he lives seventy years or seven hundred years." I cordially accept this statement, nor is there any thing in it in conflict with Paley's definition of virtue, or that specially favors that of our author, except on the assumption that virtue consists in doing right for right's sake, which is the thing to be proved.

11. Having examined every point in Dr. Gregory's argument against Paley's theory of virtue, the reader is prepared to judge for himself. The reproach of Paley's theory is its utilitarianism. On this account it has been made a by-word and a hiss by teachers and pupils. This, I am persuaded, is in part the result of prejudice and in part the result of unclear thinking.

12. It may not be out of place in this connection to examine somewhat this word *utility*, which is a stench to so many ethical olfactories.

(1) Utility means usefulness, profitableness, serviceableness, or any thing that, as agent or instrument, is productive of good effects. It is one of the most popular words in our language. It is called to render indispensable service in every department of human life, and is everywhere commended as a crowning excellence except in speculative morality, where, as if by some metamorphic legerdemain, it becomes bitterness to the taste, loathsomeness to the eye, discord to the ear, and a stench in the nostrils.

(2) In every department of human activity—even in practical morals—it is regarded as a thing worthy of the highest commendation. But in speculative morals it becomes a great vice, an execrable moral deformity. Almost every human act has two sides—a secular and a moral side. On the secular side, what is of no utility is considered worthless—even an incumbrance—and not to be tolerated at all; but on the

moral side, the same act of utility and of personal advantage, if it is not put forth for its own sake, but as a means to an end, becomes vicious, because it is, in some sense, selfish; for example, I sell a horse as a means of enabling me to pay a debt. This is a secular act, and is a means to an end; but it is also a moral act, because voluntary, and as such is morally right or wrong. But, according to the theory, if it is performed as a means to an end, and is as such of utility, or is not performed for its own sake, it is wrong or sinful. Hence, both rightness and wrongness, utility and inutility, selfishness and unselfishness, must be affirmed of the same act. This is the sum of all absurdities, excluding (logically only) the possibility of all virtue from heaven and earth.

13. This rectitude theory (pretentiously so called, as if it alone was capable of rectitude) receives its principal plausibility from the popular notion of disinterested benevolence, so called, and especially from the word selfishness as generally understood. The former is elsewhere discussed; the latter will now receive brief attention.

(1) In the estimation of men generally the terms disinterestedness and selfishness are completely disjunctive and antithetical. What is not disinterested is selfish, and conversely. But selfishness is the essence of all moral evil, and all selfish men are necessarily void of virtue. Hence, a man to be virtuous, must be in every sense unselfish, or a man of

disinterested benevolence. The reasoning is plausible, but involves essential error. Where then is the subtle fallacy? I think its lurking place can be distinctly pointed out. The error lies precisely in the assumption that selfishness is in every sense incompatible with virtue.

(2) In the first place, as elsewhere shown, there is no such thing in the popular sense, as disinterested benevolence, in heaven or earth. In the second place, the word selfishness, in one sense, is the essence of all sin; but in another sense, it is not wrong at all. Whatever touches self, or appeals to the interest of self, or promotes self-good, is of course in some sense selfish. The selfishness which is incompatible with all virtue is pure self-willfulness—an utter disregard to the rights and well-being of others, refusing to do unto others as we would have others do unto us, or to love our neighbor as we love ourselves.

(3) Selfishness, in the sense in which it is perfectly compatible with the highest virtue, is not an utter disregard to self-good, or disinterestedness; but is the characteristic of a will subordinated to proper authority, which is as regardful of the rights and happiness of others as of our own, which seeks to do unto others as we would have others do unto us, and to love our neighbor (not to the exclusion of self, as the rectitude theory requires) *as we love ourselves*.

(4) This view of the subject enables us to see the

perfect compatibility of utility, and a proper self-love with the highest form of virtue. It also enable us to see how I can sell my horse as a means of paying my debts without being guilty of a breach of morality.*

II.—*The radical defects of Paley's theory.*

1. Paley's definition of virtue is less defective than is his theory of right founded upon it. The fundamental principles of his theory are—

(1) That the Creator wills the happiness of all his rational creatures;

(2) That he has conditioned their happiness upon obedience to his will;

(3) Whatever is consistent with the divine will is right.

(4) Whatever produces happiness is right.

2. He says (page 60): "We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and this conclusion being established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely: 'That the method of coming at the will of God concerning any action by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.' " On page 61, he

* The universe, I am persuaded, is constructed after a utilitarian ideal. To assume the contrary is to assume that God created it without a purpose, or simply for the sake of creating it. If he created it for a purpose or if the act of creating was a means to an end, the creature ought to be allowed to follow the example of the Creator. I therefore conclude that utility is a law of the universe, otherwise it has no law.

says: "So, then, actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule that constitutes the obligation of it." On page 68 he says: "Now, because moral *obligation* depends, as we have seen, upon the will of God, right, which is correlative to it, must depend upon the same!" In a note he says (page 61): "Actions are right or wrong according to their tendency. The agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his design. . . . It is evident that our concern is with actions in the abstract."

3. From these quotations we learn that some of the fundamental principles of Paley's theory are—

(1) That God wills the happiness of his rational creatures. This is true.

(2) That he conditions their happiness upon obedience to his will. This is true.

(3) Whatever is consistent with the divine will is right. This is true of intentions.

(4) Whatever is expedient, or produces happiness, is right. This is ambiguous. It may be taken to mean, first, that an action produces happiness because it is right; or, secondly, that it is right because it produces happiness.

a. The first is in harmony with the idea that the will of God is determinative of right, and is evidently the sense in which Paley intended it to be taken. Utility, he means, does not make an act right, but is proof that it is right. He does not say that utility

makes an action right, but that it is the criterion by which an action is adjudged or proven to be right. If this is not what Paley means, then he palpably contradicts himself by making two distinct things causative of right in the same sense, viz.: the will of God and utility.

b. The second—that an act is right because it produces happiness—is the sense in which Paley's critics generally understand his words, "Whatever is expedient is right." His language on page 62 seems to favor this view; still, it may be understood to mean that the Creator, desiring the happiness of his creatures, has ordained that only such actions as are right or in harmony with his will, shall be useful or productive of happiness. Be this as it may, Paley is grievously at fault in the manner in which he puts the matter. Instead of saying that "whatever is expedient [or useful] is right," he should have said with Whately, "Nothing but the right can ever be expedient."

If the Creator wills the happiness of his creatures, and conformity to his will is the essence of right, then it clearly follows that whatever is right is expedient or useful or contributes to human happiness in the proper sense of the word. But if right is to be ascertained only by the consequences of our actions, then in many, in fact, in all cases, it would require omniscience to know the right, because omniscience alone can know all the consequences, near and remote, of an act.

4. Another defect of this theory is, it predicates right and wrong of the actor and act in the same sense. As elsewhere seen, moral qualities are predicable only of agents and not of their acts. Acts apart from the intentions of their authors are right or wrong only in the sense of proper or improper. According to Paley, "Right is a quality of persons or of an action" (page 69). A good intention makes the person virtuous, and good consequences make the action virtuous or right, and conversely. But we know the intention may be good, and the act put forth for the accomplishment may be followed by bad consequences. This shows that the intention and the act can not be good or bad in the same sense. The intention alone has moral quality. The act apart from the intention has no moral quality, but is right or wrong in the sense of prudent or imprudent, fit or unfit.

5. Another defect in Paley's theory is that he makes the bad consequences of an action the measure of its guilt, or the reason for its punishment. He says (page 65): "The reason for prohibiting and punishing an action (and this reason may be called the *guilt* of the action, if you please) will always be in proportion to the whole mischief that would arise from the general impunity and toleration of actions of the same sort." The principle here stated is, I think, essentially erroneous.

(1) It rests on the assumption that abstract actions

are morally right or wrong in themselves, which we have seen can not be true.

(2) If this were so, still it would not be true that the guilt of a bad act is measured by its objective or external consequences, nor is the guilt of the author of a crime proportionate to the objective bad consequences of his action, for these bad consequences generally largely depend upon circumstances and accidents of which the actor has no knowledge, and which do not enter into his intentions at all. If a man's guilt is always determined by the bad objective consequences of his action, Adam would be guilty, in a measure, at least, of all the sins of humanity, for all sin is, in one sense, the bad consequence of his rebellion. But in fact, I suppose his guilt is no greater than that of other men who have sinned with the same amount of knowledge. An act from a good intention may result in bad consequences, a thousand-fold greater than the same act from a bad intention. Good often comes of acts of bad intention; for example, the sale of Joseph. On the contrary, evil often comes of acts of good intention. In such cases, the intention is right, but the act improper, or not pertinent. Lawyers, preachers, physicians, and all classes, make this mistake.

(3) Again, on Paley's principle, a man has no possible method of knowing whether he is guilty or innocent of many crimes, because no man can know all the consequences, direct and indirect, near and

remote, of his acts. John Huss died a martyr to his convictions, and his integrity is generally commended; but if a man is responsible for all the consequences of his acts, Huss was a *particeps criminis* of his own death, for it was in one sense a consequence of his own integrity. A man, it seems to me, is morally responsible for the consequences of his actions only so far as these consequences are or may be foreseen as possible. This, I think, is the extent of the responsibility. To extend it beyond this involves the whole question of responsibility in the utmost perplexity and incomprehensibility.

6. Again, Paley's distinction between the *particular* and *general* bad consequences of actions is not satisfactory. Perhaps the greatest defect involved in this distinction is its failure to recognize the subjective consequences of bad actions or their effects upon the actor. Paley's conception of a moral government is largely conformed to the requirements of civil law rather than natural, or the human is made to furnish the model for the divine.

(1) This fault is not peculiar to Paley, but more or less vitiates the schemes of many other authors. Human laws, because they can do no better, deal mainly with the external acts of men, and only occasionally with their intention. Their awards to good and bad men are from necessity objective or external—as external benefactions to the law-abiding, and fines, imprisonment, corporal punishment, and civil

disabilities to the disobedient. Human punishments are arbitrary, do not grow necessarily out of the act or crime, may be deferred or never inflicted at all, may be discontinued without any change in the moral state of the criminal. They are purely objective in kind.

(2) Paley and many other writers, ethical and theological, make the moral government of God conform to these characteristics of civil governments. They pretermit all distinctions between the purely judicial visitations of the moral Governor for special administrative purposes, as the Deluge, the judgments upon Egypt, and the strictly retributive punishments of sin, or such punishments as grow inevitably out of the crime, and can not be set aside except by a change in the moral state of the criminal. Hence, the moral transgressor is represented as exempt from penalty till the final judgment, just as the civil transgressor is exempt till his formal trial by the court. This imports into the moral government of God the inevitable defects of human governments.

(3) A truer analogy is found between physical and moral law. The consequences or penalties of violated physical law are subjective, inevitable, coincident with the transgression, and are removable only by a change from the abnormal to a normal state. So it is in regard to the penalties of moral law. There is just as much philosophy in saying a man may put his hand into the fire and not experience the injury

till the day of judgment as to say a man may violate a moral law and not experience its bad consequences till the day of judgment.

(4) The very first and greatest bad consequence of transgression is subjective, an effect upon the moral state of the transgressor himself, arraying him against the moral Governor, destroying his consciousness of innocence and filling him with conscious self-degradation. This transgression may be committed in thought, in purpose, and yet never be externally actualized. "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." In this case the bad consequences are exclusively subjective—that is, the effect is confined to the transgressor, and does not extend to others in any appreciable sense.

(5) Where the intention is externally actualized the bad consequences may be greater in some cases than in others. The external consequences of two murders will, perhaps, never be equally bad, for they are in all cases adventitious, and may depend on things outside of the knowledge and intentions of the murderer. To attempt, therefore, to determine the demeritoriousness of an action by its objective bad consequences is the utmost folly, because it is simply impossible. On the contrary, the true measure of demerit is to be found in the subjective consequences. This view of the subject requires us to predicate moral qualities of agents and not of their acts, and to make the demerit of an agent consist in the badness

of his motives and not in the bad consequences of his acts. This fixes the attention upon the mind, the heart, the motive, rather than upon the consequences of external acts, which we can never sufficiently know to make them a reliable guide to our moral conduct. We intuitively know whether our intention is right or wrong in any given act, and, keeping the intention right, we can not violate the subjective law of right within us, hence can not experience a sense of self-degradation or a bad conscience, and will, of course, be at peace with ourselves. This subjective rule is presumed to be in accord with the will of God, and if it is ascertained to be not so, this ascertainment enables us to make it so.

7. It may not be improper before closing this notice of Dr. Paley to say that he is not inconsistent with himself; that in the absence of revelation the rule of right must be ascertained from the consequences of human actions. He discarded *in toto* the doctrine of innate ideas. Of course, he denied the doctrine that men intuitively know the right and the wrong, and consequently have within them a sufficient rule of moral rectitude, as was stoutly affirmed by those holding the doctrine of innate ideas. Neither suspected that the truth lay between them, but each party claimed to have it in full. Rejecting the idea of an intuitive knowledge of right in every sense, Paley could do no better, in the absence of revelation, than to ascertain the right in morals by the good and bad

tendencies of human actions, just as the rule of prudence is learned in reference to secular matters. We learn what is right in the sense of pertinent or proper, in reference to all secular things, by the tendency or consequences of our actions. We do not know intuitively the proper or best method of cultivating the soil, or of building houses, or of prosecuting any vocation. We learn such things by experience, or we test our methods by their consequences. This knowledge we acquire by the study of nature outside of ourselves.

8. Paley applied this general rule, which is the only available rule in relation to secular matters, to morals. In doing this he committed a fatal error. He rightfully rejected the doctrine of those who asserted an intuitive knowledge of right and wrong in the concrete, but erroneously rejected such knowledge in relation to the abstract; also, the intuitive knowledge of the character of our intentions. Both parties held a part of the truth and both rejected a part, or Paley asserted less than the whole truth and his opponents more than the whole. Paley's error in interrogating nature for the rule of moral right originated from not studying human nature and in applying the secular rule to moral subjects.

III.—*President Hopkins' views.*

President Hopkins says (Lectures on Moral Science, p. 54): "If we suppose enjoyment, satisfaction, blessedness, to be wholly withdrawn from the uni-

verse, we should feel, whatever form of activity there might be, that its value was gone. It would be a vast machine producing nothing. But if we suppose the highest blessedness of God and his universe secured, we are satisfied. It must surely be difficult to satisfy those who can not find an adequate end in their own highest blessedness and in the highest blessedness of God and his universe." He elsewhere says: "Our supreme good is joy from holy activity in the love and service of God." Though the scheme is not formally stated, we clearly see that Hopkins makes the attainment of blessedness, satisfaction, enjoyment the supreme end of right action. In this he is surely right. Dr. Gregory calls this theory "*refined religious self-interest.*" He thinks it not so bad as "Paleyism," but is radically false, because of its "utilitarianism."

1. He says (Ethics, p. 102): "According to this scheme, the happiness which comes from holy activity is the supreme end contemplated in moral action." This is a fair statement of the theory.

2. He immediately proceeds to say: "The action which secures this happiness, this theory teaches to be virtuous because it secures the happiness, while the true theory would teach that it secures the happiness because it is virtuous." This is manifestly a misstatement of the theory, and is consequently in conflict with the first statement. If happiness comes from holy activity, then this happiness can not make the action from which it comes right or virtuous; or

more properly, can not make the actor virtuous. This would require the sequence to modify or determine the character of its antecedent, which is clearly impossible. Dr. Gregory has here inadvertently confounded the evidence of rightness with its cause. The fact that a given act or process secures the end intended is evidence that the act or process is right in relation to that end; but it would be absurd to say the end made the act which caused it right. This is too plain to require illustration. It is hence very clear that Hopkins did not teach that an action is virtuous because it secures happiness. On the contrary, he meant to teach, and does teach, that the action "secures the happiness because it is virtuous" which is exactly what Dr. Gregory says "the true theory would teach."

3. Dr. Gregory, after having put himself in full harmony with Hopkins in saying that virtue "secures the happiness because it is virtuous," proceeds to prove the whole theory false. He says (*Ethics*, page 103): "The fundamental error of this view is that of utilitarianism in general. It exalts happiness to the place of the supreme good and the supreme end of moral action. It is true it makes blessedness—a higher form of happiness than Paley's—prominent, but that does not exalt it above the essential selfishness of all utilitarian schemes. . . . In all such theories the intrinsic difference between moral good and moral evil is lost sight of."

(1) Dr. Gregory insists on a difference between happiness and blessedness, yet often uses them interchangeably. It is a matter of regret if there is a difference, that he has not clearly stated in what it consists. The words are synonyms in English, Greek, and Hebrew. To make distinctions where there are no differences tends to confusion.

(2) What Dr. Gregory deems the fundamental error in President Hopkins' scheme, I regard as its chief excellence—that is, its exaltation of “happiness to the place of the supreme good and the supreme end of moral action.” Dr. Gregory and his school seem to think that the universe exists, not for the pleasure of the Creator, for then it would be of necessity a means to an end, which he deems is ethical heterodoxy, but for its own sake, or as an end to itself. If this is so then it would be a thing of no value. As President Hopkins aptly and forcibly says, “It would be a vast machine producing nothing.”

(3) I hesitate not to say, that, according to the concurrent testimony of reason and revelation, the supreme end and the supreme value of the universe consist in feeling, in happiness, in love. Take this away and the remainder, huge as it may be, is a blank, a cold desolation, worse than nonentity, for being itself would be a calamity and a curse. All real value concentrates in feeling; and intellect and will—every thing in the mind and out of it—is subordinate to feeling, and are valuable or of utility only

so far as they are productive of happiness, blessedness, joyfulness. In the light of this conception, I can see some rational motive for creation—some rational grounds for moral distinctions, some necessity for the adaptation of means to ends. But in the light of the rectitude theory, all these and kindred subjects are veiled in worse than Egyptian darkness. If the world exists for its own sake or is an end unto itself, then it is not the product of an intelligent mind, and pessimism may be just as true as any thing else.

SECTION 4.—*Correct statement of the true theory.*

1. As we have seen action or influence is the only proof of existence. Whatever acts necessarily exists, and not to act is not to be at all. All action in this broad sense is either necessarily blind and purposeless as that of the winds and waves; or it is free, intelligent, having a purpose. If all action is necessary and purposeless, then there is a cause for things, but no rational, intelligent cause. If the world is the product of an intelligent and free act then this attests the existence of a rational free agent or actor whom we call God and whom we worship as God, none of whose acts are without a purpose or end; for if purposeless, then they are not the acts of a rational being.

2. Rational purposes admit of the relation of subordinate and supreme or ultimate ends—that is, the relation of means to a supreme end. Hence, there may be an indefinite number of ends all subservient

of the supreme end, but there can be but one supreme end of an act or series of correlated acts. If we regard creation as a single act, then that act could have but one supreme end. If we regard it as a series of correlated acts, then these acts could have but one ultimate end. If we regard it as a series of non-correlated acts, then we will have a number of creations wholly disconnected and independent with no unity of end, and one part of creation in conflict with another. The first hypothesis is no doubt the true one, the only one that commends itself to our reason, and that is supported by the first chapter of Genesis.*

3. The question here obtrudes itself upon us, What is this final end? This question, though much debated, seems to me to be satisfactorily answered by the concurrent testimony of reason and revelation. It is sufficient for present purposes to know how revelation answers it; and to know that reason, the book of nature, or science, or what not, fully accords with this answer. "For thy [God's] *pleasure* they

* If the word *created* in the first verse means to *originate* then it in the subsequent parts of the history means only to form or construct out of materials previously existing. If it, in the first verse, does not mean to originate, then it must mean *purpose to originate*; and unitizes creation, because for the Deity to purpose is to do. If this is true then it is a matter of the utmost certainty that the creative act has not a diversity of final ends but one end alone. In fact the idea of a diversity of ultimate ends in the act of creation is inconceivable.

were, and were created." (Rev. iv. 11.) This brief proposition throws a flood of light, not only upon the origin of the universe, but upon the subject of psychology and the end of universal action. Hence, it deserves a little special attention.

(1) The text, it is true, affirms the final end of the creative act only in relation to human beings; but, as we have seen, there can be but one final end in relation to all created things. If the divine pleasure is the reason, purpose, or end for the creation of men it must be so in relation to every thing. What different or other ends can we conceive the Creator to have for the creation of any thing?

(2) The text teaches that the end of creation and the end of preservation or providence are identical. The form *were and were* suggest this idea. We also infer it from the immutability of the divine purpose. It in fact is not an unreasonable belief that the act of creation and the act of preservation are the same, or, in other words that the act of preservation is simply the continuity of the act of creation, and not a continuous succession of new creations, as Edwards and others teach. But in either event or any possible event, the text alleges unity in the final end of creation and providence, namely, "*thy pleasure.*"

(3) Pleasure, let it be observed, is expressive of emotion, happiness, satisfaction, enjoyment. If the ultimate end of the act of creation and that of providence is the same, then the "pleasure" which the

Creator purposed to himself in creation is identical with the "joy" he set before him in redemption. It is hence necessarily true that the Creator acts, not for the sake of acting, but for the sake of the "joy," "pleasure" that comes from acting; or his acts are not ends, but means to ends. But this imputes to the Creator selfishness, utility. Certainly it does, and this we might hesitate to do if he himself had not taught us to do so.

(4) If it should be said that the word pleasure is sometimes used in the sense of the word *will*, and that this sense of the word in this text would materially modify its meaning, we grant it. But because it is sometimes so used it does not follow that it is so used in this instance. Besides, to give it this meaning in this instance would make the text unintelligible. Its true meaning must be in harmony with Heb. xii. 2, which asserts the ultimate end of the act of redemption to be the joy, pleasure, satisfaction of the Redeemer.

(5) From these facts it is evident that the ultimate end of all divine acts is the pleasure, the joy, the happiness of the Creator.

4. Now, it is a necessary inference that if such is true of the acts of the Creator, such must be true of the acts of all his intelligent creatures, for it is incredible that he should form creatures in his own image, having in a finite measure his own essential attributes, and so constitute them as to make the ultimate

ends of their acts essentially different from that of his own. It is, if possible, still more difficult to conceive it to be right for the Creator to make his own pleasure, joy, happiness, the ultimate end of his own action, and radically wrong for his creatures to do the same thing. Certainly the highest excellence of the creature is to be like the Creator in purpose, and the injunction, "Follow me," relates to intention rather than external acts.

5. It is inconceivable that the Creator should act with the view of his own unhappiness. He, then, does act for his own pleasure, or else acts without any end at all, which would assume his action to be irrational. Exactly the same facts are true of all rational creatures. It is, hence, very clear that all rational action finds its ultimate end in happiness. If the reader has any doubt as to this conclusion, let him suppose it to be an indubitable truth that to do right would be to make himself hopelessly miserable; would he, could he, even desire to do right? If not, then this demonstrates the fact that virtue or right action is impossible. If it is wrong to make happiness, in any sense, an ultimate end, if this reasoning is even substantially correct, then it is clearly proved that the ultimate end of action, human and divine, right and wrong, is happiness. Of course, as elsewhere explained, only those who do the right things or use the proper means in the right way, realize this end.

6. This view of the subject commends itself in the highest degree to our intelligence. It does not require us to attribute to the Creator one law of action, and to those bearing his own image a contrary one. It does not require us to believe that what is right in the Creator is wrong in the creature. It enables us to see how God and his creatures, each acting with a view to his highest good, may yet in accord with the will of God contribute to the happiness of the whole, and each one in doing good to others becomes a beneficiary of his own action.

7. It also enables us to see how individuals, acting from the same motive of self-good, but in violation of the will of God, fail of their ends, and in doing evil to others do greater evil to themselves. Their error consists, not in acting from self-love, for it is not possible to act otherwise, but in acting contrary to the will of God. It, moreover, demonstrates the absurdity of the distinction between motives of desire, or self-love, and motives of duty; for if duty is a means to an end, may it not be as truly an object of desire as any other means, as the desire of eating or exercise as a means to health? It derives all the acts of rational creatures, from the same principle or source, and finds their distinctions, as right and wrong, in their intentional conformity or non-conformity to the will of the Creator. It is harmonious or consistent in all its parts, and in conflict, I think, with no principle of morality or true religion.

SECTION 4.—*Is all virtue reducible to love?*

This question is often discussed by ethical writers and merits a brief notice. The popular theory returns a negative answer.

I.—*Dr. Gregory's negation.*

1. Dr. Gregory quotes approvingly a writer who says, "Virtue of various kinds may be exercised where no men exist to be the objects of benevolence, as with Adam in paradise," etc. (*Ethics*, page 101). This assertion has been previously noticed, and it seems proper here only to say that a man can never get away either from himself or his Creator; and I know no virtue he in solitude could practice other than to love [obey] his Maker, and thus serve himself. His virtue would certainly be comprised in love to God and self.

2. Gregory says (page 102), "Benevolence is at best but one of the forms that virtue may possibly take." Let us not forget that virtue is simply obedience to the will of God from right motives. A right motive makes the act or actor virtuous. Now, how many forms of right motives are there? I can conceive of only two forms or kinds of motives—the good and the bad, the right and the wrong. If there is but one kind of right motive, I do not see how there can be a multiplicity of right acts having their motives in generically different sources. The very fact that every motive is either good or bad seems to require that all virtue shall have but one source, viz.: right

desires; and the question is, Can right desires arise from any principle except love—love of right, of truth, of God, our neighbors, or ourselves? Dr. Gregory so teaches; but for the best of reasons gives no example of a virtue that may not be reduced to love. To affirm is easy enough, but proof and illustration are required.

3. Again, the same author says (page 105), "Benevolence, or the tendency to promote happiness, can in no way be made to comprehend all virtue, and the want of it can in no way be made to comprehend all vice." Our author here defines benevolence to suit his cause—"the tendency to promote happiness." This is without authority. But granting it, can he designate any virtue which does not have its motive in benevolence or some tendency to produce happiness?

4. Dr. Gregory quotes with indorsement from Bishop Butler, as follows: "Benevolence and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one's own character, or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing but the degrees in which benevolence prevails and the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than others, nor disapprove of injustice and falsehood on any other account than merely an overbalance of happiness was fore-

seen likely to be produced by the first and misery by the second."

(1) This argument is directed against the false theory that an act is virtuous or good because it produces happiness, which confounds the proof of rightness with the cause of rightness, as has been previously noticed. Against such a theory the argument has some force, but against the proposition that all virtue may be reduced to love as its source, it has no force. He does not use the word benevolence in the Bible sense of love to God and all mankind, but in the narrow sense of kind feeling to individuals. Hence, he allows it to be partial, due "to some persons rather than others."

(2) If he had taken benevolence in the Bible sense of love, he could not have made this argument even against the theory he intended to disprove. Much less does it prove that all virtue may not have its source in love in the Bible sense of the word. It is certainly true that all benevolence in the sense in which these writers use the term, is not virtue; but it does not follow that all virtue is not resolvable into love in the Bible sense of the word. All trees are not oaks, but it does not follow that all oaks are not trees.

5. If there is any virtue which can not be reduced to love as its source, those who so believe ought to be able to designate it. Even one example, clearly made out, would settle the question in their favor. Prop-

erly denying that an act is right because it produces happiness, they imagine there must be some right acts which do not have their source in benevolence or love. Their imagination, however, it seems, is not fruitful enough to furnish them with a case explaining their theory.

II.—*Dr. Alexander's negation.*

Dr. Alexander denies that all virtue may be reduced to benevolence. He, however, attempts no particular argument, but relies mainly upon Butler. He refers disapprovingly to Edwards' theory. He says (page 169): "His [President Edwards'] definition of virtue has surprised all his admirers; 'it is the love of being as such.' When, however, this strange definition comes to be explained by himself and his followers, it amounts to the same as that which we have been considering, which makes all virtue to consist in disinterested benevolence."

1. Dr. Alexander rejects the theory, but deems it not "necessary to make any distinct remarks on President Edwards' theory." Edwards' definition of virtue, though it may be defective, is more nearly right than some of his other definitions. His disinterested benevolence, so called, as we have seen, implies the possibility of action without motive, and is, therefore, an impossible conceit.

2. I find a surprising paucity of argument against the benevolence theory of virtue. Its opponents deny it, but set forth no distinct contrary theory, and

of course must hold that virtue has a variety of independent subjective sources which they deign not to name. These facts, of themselves, throw grave suspicion upon their theory, whatever it may be.

III.—*The affirmative side of the question.*

It is worthy of remark that the word benevolence, which figures so largely in Christian ethics, does not occur in the new version of the Bible at all, and only once in the old version—1 Cor. vii. 3—and is there rejected as a gloss. Usage, however, makes it a synonym of love in its ordinary sense; and it is sometimes used to mean the same thing as love in the Bible sense. Love, in Bible usage, seems to be a generic affection of mind, from which all the generous and kindly emotions or feelings arise, as complacency, commiseration, kindness, and pity. In so far as the word benevolence may be made to express this comprehensive view, it may be interchangeably used with the word love. Now, the simple question before us is, Can all virtue or rightness in the agent acting be resolved into this love? or, which is the same thing, Does the motive in such action have its source in this affection or state of the mind? Many facts seem very strongly to favor an affirmative answer.

1. We have already seen that the acts of all rational beings have their source in one generic principle—self-good, in some of its numerous real or imaginable forms. This fact, of itself, creates a powerful presumption that virtue in the actor, has its source in

like manner in one generic source. In fact, the last proposition seems to be the ethical complement of the first; for if all acts, apart from the moral condition of the actors, have a common source, then it seems reasonable that all acts, right in their intention should have a common source, and all acts, wrong in their intention, also a common source. If this is true, I can not see any better common source to which to refer all acts right in their intention than love.

2. God is love, and if reason and natural religion were dumb on the subject, the Bible settles the question beyond the possibility of doubt that divine love is the source of divine beneficence. It is common to predicate virtue of the Creator, and this is proper, for his acts are right in the same sense in which creature acts are right, if right at all.*

But it is certain that his love furnishes the motive to all his acts, even those which we characterize as just as well as those which we characterize as beneficent or merciful; for no unjust act can be truly benevolent, or a truly benevolent act unjust. It is hence clear enough that all divine acts are virtuous, and all have their motives in divine love. Now, is it reasonable—is it conceivable as a thing possible—that

* It should not be forgotten that God's will is determinative of the right, and his executive volitions are right, because they are conformed to this determination of purpose. Hence, it is true that a thing is right because he wills it, and also true that he commands it because it is right, his will determining the right.

all acts of the Creator should have their source, their motive, in his love, and yet that the right acts of those who bear his image—the members of his household, his own children—should have their source, their motive—at least a part of them—in something *not love*, or radically *different from love* in all its possible forms? It seems to me to require more credulity than discrimination to believe this paradox.

3. Such love seems to me to be a condition precedent to all virtue.

(1) If A has love to God, then out of that love may arise a desire, a motive to obedience to any divine command whatever. This makes virtue easy and happy.

(2) If A has no love to God, but has love to himself, or his wife, or child, or neighbor, appeals to this love may furnish motives to virtuous action for the sake of others, as well as himself, in abandoning habits pernicious in their tendency. Here virtue is possible, but not so easy as in the previous instance. ■

(3) If A has no love to God, nor wife, nor child, nor any one else except himself, virtue or obedience will be still more difficult, but not at all impossible. Appeals to this self-love may awaken in him desires for the blessedness that comes from virtuous and pious living alone. In such cases virtue is difficult but altogether possible. History furnishes innumerable examples.

(4) Again, if A has no love to God, nor man, nor self (only hypothetically possible), if his heart is as

dead to love as a stone, then no appeal can awaken in him any desire for virtue or any motive to obedience; and his reformation is a matter of utter impossibility. For, as has been often said, no motive, no volition; and no right volition, no virtue. If it should be said that in this case motives or desires might come from his fears of the painful consequences of vice, I reply that fears and every thing of this nature presuppose and actually prove the existence of self-love; for self-love as truly conditions fear, prudence, and discretion as it does motives, desires, and virtue. This is too plain to require elaboration.

4. If this presentation of the subject is true, it becomes quite evident that all virtue has its source in love in some of its forms, and that even self-love or selfishness, instead of being incompatible with virtue is really indispensable to it.*

5. Paul (1 Cor. xiii.) gives a long list of virtues or graces, but it is worthy of special attention that he makes them all valueless if the subjects of them are wanting in love. He makes it the essence of all virtue. While he represents it as a virtue in itself, he makes it the indispensable characteristic of every virtue.

* Some who denounce the self-love principle as vitative of all virtue, hold that all virtue is conditioned, or is the necessary outgrowth of a renovated nature. Others of them hold it to be conditioned, or the result of voluntary action. The latter are simply inconsistent without knowing it. The former assert a necessary virtue, which is a contradiction, for what is necessitated can not be virtuous.

6. From what has been said it is manifest that to have love to God is to have the root and essence of all virtue. To have selfishness is to have the possibility of virtue. To have no love, not even selfish self-love, is not to have the possibility of virtue at all.

7. In full accord with these facts is the summary of the divine law, requiring supreme love to God and co-equal love to our neighbor. The word love in this instance means more than the mere mental affection ordinarily called by this name. It is evidently taken in a breviloquent sense, inclusive both of the affection and the voluntary action corresponding to that affection. This is clear from the fact that imperatives are laid only upon the will.

8. This relation between the affection and the will is recognized in the declaration, "If ye love me ye will keep my commandments." The voluntary feature is made more prominent in the text, "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me." But in the text, "This is the love of God, that ye keep his commandments," we have a full expression of love manifesting itself in its practical influence over the conduct of men. It is hence clearly seen that love in one aspect of it, conditions all virtue, and in another is the essence and sum of it; for to love the Creator and our neighbor, or fellow-men, is the sum of the requirements of the divine will. It was unnecessary for Edwards to say that virtue is the love of being as such, for love to God, in

the sense commanded in the summary of the law is inclusive of all virtue.

SECTION 5.—*Is all vice or immorality reducible to selfishness?*

The advocates of the rectitude theory of morals give a negative answer to this question. Consistency requires them to do this, for to deny that all virtue is reducible to a single principle, and then admit that all vice may be so reduced, would be a sort of logical suicide. They, however, as far as I know, have not specified any particular vice and attempted to show that it does not have its source in *selfishness*. It will be generally conceded that if all virtue consists rudimentally in love to God, then all vice must consist in the want of such love. Virtue is self-surrender to the divine will; vice is the assertion of self-will in opposition to God's will. As a matter of fact, it requires no great analytical skill to trace every actual vice to lawless selfishness.

SECTION 6.—*No conflict of duties.*

As we have seen, the will of God is the supreme rule of duty. There can, therefore, be no difference in the authoritativeness of different duties; but some duties may be more important in their consequences than others, and those of the greater consequences require the first attention. It is my duty to save the life of a man rather than that of a valuable animal, if the life of both depends upon my attention at the same time. There, consequently, can be no real con-

conflict of duties, for the superior importance of one duty relieves me from obligation to discharge at the same time one of less importance. Christ's command to his disciple to follow him released the disciple from the obligation to bury his father.

SECTION 7.—*No impossible duties.*

It is equally clear that there are no such things as impossible duties, except in cases where voluntary action has deprived us of normal activity or put upon us obligations beyond our abilities.

PART II.

PRACTICAL ETHICS.

PRACTICAL ETHICS.

INTRODUCTION.

The supreme end of the Creator in the creation of the world, it must be allowed, is the dissemination of his own excellence and felicity. The consummation of this end required the existence of beings like himself, rational, emotional, and free, and whose ends of action should accord with his own, for beings destitute of these attributes could participate neither in his excellence nor felicity. But freedom in the creature, in the absence of infinite knowledge, involves the possibility of a misuse of means to this end, common to the Creator and the creature. The best possible safeguard against this misuse of means, or wrong action, was the revelation of a law or rule of action, imperative in kind and enforced by suitable sanctions. This law is given both subjectively and objectively: subjectively in the abstract by the intuitive reason, and in the concrete by the tuitive reason; objectively it is given in the Bible. Whether any general objective rule of action is required by rational creatures in every condition is a matter not easily determined. This much only is known, viz., that a special objective rule was given to the first man.

The subjective and the objective rule, when rightly

interpreted, are in perfect accord. When either is misinterpreted they must be in conflict. Hence, it often occurs that what the individual believes to be right, or the best means for the accomplishment of the divine purpose, may be wrong. The converse is also true, hence the endless diversity of opinions as to what right is, especially in reference to the less important duties of life. Every rational creature is forced by the consciousness of his accountability to form or adopt some rule of action; hence every one has a standard of right and wrong. But he who adheres most rigidly to the divine rule, most fully answers the beneficent ends of his Creator and, of course, secures to himself the greatest personal good; and, other things being equal, becomes the greatest benefactor to his kind. It is not rash to say that the best rule of conduct, or code of morals known to the world is that comprised in the Decalogue, often called the moral law.

Different writers propose to themselves different methods in treating of Practical Ethics. One method may be preferable to another, but the subject imperatively requires no one method to the exclusion of others. The method that I propose is a brief discussion of the several duties enjoined in the Decalogue and the reasons of them.

SOME FACTS CONCERNING THIS LAW.

1. It is not an end unto itself—no law is such—but the divinely ordained means, by which the purpose of

the Creator is secured. But the purpose of the Creator is the good of his creatures. Hence, obedience to the law both honors the Creator and benefits the subject. But disobedience both dishonors the Creator and injures the subject.

2. The honor of the Creator and the good of the creature are bound up in the same purpose and are inseparable. Hence, the motive to one is virtually the motive to both, and that motive ought to be and may be realized as the strongest conceivable.

3. Another excellence of this law is the equitable adjustment of its demands to the capacities of its subjects, requiring of each according to his ability and awarding to each according to the measure of obedience.

4. This law is truly an objective revelation of the law of nature in the sphere of morals—a pure concreation with the human mind and whose rewards and punishments are the necessary sequences respectively of obedience and disobedience. It would therefore be as unnatural and unreasonable for a man living in habitual disobedience, to escape punishment as for a man living in violation of all the fundamental laws of hygiene to enjoy perfect health. The spirit of it is, Obedience is life; disobedience is death.

5. The law as given to Moses was written upon two tablets of stone—upon one, four; upon the other six distinct precepts, the first setting forth man's duty to his Creator; the second, his duties to his fellow-men.

The first division will be devoted to the first table, as first in order and first in importance. The obligation of the rational creature to the Creator is primary and absolute and is inclusive of all others.

6. The bestowal of needful favors, it is allowed, always brings the beneficiary under obligation to the benefactor, and this obligation is always proportionate in strength and binding force, to the nature and value of the favor bestowed. God is our Creator, the Father of all our mercies. *To be*, itself, is generally esteemed as a blessing, but to be, with a possibility of a state of consummate and endless blessedness, is a boon above all price. *To live* with only a meager measure of present enjoyment is esteemed of more value than all the world besides. "All that a man hath will he give for his life," "Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul [life]?" Yet life and all the good things pertaining to it, are the gift of the great Creator. "In his hands are the issues of life and death." He can kill and make alive. It is his to give and to take away. Of whatever value we may esteem it, or whatever it is worth, we owe it all to him. Of how much value are our bodies, our limbs, our feet, and hands; our senses, eyes, ears, etc.; our reason and speech; our friends and friendships; our hopes and assurances of future good—to him we owe all. If we have kindred and friends dear to us as life itself, it is because he has given them to us. If I, by the use of my limbs or intellect or sagacity, secure to

myself temporal good or honor or wealth, it is because he has given these powers and furnished the occasion and the possibility of their successful use. If I receive favors at the hands of friends, it is because he has given me these friends and given to them the means of these benefactions. They are but his ministers or stewards and he himself the real benefactor, and myself the beneficiary. If I am so constituted that I can enjoy real pleasure in bestowing kind words upon the afflicted and unfortunate, or in relieving distress of any kind by counsel or by charity or benefaction in any form, it is because he has given the capacity for this pleasure and the occasion for its realization. He is the Author of every good and perfect gift, and hence to him all obligation is primary and absolute.

7. It is also inclusive of all other obligations. Certainly we rightfully recognize obligations strong and imperative between husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters, friends and neighbors, rulers and subjects. But these obligations are not primary but secondary, not absolute but relative, not fundamental but incidental. All these obligations are fundamental and absolute only in relation to God—that is, the father does not primarily owe to the son the duty of support, protection, and education, but owes the duty to God in relation to the son. So it is of all other relative duties. They are primarily due to the Creator, and to the creature only relatively.

Hence, as has been previously said, obligation to God is inclusive of all other obligations as love to him is inclusive of all other virtues.

(1) The universal recognition of the truth that obligations in relation to mankind are in fact obligations to God, would render clearer and more effective our convictions of duty generally. To know that loyalty and fidelity to God is loyalty and fidelity to men, or that infidelity to one is infidelity to the other would quicken our sense of duty to both. He that loves God loves his neighbor also, and "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these ye did it unto me," and "Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these ye did it not unto me." Hence, it is quite clear that in serving God aright we serve mankind, and in serving mankind we are serving God.

(2) Many persons seem quite alive to their obligations of piety but quite dead to any obligations of charity. To ask the Creator to bless the poor, the needy, and the suffering, is esteemed an imperative duty, but to help the poor, the needy, and the suffering themselves seems to form no part of their ethical creed. This is piety without morality, shadow without substance.

(3) Some persons make an ostentatious display of virtue in the way of piety and charity and perform some deeds good in their results. Such persons are vain rather than virtuous, selfish rather than pious. This is Phariseeism. A sound morality, however,

does not require that all good deeds be veiled from observation. Our light should not be put under a bushel, but on a stand, and should so shine as to illustrate the intrinsic value of the good deed and not the qualities of the doer. But examples, to be profitable as such, must be known to others besides the benefactor and the beneficiary. If I publish my benefactions I am virtuous or vicious according to the motive from which I make the publication.

(4) From these facts it becomes obvious enough that all acceptable service to the Creator does not consist in acts of formal worship, in acts of devotion in public and in private; in advocating and contributing to the support of public charities, benevolent enterprises and the like. But acceptable service may be rendered to him in all the possible modes of doing good to our fellow-men; as by parents in toiling to provide for their children the means of support, education, and protection, and in setting before them a good example; as by physicians and nurses in relieving the distresses of the afflicted; as by jurists in vindicating the rights of the injured and the oppressed; as by legislators and public officials in providing for and protecting the public weal. All such acts when performed with a proper sense of responsibility to the Creator are an acceptable service to him and will not fail of a suitable reward.

THE SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE FIRST TABLE OF THE LAW.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST COMMANDMENT.

1. The first commandment is expressed in these words, "*Thou shalt have no other gods before me.*" The same command is more definitely given by the great Teacher in the words, "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." Worship and service are here used in the same sense, and hence what is required to be rendered to the true God is expressly prohibited in references to all other things, whether called gods or any thing else. The injunction is made personal to every one. It is, "*Thou,*" etc. It is also made imperative, "*Thou shalt,*" etc. But skepticism is wont to ask, "Why worship at all or have any religion?" The question is so easy of answer that none seems necessary. As well ask why eat, or sleep, or think, or love, or hate, or hope, or fear? The answer is, All these things are natural to men or proper and inevitable. Men are made to do these things, and not to do them is not to be men. It is exactly so of worship. It is natural and inevitable, as much so as any physical or mental exercise. In fact the religious faculty seems to be

the complement of reason, hence no reasonable creature exists without his religious creed. If he thinks himself no more than an animal and that he will die and cease to be, then this is his creed, and his actions conformable to his faith may be called his worship.

2. Every rational creature is deeply sensible of his dependence, his helplessness, and realizes his need of help from superhuman power; and in all cases except where they have stifled the voice of God within them by the power of an obsequious logic, they invoke help from without; especially is this the case when they stand sensible in the presence of danger from natural forces, as the tempest, the cyclone, or the earthquake. Philosophy and history concur in teaching that man is by nature, or constitutionally, a religionist, and it is of no significance to ask why he is so.

3. A question of much more utility is, What should be worshiped? It truly signifies little to ask why man should eat, or think, or act; but it is of vital importance as to what he eats, or thinks, or does, or worships. As the physical well-being of the man—health and vigor—depends upon what he eats, his mental states upon what he thinks, so his moral well-being depends upon what he believes, does, and worships.

4. It is a well-ascertained law of the body that it assimilates that upon which it feeds; in like manner the mind assimilates that upon which it feeds, thinks, dwells—that in which it finds enjoyment and satisfac-

tion ; hence the magic-like power of association, of example, of literature, of paintings, of mental pictures formed by the imagination, for good or for evil according to character. We can not be in thought and feeling one thing and in morals something else. We can not love evil and do good. We can not worship one object and assimilate its opposite. The mind, constituted as it is, inevitably becomes more or less like its object of worship.

5. This fact indicates a sufficient reason, apart from all external commands, why we should worship God and not something else, for he is the sum of all excellence and blessedness and has purposely so constituted all created spirits as to condition their spiritual well-being upon conformity to his excellence, hence it is that the more truly and faithfully we worship him, the more truly and perfectly are we like him ; and the more we become like him the greater is our happiness ; and the greater our happiness the more completely is his purpose accomplished in us. In these facts we have something of the reason or philosophy which underlies the precept requiring the worship of the only true God, and prohibiting the worship of every thing else.

6. A more obvious and practical reason for obedience to this command is found in the blessed consequences of obedience and the fearful consequences of insubordination to the divine will. Idolatry in its less criminal forms is so unreasonable in itself involving

such inveterate superstitions, and is so pernicious in its effects, that intelligent men in Christianized communities are in slight danger of falling into it. They prefer to repress their religious instincts rather than to gratify them by adopting such an irrational religion. Thousands of such, however, persistently refuse to worship the true God according to the spirit and intent of the command. Whatever may be their avowed creed, they refuse to their Creator a loving obedience, do not give him supremacy in their affections, but persistently give these to other things which they make their idols, such as gold, fame, family, and pleasure. These mammon worshipers as truly rob God of his due, as truly defraud themselves of the blessedness that comes from true worship and obedience, as do those who bow down to stocks and stones. This is sometimes called metaphorical idolatry. Though metaphorical in form, it is criminal and destructive in its very nature. He that permits himself to become wholly engrossed with the pursuit of earthly pleasure, fame, and fortune, is the destroyer of his own highest interest.

CHAPTER II.

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT.

This is in the words following: "*Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above or in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them; for I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and showing mercy unto thousands [of generations] of them that love me and keep my commandments.*"

SECTION I.—*Authoritativeness of the command.*

The particular form of this command no doubt was determined by the fact that the Hebrews had become familiar with the great diversity of objects worshiped by the Egyptians and had come to look upon this worship without special disfavor, hence the comprehensive character of the prohibition.*

* Dr. A. Clarke makes the following statement of the objects of Egyptian worship: "Oxen, heifers, goats, sheep, lions, dogs, monkeys, and cats; the ibis, the crane, and the hawk; the crocodile, serpents, frogs, flies, and the scarabæus or beetle; the Nile and its fish; the sun, moon, planets, and stars; fire, light, air, darkness, and night, were all objects of Egyptian idolatry."

The first command enjoins the worship of the true God and prohibits the worship of any thing else as a substitute. The second is directed especially against the worship of all visible objects conceived to be gods, or images or symbols of gods.

1. The divine authority of the command is of itself sufficient reason for its faithful observance. But the reason of the command doubtless lies in the divinely established law of means to ends. Man was created for a purpose, and the attainment of that purpose is, according to the constitution of the mind, an impossibility if men, instead of worshipping God, worship as god the works of their own hands. To do this would be to use means utterly subversive of the Creator's purpose. He purposes the well-being of his rational creatures and has correlated the means to this end, and to employ other means is to fail of the end. He would be deemed guilty of unpardonable folly who should sow tares for the purpose of producing a harvest of wheat; but such a one would not act more unwisely than he who worships graven images for the purpose of satisfying the cravings of his spirit for substantial good.

2. Some well-informed men affect to find in polytheistic and image worship nothing but an innocent superstition, which, while it can be productive of no substantial good, can do no serious injury to mankind. They also affect to look upon all religions as about equally valueless. Such persons may not be wanting in

ability, but are certainly criminal in the use of their abilities, for the evils of image worship are, in Christian lands, concealed only to those who are unwilling to see them. Few practices tolerated among men are attended with such lamentable effects upon the human mind, and hence upon the world. The history of the past fully attests this fact.

SECTION 2.—*The philosophy of this historical truth.*

1. In the absence of the knowledge of the true God the bewildered mind becomes sensible, in various ways, that certain things have a beneficent effect upon the interests of men, as the sun, the source of heat and light. A similar idea is formed of the heavenly bodies generally. So animals and plants are known to be of great benefit to men. But not knowing the true God, nor the ends for which he has created all things, men come to regard many of these sensible objects as their benefactors, and, not knowing any more proper object to which to give homage, or to which to look for future good or protection from evil, they very readily make such things the objects of religious worship. Many go beyond this. They really worship the object as apprehended by the senses. Others, perceiving that nothing produces itself, refer all sensible things to some supernatural agency, but are unable to determine, from their knowledge of things, whether all things are referable to one or to a multitude of agencies. The great diversity and apparent conflict in physical phenomena

to the uncultured mind would strongly favor the idea of a plurality of agencies. Hence, polytheism would be the probable outcome.

2. But because the human mind, especially in an uncultivated state, prefers the sensible to the supersensible, the visible to the invisible, it follows that the invisible agencies which are supposed to control the world would be represented by pictures or graven images. Hence, what at one stage of the process was pure nature worship comes to be largely image worship, in which the image stands as the type, symbol, or representation to the eye of something beyond it, in itself invisible. These invisible somethings must, for very consistency's sake, be invested with attributes and qualities of various kinds. But animal nature and human nature must, from necessity, furnish all the attributes, passions, appetites, and affections with which these ideal beings must be invested. Hence, these ideal gods are invested with an animal and, at best, with a human nature. Hence, to worship them is substantially to worship human nature in its animal and mental characteristics. The idol worshiper, consequently, sets before himself as his ideal of excellence and as his model of virtue and morality only a somewhat distorted picture of humanity in a very low and degraded form.

3. Of course, there can be nothing in this ideal or the worship connected with it calculated to enlighten, elevate, refine or purify the heart, or to restrain the

appetites and passions. No moral restraint can come from this system itself. Whatever advancement in knowledge, in civilization, in virtue, may be attained must come from other influences not only independent of such worship, but in spite of it, for its natural tendency would be to ignorance, debauchery, and all manner of sensuality, as indicated in the first chapter of Paul's epistle to the Romans. Its whole tendency is to make of men not angels but beasts. Reference to the orgies of Bacchus, Venus, Astarte, and other divinities might be given for illustration.

4. If the Creator had been indifferent to the interests of men he, of course, would have left them to themselves to work out their ruin with greediness. But because he loves them he interposes his authority against false religions which can work only evil. Hence, no sin is more frequently nor more severely denounced in the Bible. This second command is God's authoritative protest against man's self-ruin, and it is not less the voice of reason than of authority.

SECTION 3.—*The reason for this command, as given by Jehovah himself.*

1. Not ordinarily does the Creator give a reason for his commands, but in some instances he condescends to do this. The reason given is this: "For I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children even to the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and

shewing mercy to thousands [of generations] of them that love me and keep my commandments."

2. Idolatry is, in the Scriptures, generally represented metaphorically as adultery. This results from the corresponding representation of God and the church as bridegroom and bride. Infidelity in this relation is destructive of all domestic good. God is not more jealous for his own honor than for the honor and happiness of his family, or is jealous for the sake of the interest he has in the well-being of his creatures.

3. Though this reason is given as the ground for the prohibition of image worship, still it is equally the reason for the prohibition of any habitual sin which can give hereditary taint. This broad application is evidently intended, as appears from the terms of the text, "of them that *hate me*," and not of those only that are guilty of idolatry; and mercy to "them that *love me and keep my commandments*," and not of those only who are free from idolatry. This is not illogical, for a reason against a whole series of sins may be rightfully given as a reason against any of the series. Or it may be assumed that idolatry is, in substance, the sum of all sins. As we have seen, sin is unlawful selfishness, and if idolatry is willfully denying to the Creator whatever is his due, then idolatry is unlawful self-worship, and is, in truth, the sum of all sin. If this is true, then, we can readily see why what is a reason against all sin is given as a reason

against idolatry. That this view of the subject is authorized by the Bible is evident from the fact that this same reason is given against other sins besides image worship.

4. Visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation has been a puzzle to biblical exegetes, and especially to theologians. The difficult points are: How does the Divine Administrator do this? Is it right or just? Is it not even cruel? Without going much into detail, two general methods are proposed.

(1) That the Ruler imputes the guilt of the fathers to the children and punishes them for the sins of their ancestry. The theory is, I think, false in its very conception, and withal can not be harmonized with the text, for, according to the principle, the visitation ought to continue through all time, but the text limits it to the third and fourth generation.

(2) According to the other general theory, the visitation upon the children is assumed to be conditional—that is, the iniquity of the fathers is visited upon the children, provided the children themselves commit the same sin. But this is not satisfactory, for in this case the children would be visited for their own iniquity and not that of their ancestry. Again, on this hypothesis, the words to the third and fourth generation have absolutely no meaning at all, as the reader will readily see.

(a) Both theories assume that the visitation is by

fiat, or supernatural, or independent of natural law or process. This, it seems to me, is a radical error. If it should be said in vindication of this supernatural visitation that God himself is represented as visiting or inflicting this punishment, it is sufficient to say that what God does in or through nature or by natural law is as truly his work as is what he does by fiat or supernaturally. Hence, he is as truly the Creator of Abraham as he is of Adam. His promise to reward the righteous or punish the wicked does not necessarily imply that he will do one or the other by fiat or otherwise than through his established ethical laws.

(b) The text seems to admit of no intelligible or even non-contradictory explanation except on the assumption that the visitation is strictly through the law of heredity, as it affects both body and mind. On this assumption it becomes intelligible and self-consistent throughout and is highly significant. As has been seen, idolatry—all immorality—tends to degeneracy, degradation, and destruction of body and mind. This none can question. It is equally demonstrable that physical, intellectual, æsthetical, and moral tendencies (not acts) are transmissible through the laws of heredity. This fact is too well established to require proof in this connection.

(c) These facts enable us to see how the iniquities of the fathers can be visited upon their children, not as punishment, but as calamity. All calamities are

not crimes, and all suffering is not punishment. To be born blind is a calamity and an affliction, but is not a crime, nor, as such, punishable. It may be a matter involving deep regret, but occasions no remorse. Hence, these visitations of the iniquity of the father upon the children are physical, not moral, evils. They may affect both body and mind, but involve no consciousness of guilt in the children, and are not incompatible with the most exalted virtue.

(*d*) The law of heredity is that the tendency formed by evil habits in the parents is transmitted to the progeny. This tendency itself is not sin in the progeny, but a strong tendency to it—does not necessitate it, but facilitates it. Hence, the progeny of vicious parents are more likely to be vicious than those of virtuous parentage, and, as a fact attested by observation, they more generally become personally immoral. It should also be noted that the downward tendency is like that of a falling body—it increases in velocity. Hence, the children of vicious parents generally become more vicious than their parents, and it is precisely for this reason that the transmission of the iniquity is visited to the third or fourth generation. By this time, as a general rule, immorality has completed its destructive effects upon mind and body, notably the latter, and the family becomes extinct.

(*e*) Without dwelling upon details of the law of heredity in its effects upon the virtuous, it is sufficient here to say that the tendency to morality in the prog-

eny of virtuous parents is stronger than in the parents. The tendency is from good to better through successive generations. (Thousand is a definite number for an indefinite one.) Of course, this stronger tendency may be counteracted by other adverse influences and abnormality may result.

(*f*) In the light of these brief statements we can form some rational conception of how God can and does actually visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him (the immoral) and show mercy to thousands of generations of them that love him and keep his commandments (the moral), not by a fiat or supernatural interposition, but through the divinely established law of heredity; also, how he does this without punishing the iniquity of the parent in the persons of his children, grandchildren, and on to the fourth generation; also, why no injustice is done by the Divine Administrator in the enforcement of this law, knowing that to be born of virtuous parents, of sound mind and body, is a great blessing, not a virtue, and that to be born of vicious parents, of enervated minds and diseased bodies, is a calamity, and not a crime.

(*g*) We may now see why the sanction of this law of nature is so strongly invoked in the interest of a true morality, or why the consequences of this law to posterity are urged upon parents as an incentive to morality. It is a well-known fact that the love of

children is the strongest passion of human nature. This second command of the law appeals to this parental love as a motive to right conduct and a lofty morality. Men are urged in their own highest interest and in the highest interest of their children to abstain from all immorality. Surely a higher motive can not be addressed to the human mind.

(*h*) Yet it is a lamentable fact that thousands of parents, intent chiefly upon their own gratification, pour the poisonous infections of their own vices into the minds and bodies of their offspring, and thus transmit the consequences of their own follies to coming generations. The best possible guaranty of good to parents and to their children is a virtuous life, and the best possible inheritance is a sound mind in a sound body, both free from abnormal hereditary taints.*

* [By N. Green, LL.D.] In addition to the matter of heredity, it may be mentioned that good examples, habits, deeds, methods, etc., seen and imitated by the children of the good, are by them adopted, and may be improved upon, and by them transmitted to their children. Thus the probability that the posterity of the good will themselves be good and, therefore, blessed of the Lord is greatly increased. The reverse is also true. The evil example of the wicked parent is likely to be adopted and transmitted in like manner. Practical ethics, therefore, plainly teaches that good young men should select their wives from good families. There can not be too much care in this matter. How cautious were the patriarchs, Abraham and Isaac, in the selection of wives for their sons! Is it not likely they were acting under divine impressions?

CHAPTER III.

THE THIRD COMMANDMENT.

The third commandment is in these words, "*Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltless who taketh his name in vain.*" Here, as in the second commandment we have the prohibition and the reason for it.

SECTION I.—*The prohibition.*

The prohibition includes all light and irreverent use of any of the names or titles of the Creator as given in the Bible, or any substitute for such names. The vain uses of these names are practically innumerable. All these, however, may be classified under two general heads; First, uses of the divine name as required by law, and, secondly, uses of it not required by law.

I. An affirmation made in the name of God or upon his word is an oath or its equivalent. Civil authority in the interest of society often requires such a use of the divine name. The Bible recognizes this use as not immoral in itself. This lawful use of the divine name may become immoral in two ways: First, when the thing affirmed is known or believed to be false; secondly, when the matter affirmed is really false, but fully believed by the

affirmant to be true. The first is a gross violation of morality; the second is not necessarily an immorality. Or, if there is any immorality involved, it is not in the affirmation, but in not being rightly informed as to the facts.

(1) If the matter affirmed in the name of the Deity is known to be untrue, the name is not only used in vain or to no good purpose, but to deceive. It is an attempt to make the Deity bear witness to a falsehood and deception. The holy name is used for unholy ends. This is accounted perjury, and is properly punishable by law in civilized countries. False swearing, or affirmation in the holy name of the Creator, is, perhaps, the greatest abuse of the faculty of speech and the highest offense against him who gave this noble power for the noblest end—to honor him and bless his rational creatures.

(2) The name of the Creator may be profaned in the *manner* of its use even in oaths lawful in themselves. To administer or take an oath in a light or frivolous manner denotes a want of intelligent appreciation of the sanctity and reverence due the holy name of God. Whoever has been much about courts of justice and public places where oaths are administered, has not failed to observe the light, frivolous manner in which the name of ^{the} heart-searching God is used, and the effort on the part, even of those whose duty it is to administer, seems to be to profane the oath and shut God out of their thoughts. To admin-

ister or take an oath in such a manner is to take the name of God in vain—an empty ceremony, the very performance of which is an unholy desecration which diminishes the moral power of an oath over the conscience. All ignorant use of the sacred name of God blunts the moral sensibilities, and tends to general immorality.

(3) Oaths should never be taken except forms of law require it, nor should the law ever require it in matters of trivial importance. The less oath taking, the greater is the power of the oath, and the greater the reverence for God and for morality.

2. Taking the name of the Lord in vain where lawful oaths do not furnish the occasion, as in vain and profane swearing and wanton blasphemy. The faculty of speech is one of the noblest gifts of God to man. It is, in fact, the complement of reason, as one without the other would be a calamity rather than a favor. The practical uses of language are numerous and incapable of overestimation; but certainly the last and worst use to which it can be put is to desecrate, vulgarize, and insult the name of Him who gives it.

(1) No vice has less to excuse it or to extenuate it. If a man lies or steals or commits any other breach of good morals, he has an end of some sort to accomplish; but in profane swearing he seems to act more without a motive or reason than in any thing else. About all that can be said is that he feels and

acts, but has no reason for his action. There is no sense in it, no propriety in it, and no profit in it. It shocks decency, stultifies reason, and degrades its victims.

(2) It is sometimes the outburst of anger. A man becomes offended at his neighbor, wife, or child, and gratifies his rage by insulting his Father and Benefactor.

(3) It is sometimes the outburst of exuberant hilarity. In such cases, men express their thoughtless gleefulness by insulting Him who has given them capacity for gladness. The habit, however contracted, is often thoughtlessly indulged, and profane expletives blacken conversations otherwise sensible and proper enough.

(4) The habit of imprecating curses upon ourselves or others, is very much like prayer—that is, it is a practical confession of weakness, the desire to have the Almighty do for us what we can not do for ourselves. It is a maledictory prayer, hence, the difference in the cases is this, the good man invokes blessings, and the swearer invokes curses upon himself and others. The one reverently invokes the divine favor, the other irreverently, insultingly invokes the divine wrath.

(5) Profane swearers generally affect to despise all hypocrisy, yet they are the most arrant hypocrites in the world, for they do not mean what they say when they pray for curses upon themselves and friends.

The currency of this vice is a clear, practical proof of the abnormal condition of the moral world. Thousands of men hesitate not to invoke the curses of God upon themselves and others, who would blush or feel humiliated to ask his blessings upon themselves or friends.

(6) Many persons, too, who never indulge in gross profanation of the divine name—would feel themselves disgraced by such a practice—nevertheless often use forms of speech which violate the spirit and intention of this commandment. “The use of the word ‘God,’ ‘Lord,’ ‘Christ,’ or such like, without necessity, seriousness, and reverence, whether in improper religious discourses or as expletives in talking about other matters; every expression that takes the form of objuratation or imprecation, though the name of God be not used; indeed all that is more than ‘yea, yea’—that is, every thing that, in common conversation, goes beyond a simple affirmation or denial, all jesting with the word of God, or sacred things, all irreverence in whatever relates to him and the use of his tremendous name in religious worship in a heedless and hypocritical manner: all these, I say, are violations of the spirit of this law.”—*Scott*. “Is it unnecessary to say to any truly spiritual mind that all such interjection as ‘O God!’ ‘My God!’ ‘Good God!’ ‘Good Heavens!’ etc., etc., are formal, positive breaches of this law? How many who pass for Christians, are highly criminal here!”—*A. Clarke*.

SECTION 2.—*The reason of this command.*

“For the Lord will not hold him guiltless who taketh his name in vain.” The reason of this command has its ground in the divinely ordained constitution of things. God’s revealed purpose not to hold the blasphemer guiltless, is only a revelation of what is ingrained in the laws of the human heart. The sin of blasphemy, reacting upon the human heart fixes it in a state of guilt which, in the nature of things, can not be removed by a mere declaration of pardon, which in fact can be pardoned only by a change of its moral state from that of irreverence and insubordination, to that of reverent and obedient love. The profane use of God’s holy name is expressive of irreverence, hatred, and disobedience to God himself, and destroys that harmony between the Creator and creature upon which in the divine purpose, the happiness of the world depends. The guilt of the sin is enormous, can neither be adequately expressed nor adequately illustrated. Such facts as the following, however, will enable us to see something of its enormity.

1. God is our Creator and Benefactor. All we have—being itself—comes from him. How unreasonable and ungrateful for us to expend the strength he gives us in rebellion against him, or the breath we breathe in defaming, or the power of speech which he gives us in profaning, scandalizing and dishonoring his holy name!

2. The very first requisite for the happiness of the

family is that, while the father loves, provides for and protects his children, the children must reverence and honor the name of the father. But if they, on the contrary, despise and abuse that name, and hesitate not in the most wanton manner to dishonor it, his complacent love must be withdrawn from them. Though in pity, he may bear with them and provide for them, still he can not hold them guiltless. It is also true that this irreverence for the parental name prepares them the more thoroughly for every species of opposition to his will. This, however, is an altogether inadequate illustration of the sin and ruinous consequences of blasphemy.

3. The highest prerequisite in a soldier is respect to the commanding officer, such as will incline him to render a prompt and faithful obedience to official authority. No amount of physical strength or personal courage or soldierly skill will compensate for this want of respect and its consequences, or prevent its pernicious results. For the want of it a battle, a cause, a nation may be lost. The whole purpose of the government may be thwarted. In like manner if reverence to God and his name is wanting, nothing can compensate for this evil, for this prepares the heart for universal rebellion; and the failure of the divine purpose in regard to the happiness of the individual and the general well-being of society must be the result. How unreasonable is the blasphemer! How unjust to God! How blind to his own good!

CHAPTER IV.

THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT.

The fourth commandment is in these words: "*Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates; for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath-day, and hallowed it.*"

The Sabbath day differs from no other day except in its uses. It is the Sabbath of the Lord because the Lord blessed it and hallowed it, distinguished, separated, appropriated it to himself for a day of rest to toiling men and beasts from ordinary labor and care. We have, first, the imperative, "Remember the Sabbath day," and, secondly, the manner of its observance, and, thirdly, the reason for keeping it.

SECTION I.—*The duty.*

It deserves special notice, and is quite significant that the form of this command differs from that of all the others, one accepted. The general form is, *Thou*

shalt, but in this we have *Remember*, etc. Of course we can not remember what has not been known to exist. This form of command presupposes that the Sabbath had been previously instituted, and was now incorporated into the Decalogue to secure its more perfect observance. This authorizes us to say that the language of Moses (Gen. ii. 2, 3) gives us the true origin of the Sabbath day, and that it, consequently, existed from the creation of man and is intended to be perpetual.

SECTION 2.—*The manner of observing it.*

1. How the Hebrews at first actually conducted themselves or what they did on the Sabbath is not very certainly known. We know what they were required not to do, but to know what is not done is not to know what is done. The presumption is that, while abstaining from ordinary labor, in obedience to God's revealed will, their minds, necessarily active, would be occupied in meditation, prayer, religious conversations, and in other things of this kind.

2. *Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work.*

Dr. Clarke says: "He who idles away time on any of the six days is as guilty before God as he who works on the Sabbath." Dr. Scott, however, says: "It is plain that the words, 'Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work,' were merely *an allowance*, and not *an injunction*, for the Lord forbade by other precepts all labor on some of these days; but they were assigned for the diligent performance of the business

which related to this present life, while the seventh was consecrated to the immediate service of the Lord." Both views, I think, are extreme. The man who plows or sows on the Sabbath is more criminal than the man who does nothing on Monday. On the contrary, the words "shalt work" mean more than merely "an allowance." They involve an obligation, and not merely a privilege or permission. The spirit and intent of the words seem to be: In six days shalt thou labor and do all the work necessary, or believed to be necessary, whether it requires three days or six, so that nothing of ordinary work need to be done on the seventh. If this is the intent of the text, it does not forbid recreation or all rest from labor nor furnish a cloak for habitual idleness, which is a sin of no small magnitude, for man was made to work, and in reasonable labor finds his normal, most rational, and most substantial happiness, doing good to himself and others. The habitually idle man, on the contrary, is a burden to himself and a nuisance to the world.

3. To keep the Sabbath according to its intention requires the following things: *Negatively*, (1) To abstain from all secular business ourselves; (2) to require all under our control, as children, servants, and visitors, to abstain from such business; (3) to disallow domestic animals, employed in labor on other days, to be put to labor on the Sabbath. The only exception to the negative part of the rule is found in what are called works of necessity—that is, where property,

unless it receive immediate attention, will certainly be injured or destroyed, as an ox in a ditch. *Positively*, The Sabbath law requires the reading and studying of the sacred Scriptures, prayer, attendance on public worship, visiting the sick when necessary, relieving human suffering when possible, and doing good to the bodies and souls of men in all available ways. None of these duties are restricted to the Sabbath day, but may all be discharged on other days, as occasion requires. They, however, are appropriate to the Sabbath day. The exceptions to the positive side of the rule are far more numerous than those of the negative, and can not be enumerated. Most of the duties here enumerated may, in particular instances, be subordinate to other duties, and hence cease to be duties at all in such instances; for example: Ordinarily it is my duty to visit the sick, but if I am sick myself, or my family, it may then be impossible or imprudent to visit my sick neighbor. The enlightened Christian judgment must decide in all such cases.

SECTION 3.—*The reasons for the command.*

1. "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day, wherefore the Lord blessed the seventh day and hallowed it." "Rested the seventh day" is, of course, an anthropomorphic expression, for we can not conceive of the Creator as resting in the sense in which men rest. The idea seems to be that as the

Creator, after the expiration of the six creative days, discontinued the exercise of his creative power in fiat form, so men, after the expiration of six working days, should rest the seventh day. As there was an adequate reason why the Creator should discontinue the exercise of the creative process, so there doubtless is a sufficient reason why men should observe the Sabbath day. This reason has its ground in the divinely constituted nature of body and mind.

2. So long as it shall be necessary to labor, so long will a sacred rest day be necessary to man. The duty to labor has its foundation in the necessities of human nature. Food and raiment are of imperative importance, but these come to us legitimately only through labor. The duty to rest has its foundation in the same necessity. The man that never sleeps nor rests from work will not labor long nor accomplish much. To secure the best results it is as necessary to lubricate and care for the machine as to work it. It hence appears that the Sabbath meets a physical necessity in human nature.

3. But the highest interest of humanity lies on its spiritual side. While the body needs periodical rest, the spirit needs healthful moral development—a sort of moral discipline fitting it for an appreciation of the exalted ends for which it is designed. Appropriate exercise is not more necessary to the growth, vigor, and enjoyment of the physical nature than are moral and religious growth to the vigor and enjoy-

ment of the spiritual nature. As a given portion of time is required for the attainment of physical good, so a suitable portion of time is necessary for the attainment of spiritual good.

4. If the Sabbath is adapted to the manifest needs of both the physical and the spiritual sides of humanity, then it must be regarded as a beneficent institution productive of good and not evil, to all who keep it according to its spirit and intention.

5. The holy Sabbath day is an appropriate periodical commemoration of the work of creation, and, at the same time a beautiful type of everlasting rest in heaven, and those who keep it according to its spirit and intention have a sweet foretaste of that heavenly rest.

The four commands now considered relate to our duties to our Creator. They are expressions of his will concerning human conduct. To know this fact is, of itself, a sufficient reason for a prompt and cheerful obedience; but to know that this obedience is as truly required for our good as it is for God's honor, presents to the mind the highest conceivable motive to obedience.

CHAPTER V.

DUTIES TO SELF.

1. Most ethical writers reckon as a fundamental and distinct part of human obligations, man's duties to himself. Paley devotes three chapters to the discussion of these duties. He however attaches but little importance to the question, as to how human duties shall be classified. He says (Book IV. page 3): "The obligation of all duties being fundamentally the same, it matters little under what class or title any of them are considered. In strictness there are few duties or crimes which terminate in a man's self." Dr. Gregory devotes sixty pages to the discussion of "Individual Ethics," or "Duties Toward Self." He, however, like Paley acknowledges but one source of obligation. He says (page 172): "Strictly considered *all duty is owed originally to God only*; but in consequence of the three great relations of the moral agent, in which he is to accomplish his mission, duties to God may be distributed according to the three directions which they may take, into duties toward self, toward mankind, and toward God." He seems, however, to be sensible that this classification is illogical, giving to duties toward God the character of both genus and species. He says, "To make the proper distinction,

the word *toward* should be used instead of *to*, when these separate spheres of duty are to be indicated." This expedient to help out an illogical classification is objectionable, first because of its extreme artificiality; secondly, because it makes duty to self and duty to our neighbor both co-ordinate and distinct. The force of this objection will more fully appear in what follows.

2. This classification of duties into three leading classes is well-nigh or quite universal. It is not only plausible, but the subject seems almost imperatively to require it. The analysis, however, is radically defective, as will appear from the following facts.

(1) Duty in the ordinary sense is relative: it assumes something to be due from one person to another. In its discharge something actually passes from the obligor to the obligee, from the debtor to the creditor. But to say that a man discharges his duty *to* himself or *towards* himself is to make the same person both creditor and debtor, both subject and object, in the same act. We can readily conceive of ■ movement from A to B, but we can not conceive of ■ movement from A to A. We can readily conceive the creature to owe something to the Creator, or something to his fellow-creature, but not to owe something to himself in the same sense. We can also understand how a man can do good to his fellow-man and in doing this do good to himself; but this is not doing good to both in the same sense. Doing good to self in this case is simply the result of doing good

to another. There are not two acts, but one ; not two duties discharged, but one. The same is true of all duties or obligations. They are something due to others and not to ourselves.

(2) The second objection to the common classification is that it involves such a complexity of obligations and consequences as to render human action unintelligible. If A visits a sick man, what duty is he discharging, a duty to his Creator, or to his neighbor, or to himself? If the duties are distinct or independent he can not by one act discharge them all, yet most men looking at the matter in a common sense way, would say that in visiting the sick he discharged his duty to his Creator, and his neighbor, too, in a subordinate sense, and as a consequence, has a good conscience.

3. Though writers may understand themselves when they speak of men's duties to themselves, yet the method of representation fosters the impression that, as a fact, men owe duties to themselves which may be in conflict with their duties to their Creator. Such do not hesitate to say that their first duty is to themselves and families. Thousands justify themselves in pursuing various vocations, which in themselves are confessedly immoral on the plea of duty to support themselves and families.

4. But it may be objected, Do not men really owe it to themselves, especially to their families, to provide food and raiment? I answer, no. Men owe it to God

to do such things, to take care of themselves, to guard against disease and personal injury, to improve themselves in knowledge and business efficiency, to provide food, raiment, shelter, comfort, and happiness for the family, to be prudent, temperate, and industrious—in a word, to abstain from evil and do good; and only in proportion as they do such things as God requires them to do, can they be happy or make others so. It is a fact worthy of special notice that the Bible, while it generally appeals to self-good as a motive to the performance of duty, never speaks of men's duty to themselves. The Bible recognizes only two classes of duties—duty to God which is fundamental, supreme, and absolute; and duties to men which are relative and subordinate. The Decalogue was not written upon three tables but upon two. There is no table for duties to self. Self is served effectually and truly only by discharging duties to others.

5. The grand design of all these commands is conservation and enhancement of human good. The Creator, apart from his interest in his creatures' welfare, has no motive for saying what man shall or shall not do. He is in no sense dependent upon his creatures. All possible creature service, homage, and obedience can not profit him. All possible rebellion, slander, and blasphemy can not injure him. Suppose all men of every age, from the beginning to the end of time, should set ten thousand false gods before them and never name the true God. He would not

be injured, but every man, as we have seen, would be hopelessly ruined. Or suppose all should make thousands of graven images and bow down to worship them, or suppose all should open their mouths only in horrid profanation of God's holy name, or suppose all should remember the Sabbath day only to desecrate it and make it a day, above all others, of revelry, sensuality, and horrid debauchery—who would be hurt, dishonored, ruined? Not the ineffable Creator, but rebellious men.

6. It is, hence, certain that it is only because of his love for us, his interest for our good, that he has revealed to us these commands in tones of authority, the import of which may be summed up, "*Do thyself no harm.*" They form the best possible safeguard against all evil, physical and moral; they furnish the best possible guaranty of all attainable good. All that the laws of hygiene require, they require. All that the reasonable laws of social life require, they require. All that the laws of domestic peace and prosperity require, they require. All that the laws of prudent industry and enterprise, public and private, require, they require. All that rightful civil government and healthful national prosperity require, they require. To obey them insures the highest good, and to disobey them involves utter ruin. If this is true, it becomes too plain to admit of doubt that the highest good of humanity is attainable by the discharge of the duties we owe to God, and by no other method.

SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE SECOND TABLE OF THE LAW.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT.

Preliminary statements concerning the second table of the law.

All the precepts of the second table pertain to relative duties or such as become obligatory upon men by virtue of the various relations existing among men. But these relations do not, as is often asserted, create these obligations. They only furnish the occasion for the discharge of a duty primarily requiring obedience to the Creator, as has been previously seen. If God did not will it, the parent would be under no obligation to the child, for neither parent nor child would exist. But he wills the relation and the mutual obligation which it involves, or the Creator, for his own ends, has established the relationship, and by so doing furnishes an occasion for obedience to his own will, as it regards these relations; hence, duty to man is duty to God. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto these, ye *did it unto me.*" "Inasmuch as ye did it not to these, ye *did it not unto me.*" This puts all obligation on its only true, defensible grounds. It keeps God

prominently before the mind as the source, and only source, of obligation, which fact is of itself eminently fitted to give force or efficiency to all obligation. On the contrary, the doctrine that our relations create our obligations removes God further from our minds, and, of course, enfeebles our sense of obligation to him and to one another.

The fifth commandment says, "*Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.*" Here we have the injunction and the reason of obedience given.

SECTION I.—*The injunction.*

1. Filial obligation implies prior parental obligation; or God's will that children should honor their parents implies that it is his will that parents shall care for their children. This duty is clearly revealed in the Bible and is enforced with powerful sanctions.

2. It is also revealed in nature and finds powerful incentives both in instinctive and rational affections. Fidelity to this obligation is the best possible guaranty of the health, intelligence, usefulness, respectability, and happiness of the child. "Train up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it." But infidelity to this obligation is perhaps the gravest breach of trust possible to men. It is infidelity to God and irreparable wrong to the child.

3. Infidelity on the part of the parent does not release the child from obligation to honor and respect

the parent, because his obligation is primarily to God and only relatively to the parent. For the same reason, no infidelity on the part of the child can release the parent from the duty of loving, pitying, and, as far as may be compatible with other obligations, of helping the child who needs, though he may not merit, such assistance.

SECTION 2.—*General duties of parents to children.*

It would be simply impossible to specify every particular duty of parents to their children, or even to lay down rules which will apply to every particular case that may arise. What would be a duty in one set of circumstances may not be a duty under materially changed circumstances. This much, however, is both reasonable and obvious enough under all circumstances: To purpose the child's good in the highest sense of this word and to do all for this end that is compatible with other duties of equal or paramount importance. This will serve as a guiding principle, and if faithfully adhered to will keep the conscience right, though mistakes may occur in the application of the principle. The duties of parents to children may be comprised under the following general heads.

1. *Sustenance*.—This will, of course, include suitable food, raiment, shelter, protection from exposure to liability of personal injury, to sickness and what may produce unnecessary suffering, bodily deformity, or premature death. As to the manner of rendering these services, much can not here be profitably said.

Much depends upon the abilities of parents, and something on other circumstances. Common sense, taking into the account all the facts and having the eyes steadfastly fixed upon the end to be secured—the highest good of the child—must determine in every case.

(1) It may not be out of place here to say that many children suffer through wanton neglect—for the want of proper attention, proper food and raiment. Others suffer through voluntary poverty, or poverty brought on by idleness, drunkenness, and other kinds of dissipation, on the part of their parents or protectors. Others again suffer through unavoidable poverty.

(2) Still another very large class of children suffer from causes the very reverse of those mentioned—that is, through parental extravagance. Some parents, through misguided kindness, parental instinct rather than discreet affection, literally cram diseases and death in the form of unsuitable diet, into children, and then perhaps challenge the justice and goodness of God impiously attributing to him what they have foolishly done themselves.

(3) Others, again, instill into their children from infancy an insane passion for gaudy attire, which becomes well-nigh insatiable and renders the pitiable victims miserable through life, and sends the curse, through the law of heredity, on down through the ages. In such cases the great moral purpose, the

highest good of the child, is set aside by the vanity of the proud but selfish parent. All the good of the child is sacrificed to parental weakness or vanity.

2. *Education*.—Not less imperative is the duty of educating children than is the duty of support during the period of helpless childhood. For without the education, the support is followed with no good results. By education here I mean not exclusively nor mainly the curriculum of the schools, but such an education as will enable the child to become self-supporting and a valuable power in society, and not a useless drone or a nuisance. If this result can be best secured by a thorough collegiate education, let this be given. The better the intellect is trained, the better, as a rule, will it be for the individual and for the community; but thorough education is often impossible. Many parents have not the means of doing this, and must provide for the independence of their children by other methods; but wherever there is a sound mind in a sound body, the child by proper training during the years of minority may acquire the ability of self-support and independence. By the independent man I do not mean one able to be clothed in purple and fine linen, to fare sumptuously every day, but one who can earn for himself a comfortable support, and become a respectable and useful member of society. Education in this broad sense is possible to all. The parent who neglects to so train either the brain or muscles of his children as to make

them capable of becoming useful members of society, is truant to his duties to his Creator and does his children an irreparable injustice.

3. *Moral training.*—If the importance of duties is to be estimated by their consequences, near and remote, it follows that the highest parental duty is that of the moral and religious training of their children. This duty is doubly significant because it vitally affects both the physical and spiritual, the temporal and eternal, interests of mankind. An immoral and vicious life entails innumerable physical, domestic, and moral evils, not upon the profligate alone, but upon others as well. To avert these evils from children is a matter of the highest importance and one of the noblest achievements within the sphere of human possibilities. But this noblest of works can be done according to the established order of moral agency, only by instilling into the youthful mind sound principles of morality and religion, a love and habit of truthfulness, of reverence for God and his word and his worship, and an aversion to profanity, injustice, cruelty, dishonesty, and all manner of vulgarity and vice. These principles may be instilled into the mind when very young, and the earlier the better; and when well rooted there become a sort of safeguard against vice, at least in its grosser form. There are three methods by which this end may be, in a measure, secured.

- (1) The first is by keeping children out of low com-

pany. It is a law of our social nature to be more or less affected by the principles and habits of those with whom we associate. The influence insensibly steals upon the child and soon it finds itself growing better or worse. The good are made better by association with the good. The bad are made worse by association with the bad. The good are often made bad by bad association and the bad are sometimes made good by good association. "Evil communications corrupt good morals" is a truth that parents should never forget nor disregard, and when they pray, "Lead us not into temptation" they should be vigilant to do for their children what they ask the Lord to do for themselves—*keep them out of temptation*. The rule, however, is difficult of practical application. Children crave the society of other children, and to attempt wholly to repress this feeling, is to despoil the rose of its fragrance and beauty. To deny them all social privileges, is liable to produce in them a state of feeling subversive of the end aimed at by the parent. This social impulse should not be crushed. It needs only to be controlled, and this requires tact rather than authority.

(2) Another means of saving children from immorality is found in opportune and simple instruction in the principles of morality and religion; teaching them their duty to God, to their parents, and to one another. Such truths, properly presented, make profound impressions upon youthful minds. These lessons should

be given in a grave, yet cheerful way. Children should not, by the manner or the language of their parents, be made to believe that to be moral and religious one must always be gloomy, morose, or miserable, or to think that one must always be unhappy on earth in order to be happy in heaven. They should be taught to love God because God loves them; to love truth, kindness, and forgiveness, because this is the only way for them to be happy here and hereafter.

(3) But authoritative restraints and wholesome precepts, though valuable, are, upon the whole, less effectual than good example. If parents wish their children to keep out of bad company, they must keep out themselves. If they wish them not to contract immoral habits, they must avoid bad habits themselves. Good precepts when counteracted by bad examples are powerless for good. It is useless for the parent to say to the child, "You must not lie, nor steal, nor use profane words, nor desecrate the Sabbath, nor get drunk," if the child sees or knows that the parent does these or such things. Such inconsistencies cause the child to doubt the parent's sincerity, and also to doubt the truth of the Bible itself. In fine, parents have no right to expect their children to be virtuous or pious unless they are so themselves. In this self-evident fact parents have a double incentive to a strictly virtuous and exemplary life.

SECTION 3.—*The authority of parents over their children.*

The duties which God has imposed upon parents in relation to their children, imply some degree of authority over their children. As to the extent of this authority, ethical writers are not entirely agreed. Different theories obtain in different countries and among writers of the same country. Bible facts and principles seem to authorize the following general statements.

1. Parents have the right to prescribe the kind of food and raiment used by the child, to require obedience to reasonable commands, to require reasonable manual labor, to prescribe a course of secular and religious study, to require submission to general household regulations, to require attendance upon family and public worship; to require correct moral deportment, the keeping of the Sabbath and obedience to the Decalogue generally. This authority implies the right of coercion. This authority, however, as to its legal form, ceases when the child becomes of lawful age.

2. The parent, on the contrary, has no right over the life of the child as the Romans allowed; no right to inflict such corporal punishment as to endanger life, or cause permanent injury; no right to sell the child into slavery, as many nations claim; no right, after maturity, to exact the earnings of the child or choose ■ profession, or select a life vocation; or to re-

quire a child to lie or steal or to be an accomplice in any immorality whatever; no right to form or break marriage contracts or partnerships of any kind, or interfere with the child's conscience in relation to religion or any thing else. Advice and persuasion are always allowable; but all legal authority ceases with the attainment of lawful age. The parent has the right to disinherit the child for disobedience, marked disrespect, dissipation, general worthlessness; or for other prudential reasons, as where some children of the family are helpless and incapable of making a support, while others are not in such condition.

SECTION 4.—*Requirements of the fifth commandment.*

Having considered parental obligation as implied in filial obligation, it is proposed now to consider the direct requirements of the fifth commandment.

1. *Honor thy father and thy mother.* The words are brief but exceedingly full of meaning. The duty is much amplified in other portions of the sacred Scriptures. The following instances are worthy of notice: "Ye shall fear every man his mother and his father, and keep my Sabbath" (Lev. xix. 3); "Hearken unto thy father and despise not thy mother when she is old" (Prov. xxiii. 22); "Whoso curseth father or mother let him die the death" (Mark vii. 10); "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right. Honor thy father and mother (which is the first commandment with promise) that it may be well with

thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth" (Eph. vi. 1-3.)

2. The word honor as used in the fifth command is intended to be taken in a sense sufficiently comprehensive to include all the duties indicated in these Bible utterances. It will consequently include the following duties :

(1) *Gratitude.* Gratitude is included in the command to honor thy father and mother. Gratitude is an agreeable emotion awakened in any person by benefits generously bestowed by another. God is the Supreme Benefactor. To him is due by every creature the highest possible gratitude. Next to him, in respect to benefactions, stands the parent or the person who truly fills the place of the parent, hence to such persons is due a measure of gratitude, of thankfulness inferior only to that due our heavenly Father. It is simply impossible to enumerate the acts of kindness, indispensable to health, happiness, and life itself received by the child at the hand of the parent, also impossible fully to appreciate those favors and the many cares, anxieties, and continuous watchfulness of which helpless childhood is the occasion. If thankfulness is possible to any heart, it ought to abound in the heart of children toward the parent. He that cherishes this feeling in his heart is a wiser, a better, and a happier man by far than he who cherishes it not.

(2) *A filial fear; as opposed to servile or slavish*

fear. This is near akin to the duty of fearing God, which implies reverence and love. Supreme reverence and love are due to the Creator; and the same feeling is, in a subordinate degree, due to parents. Our relations to God are unique. There is no other such relationship. Our relations to our parents are also peculiar. Because of these unique relations our duties to God and to our parents are peculiar, not identical, nor co-ordinate—similar in kind, but different in degree. The duty, therefore, of fearing, reverencing, and loving parents is subordinate only to the duty of fearing, loving, and reverencing God.

(3) *Obedience.* Obedience is also included in the command. This, within certain limits, is a duty indispensable to the welfare of both parent and child and the whole household as well.

(a) The child, during infancy and the greater part of its minority is incapable of self-support and protection—is ignorant and knows as little of its interest as of its moral obligations, hence needs to be cared for, guided and governed by the will of another, whose affections are concentrated upon it. Commands may be laid upon it for the child's own sake alone, or for the mutual benefit of both parent and child, but never for the benefit or pleasure of the parent and to the injury of the child. The child being unable to comprehend the reasons of the injunctions laid upon it, must be caused to render obedience through respect to the will of the parent, if possible. If this it

does not do, then compulsion becomes a duty. For the administering of punishment the good of the child should be the supreme end. No revengeful or vindictive feeling should be indulged by the parent, however grave the offense. Punishment should never be administered when either party is in a violent passion. The reasons are obvious enough. If the parent is in a violent passion he is likely to be too severe, and do what he will afterward regret. In such a case the end of punishment is likely to fail, for the child will regard the punishment as malicious and as an assault rather than as a correction. Again, if the punishment is administered while the child is in a passion, it will be more stubborn, and will less readily show signs of penitence; and useless suffering will be the consequence. The object of punishment is penitence and the promise of reformation, and when these have been secured the punishment should cease; for to continue it beyond this is both cruel and unwise—cruel because it is useless, and unwise, because, the child having rendered the only satisfaction in its power, believes itself uselessly abused, not wisely chastised, and learns to hate the author of this abuse. Corporal punishment, though sometimes necessary, is one of the last methods to be adopted. It is degrading, tending to destroy the spirit of manliness and self-respect which is often a stimulus to dutiful conduct. There are many other kinds of punishment less afflictive to the parent and

more effectual to the child than the birch or the strap, or the fist. The inventive powers of the considerate parent will readily suggest more judicious and effective methods. But after all, the birch in some cases seems to be the right thing.

(*b*) It is a matter of the very highest importance that obedience be secured in some way. The interest, the peace and happiness of both parents and children require it. The comfort and the peaceful rest of parents—particularly of mothers—are often destroyed by rude, disobedient children who respect no authority nor study any person's interest or pleasure except their own, and in their wanton willfulness convert the domestic circle into a bedlam. The most disobedient, self-willed children are manifestly the most impatient, peevish and unhappy of children. The most obedient, those that are required to conform their conduct to the will of their parents, are of all children the happiest and contribute most to the happiness of their parents and to the comfort of all around them.

(*c*) The necessity of obedience is manifest from another consideration, viz., that the child is father to the man. Disobedience and self-will in childhood is the preparative, the pledge and prelude of disobedience and lawlessness in manhood. As the twig is bent, so the tree will be inclined. Lawlessness in childhood promises only lawlessness in manhood. An overwhelming proportion of those who break the

laws of the State, trouble the courts, and fill the jails and penitentiaries, are those who were not caused to be obedient to parental authority in childhood.

(4) *Sustenance.* The duty of sustenance, in whole or in part, according to circumstances, is also included in the command to honor father and mother. During their minority it is the duty of children to contribute their share of labor to the support of the family, if circumstances require it. This is self-evident. After attaining to manhood or womanhood, and being able to do so, it is their duty to assist their parents in old age, in sickness, all cases of disability, if their circumstances require such assistance, as often happens.

SECTION 5.—*The reason of this command, or the promise connected with it.*

“That thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.” Paul assigns the reason of the command in these words, “That it may be well with thee and thou mayest live long on the earth.”

1. Paul says this is the first commandment which has a promise connected with it. It is worthy of note that none of the precepts of the first table of the law has any promise expressed. All commands, however, have implied promises. They imply to the obedient at least the approbation of him who gives the command, and generally much more than this, for as we have seen numerous and inestimable blessings come from obedience to the divine precepts.

2. The first precept of the second table differs from all its predecessors by having the promise expressed, which, as paraphrased by Paul is "that good may come unto thee and thou mayest live long upon the earth." Moses' language, taken in the most restricted sense, seems to limit the blessings of obedience in this case to long life; but Paul's statement may be construed to include all good, secular and sacred, and not merely long life. According to Moses we have a partial good put for a universal one, which is often done in the Bible. According to Paul we have a blessing which is common to all obedience together with a special blessing given as a reason for a special duty. That common blessing is good, in its broadest sense, and that special blessing is long life.

3. Long life is a blessing which is generally much coveted, especially if it can be made a happy one; but how honoring father and mother tends to secure it is not at first thought very clear, and requires a little study to make it comprehensible. It, I think, may be explained in the following manner.

(1) The Bible sometimes puts the tendency of a thing for the actual effects of a thing, or puts a necessary or certain sequence for a possible one. Hence, we need not assume that every person who honors father and mother actually attains to old age, or that all that die comparatively young dishonor father and mother. It is sufficient to assume that the natural tendency of filial fidelity is to long life. Now, the

question is, Why this tendency? What is the philosophy of it?

(2) Sins, like demons, generally have their associates. He that violates one precept is likely to violate others. "He that offends in one point is guilty of the whole." The lawless disposition that conditions the breach of one command, readily conditions the breach of any other. Hence, we can readily see why the Bible generally puts disobedience to lawful authority, of all kinds, in very bad company. Paul, in describing lawless men, generally says, they are "filled with all unrighteousness, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, insolent, haughty, boastful, inventors of evil things, *disobedient to parents*, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, unmerciful." This representation accords with all observation, and experience as well. It would be a marvel to find a man of a single virtue and perhaps much more so to find a man with a single vice. Disrespect and disobedience to parents forms the sum of no man's sins—it is only one of a group. It, in fact, is the natural mother of all lawlessness, for in the family, as we have seen, contempt of authority and impatience of restraint begin.

(3) While all virtue tends to secure good health, cheerful spirits, long and happy lives, all vice infallibly and irresistibly tends to bad health, bad con-

sciences, bad tempers, unhappy lives, and premature death. The Bible utters a profoundly philosophical truth when it says, "The wicked shall not live out half his days." We readily see how disobedience to parents with its affiliated vices, may, in various ways, shorten human life.

(a) They bring on disease and a premature death and the man dies virtually a suicide.

(b) Vices may be, as they often are, the means of provoking strife and violence, and a man may be killed in comparative youth. His own self-will and lawlessness may provoke his ruin.

(c) His ungoverned temper and inflamed passions may incite him to destroy the life of his fellow-man, and he is hung in the midst of his days.

(d) The wretched state to which his lawless habits may reduce him, often causes insanity or despair, deemed worse than death. Suicide often follows.

In the light of these truths we can not fail to see how obedience to this command tends to long life and other inestimable blessings.

This fifth command furnishes a striking proof of the coincidence in the requirements of natural and revealed religion; or, that what is necessary to man's highest well-being is exactly what revelation enjoins.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT.

The second precept of the second table of the law is in these words, "*Thou shalt not kill.*"

SECTION 1.—*Collateral texts.*

The following texts are collateral and expository :
"Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment; but I say unto you, whosoever is angry with his brother without cause, shall be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever shall say to his brother, '*Raca*' [vain fellow], shall be in danger of the council; and whosoever shall say 'Thou fool' [graceless wretch], shall be in danger of hell fire." (Matt. v. 21, 22.) "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." (1 John iii. 15.)

SECTION 2.—*Justifiable homicide.*

X The Hebrew word translated kill in this command means to destroy human life with a murderous or evil intention. All actual murder is man killing; but all man killing is not murder; or murder is only one species of man killing.

The following cases are not murder according to the intention of the sixth command:

1. When neither the act nor its consequences, or

the killing, is intended ; for example, a man unintentionally strikes the hammer of a pistol ; the pistol fires and a man is killed. Here neither the act of firing the pistol, nor the killing, is intended. Whatever criminality is involved attaches not to the intention but to thoughtlessness or something else. Numerous other illustrations can be readily furnished by the reader.

2. Where the act is intended, but the killing is not intended ; for example a man shoots at a wolf but kills his companion. Here the act of shooting is intended but the killing is not. This is not killing in the intention of the commandment. Death through mistakes in applying means to ends, in administering wrong medicines and the like, come under this general head. A high degree of criminality may attach to the party killing, but not to the intention of the act but to something back of it.

3. Where both the act and the killing are intended in necessary self-defense. Self-preservation is both a duty and a privilege, and moralists generally allow that a man is justifiable in destroying the life of an enemy in order to save his own. The rule however is exceedingly difficult of a satisfactory application. A man can not always know, with absolute certainty that he will be killed if he does not kill another person. A man may have evidence that induces him to believe that such will be the case, but he can not absolutely know it to be so. He must, therefore, act upon the

force of probabilities. But what seems probable to one may not seem so to another. The bare threat of A to kill B is not of itself sufficient to justify B in killing A. Nothing short of an actual overt attempt to execute the threat would justify the killing; for men in passion often make threats which they have but little serious intention of executing, or for the execution of which they are not likely to seek occasion. It also deserves to be stated that the rule is exceedingly liable to abuse. Thousands of deliberate murders are committed and the murderers acquitted by the courts of the country, on the plea of self-defense. It is an easy matter for one man desiring to take the life of another, by a little skillful strategy in the way of tantalizing, persecuting, and insulting behavior, to provoke his intended victim to do or say something which may be so distorted as to be construed into a threat of personal violence; and having provided himself with a pretext deliberately takes the life of his victim; and on the plausible but false plea of self-defense, may be acquitted by the courts. But such, however, are aggravated murders and the perpetrators are guilty of a premeditated violation of this commandment.*

4. Where the act and the killing are in defense of

* The rule of self-defense is, in municipal law, as follows: If one is in danger of being killed by his adversary, or is in danger of great bodily harm, or believes himself to be so, that belief being based upon reasonable grounds, he may take the life of his adversary, it being self-defense and not murder.

the rights of another. If a man is, as we have seen, justifiable in preferring his own life to the life of one who attempts to kill him, is he not also justifiable in preferring the life of his wife or child, father or mother, master or servants, to the life of one who attempts to kill one of these? In such a case the intention is not so much to destroy the assailant as to save the life of the party assailed. It, I think, accords with the moral sense of mankind generally, that a man is justifiable in destroying the life of another, when it is manifestly the only means of saving the life of one in any of the relations just mentioned. The deed is less a matter of malice than of an instinctive sense of duty. The same reasoning would apply to attempts of outrages upon mothers, wives, and daughters.

This rule, however, like the preceding is difficult of a practical application and also liable to abuse. The possible abuse of a rule does not, however, prove it false. Under this class come all those cases in which circumstances make it impossible for all present to be saved, as often happens in the burning of theaters, churches, and hotels from which it is impossible for all to escape, also in the sinking of ships, where great numbers are thrown into the water. Every man may prefer his own life to that of others. Under the inspiration of a noble magnanimity a man may sacrifice his own life to save even a stranger. This, however, is a sublime magnanimity rather than

duty. No ethical obligation requires this. While the highest code of morality requires every man to love his neighbor as himself and to do unto others as he would have others do unto himself, it is also, true that the Creator has intentionally constituted every man his own protector and the protector of those naturally dependent upon him. But for this reason some might be without natural protection at all. The fact that the Creator has so constituted us, that we naturally prefer ourselves and dependents to others guarantees some sort of protection to all. Nor is this natural law in necessary conflict with the law requiring us to do unto others as we would have others do unto us.

In all such cases the intention is not to injure or destroy the life of others but to protect our own. The killing being void of malice or vicious intention is not a violation of the spirit of this command.

SECTION 3.—*Criminal homicide.*

1. Another case in which the killing is not murder, at least in the highest sense, is where one effect or consequence is intended and a different one actually follows; two men—fast friends, it may be—become suddenly angry and get into a fight and one is killed. Cases of this kind admit of various degrees of criminality, all, however, less than that of premeditated murder. Malice, of course, there must be on the part of one or both of the belligerents. While one party may be truly malicious, intending to injure the other, the other party may, without malice, intend only to

prevent his assailant from doing him an injury, and in doing this may unintentionally kill the assailant, or both parties may become suddenly malicious and intend personal injury one to the other but not to the extent of destroying life. Each feeling himself, to be injured, may intend only to avenge his injury but not to kill his antagonist. In this case the act is intended but a greater injury results from the act than is intended. The exact degree of criminality in these cases is often very difficult to determine; and injustice is often, no doubt, unintentionally done in fixing the degree of punishment.

2. Another class of cases is where the act is intended, not from any malice to the victim, but for the selfish pleasure of annoying or affrighting him. Several varieties of such cases are possible.

(1) An attempt for one's own mean pleasure to scare or annoy a person by manipulating some deadly instrument in a menacing manner, as brandishing dangerous weapons, as a sword or knife or pointing or snapping of a pistol or gun, falsely supposed not to be loaded. Personal injury, and often death, is the result. Such cases are no doubt sometimes deliberately planned murders.

(2) When from the criminal love of fun, or rather deviltry, one plans an affright for another; *e. g.*, two persons, when mad dog excitement is high—passing the road—one excitedly exclaims, "Mad dog!" and breaks to run, and the other persons falls dead.

Many persons are more or less afflicted with heart disease. To such, violent excitement is extremely perilous, often causing instant death. But such shocks are of no advantage to any, and those who practice them ought to be punished.

(3) When for mere sport attempts are made to alarm persons by either ghostly or burglarious demonstrations. In such cases there is danger to both parties. One may be injured by the fright, and the sham ghost or sham burglar may be hurt or killed. In all such cases no malice is presumed and yet malice often follows. The motive is the fun or gratification of one person at the expense of another. The consequence may be the loss of one life and the ruin of another; or more frequently a life-long enmity between the parties. Wit, pleasantry, and fun making are innocent and proper in their places, but are criminal and mean when practiced in such perilous methods. Such cases are not murders in the intent of the sixth commandment, but are more or less criminal. Brandishment of dangerous instruments, especially the pointing and snapping of pistols, ought to be made punishable by law.

3. Another case of homicide not murder in a strict sense, is the killing, under certain conditions, of a house-breaker. According to Jewish, Grecian, and Roman law, it was not criminal to kill one attempting to break into a house by night; but was criminal if the attempt was made in the day-time. The reason of

this distinction is obvious enough. If the attempt is made in daylight, the real intentions of the intruder may be pretty clearly understood. If he intends only to rob the owner of the property, the owner is not justifiable in killing him, because a human life is adjudged of more value than what property the robber could carry away. Moreover, by diligent means, the property might be lawfully recovered, and the robbery legally punished. But if the object of the intruder is not merely to rob but to commit murder, or rape, or some grievous personal injury, to kill him would be no breach of the sixth commandment, for reasons previously given. On the contrary, if the breach is made in the night, the motives of the intruder can not be so readily apprehended. It may be robbery, or rape, or murder, one or more or all. In this ignorance of the motive which in any event is wrong, the householder is justifiable in using vigorous means to prevent the accomplishment of the purpose, and if his acts result in homicide, he is not a murderer. But if the intruder, when discovered, either submits to an immediate arrest, or surrenders, this is evidence that his purpose is, for the present at least, abandoned; and the householder is not, in either case, justifiable in killing or in an attempt to kill him, or even to do him serious bodily harm. An attempt to scare him is a different thing. Attempts to break into a house occupied by persons, and into a house used for the deposit of money or goods are essentially different in

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this respect. In one case the purpose is manifestly only robbery; in the other it may be more and worse than robbery.

4. All cases of manslaughter that occur in attempts by officers legally appointed for such purposes to arrest criminals are not necessarily a violation of the sixth commandment. All persons charged with crime are morally as well as legally bound, whether guilty or not, to submit to arrest. The arrest is neither the conviction nor punishment of crime. Certainly it is a painful humiliation even to the innocent—and one, too, which in some cases seems to admit of no redress. But by the guilty it is dreaded more for its legal than for its moral consequences. They, therefore, very naturally seek to avoid arrest. This they may attempt in two very different ways:

(1) The accused may resist the officer of the law. If the accused, instead of submitting to the officer, attacks him with evident intent to kill him, the officer may kill the accused in self-defense, as might any other man when so attacked, but not because he is an officer. If the accused will not submit to the officer and threatens death to any one laying hands upon him, it is not the duty of the officer to shoot him, but to summon assistance, the more the better, for a man will submit more readily to a dozen armed men than to one. Where there is but one he considers the chances equal, perhaps in his own favor, and may be very stubborn. But where there is a dozen or so the

chances against him are so great that he knows resistance will be his death and will accordingly submit, unless he prefers death in a fight to the penalty of the law he has violated. But in the event the accused can not be captured without death to another party, then he may be killed, and the killing is justified on the ground of self-defense in the discharge of official duty. No moral code requires an officer to sacrifice his own life nor authorizes him to take, at his own option, the life of an accused party for purposes of an arrest. Only when a party has been convicted of a capital offense, and the time and place fixed by judicial authority, may an officer intentionally take human life without guilt.

(2) The accused may seek to escape arrest by flight. This does not justify the officer or any one else in killing him or shooting at him, as is a very common and lawless habit. If the accused, when shot at, should turn and kill his pursuer, he would be no more guilty than the pursuer would have been had he killed the accused, for officers are as much bound by the moral law as other men, and no code of morals authorizes them to kill men on their own option except in cases of self-defense. If this reasoning is true—even substantially so—it follows that much of the man killing by officers is nothing less than murder in the second (and in some cases even in the first) degree, and for which the perpetrators should be punished as in other cases. The habit of shooting down in the streets like a dog

persons suspected, or even known to be guilty, of crimes, because such persons do not dance a prompt obedience to the orders of a policeman who may be uselessly provoking and abusive, is quite detrimental to good morals. It familiarizes the public mind with deeds of violence and blood, and cheapens, to a large extent, the value of human life.

Whatever degree of criminality may attach to any of the above-described cases, it is not sufficient in any one of them to constitute murder in the highest sense. Murder in this sense requires pure malice or some supremely selfish end, accompanied with forethought or plan. To kill a man from pure hatred and with premeditation is murder. To kill a person for his money or property is murder and robbery. To kill one person for the money of another, given as a bribe, is murder and bribery. To kill a person as a means of concealing some other crime, as robbery or rape, is murder. To kill persons to get them out of the way, as infants or helpless parents, is murder. To kill one person in fulfillment of a rash or unlawful promise to another, as Herod's execution of John the Baptist, is murder.

In these and all strictly analogous cases the killing is unquestionably murder in the first degree, and is, of course, a palpable violation of the sixth commandment. There is, however, another class of homicides about which there is not so much conformity of opinion.

SECTION 4.—*Is the killing of a man in a duel, conducted strictly according to the requirements of the "code of honor," murder?*

1. Christian moralists generally answer in the affirmative, but the advocates of the code hesitate to accept this answer. It is readily granted that an ordinary murder and a killing in a duel differ in some respects, but upon examination it is found that they differ in their circumstances and non-essentials, and not in their nature or essential characteristics. Malice in one or both parties, with premeditation, certainly exists, and is to all intents the occasion of the killing; and this, as we have seen, constitutes the killing a murder. If it is intentional and not without deliberation, what else than murder can it be?

2. It, too, it seems to me, is about as irrational as it is criminal, for the following reasons:

(1) One gentleman impeaches the honor of another; the duel is fought to determine whether this impeachment is just or whether the impeaching gentleman has dishonorably made the impeachment. There is evidently dishonor in the case, and the real issue is to determine to which party it attaches. A body of referees and of cool, clear-headed, and disinterested men might give a rational and satisfactory solution of the issue, but how a fight can settle it baffles all comprehension; or, if it can be settled only by a fight, why not select a couple of representative dogs to make the fight? They are of less value than

men, and would settle the question of honorableness just as fairly and as satisfactorily as a fight by the honorable gentlemen. The truth is, there is absolutely no congruity between the means and the end, and no assurance that the question of honor will be honorably or justly settled. The honorable man may be a very bad shot and may be killed, and then the event, if there is any justice in the rule, proves the honorable man to be dishonorable; and so the honorable man loses both his honor and his life. Conversely, the dishonorable man has, by consequence, become honorable by killing an honorable man, and also saved his own life. If boys ten years old could not devise a more reasonable method of settling a question of honor than this they ought to be sent to a lunatic asylum.

(2) One gentleman wishes to kill or disgrace another, and to do it in such a way that he will not be accounted an assassin or a vile murderer. He, therefore, sends a challenge or provokes the other party to send one. If the challenge is declined, then the challenger can, with impunity, berate his opponent as a poltroon. If it is accepted, then he risks his own life for the sake of an opportunity of killing, in an honorable way, the object of his hate. Here the challenger does great injustice to himself and family. If I have received such injustice at the hands of another as to justify me in killing him, it is injustice to myself and family to expose my own life in order to have a

chance to do what I am justifiable in doing without such exposure; or I must be unjust to myself and family in order to punish an injustice done me by another—that is, must be unjust in order to be just.

3. Generally men fight duels more to vindicate their courage than their honor—that is, they fight to prove to others that they are not dishonorable in the sense of being cowardly. But all men have courage, some in one sense and some in another. Some men have the courage that comes from thorough rational conviction, and some have the courage that comes from popular sentiment or from the fear of popular condemnation. The first dare to do right regardless of popular opinion; the second hesitate not to do wrong pusillanimously in obedience to public opinion. The first may make a martyr to principle; the second, a martyr to popular sentiment. The first dares to do right regardless of present external consequences; the second dares to do wrong for the sake of present external consequences. One may display as much courage on the battle-field as the other. Both of these kinds of courage may exist in the same mind at the same time, and sometimes one will predominate and sometimes the other. Hamilton, in his duel with Burr, is a notable example. His courage that came from the fear of the odium of cowardice was stronger than the courage that comes from conviction of right. He fell a martyr to a false popular sentiment, or to the “code of honor,” so called. If he had de-

clined the challenge, he would have been a martyr, in some sense, to his principles.

4. All men that fight certainly have courage in some sense, but the vital point is, Which is the truer and better and nobler courage, that which comes from rational convictions or that which comes from a fear of a capricious and heartless public sentiment? It is no paradox to say that brave men fight duels and that cowards fight as well. It is easy to see how a coward, in the true sense of the word, may be induced to give a challenge, and how one equally cowardly may be induced to accept it. If this is possible, then, of course, the duel proves absolutely nothing as to the character of a man's courage. Many men, in giving challenges, display a species of meanness more despicable than the most despicable cowardice. If I know, or have probable evidence of the fact, that my opponent, or rival, or enemy, is in his judgment opposed to dueling, having conscientious scruples against it as an immoral, unlawful, unchristian relic of barbarism, and then challenge him, I display a depth of meanness which Satan himself can not excel. This is to seek to destroy not only the body, but the soul of my opponent. If men must challenge somebody, let them challenge those who, like themselves, have no judgment, no conscience against the code.

5. In vindication of dueling it is insisted that it is a great evil to bear the torture consequent upon aspersions of character, such as can not be punished by

civil law. It is true it is impossible by civil legislation to provide effectually against every social evil, but the defect is in human nature itself. Such evils as can not be remedied by civil legislation must be borne or corrected by moral means. So long as men are corrupt they will deal unkindly and even unjustly with the names, reputations, and feelings of other men, as well as with their more substantial rights and interests.

6. The great objection to the duel is that it proposes a remedy which is in itself a greater evil than that which it is intended to correct. This is sufficiently manifest from what has been said. We hence conclude that whatever will justify one man in killing another man in a duel will justify him in killing him without the formalities of a duel, and that dueling in every form is a violation of the sixth commandment.

SECTION 5.—*Does the sixth commandment prohibit suicide?*

1. Some think suicide wrong but insist that it is not prohibited in this command. To me the opposite conclusion seems very clear. The object of the verb *kill* is not expressed but must be supplied in thought; and from the nature of the case, must include all human beings, which would of course include self. If I am at liberty to exclude myself from the prohibition why may I not exclude any other self? I am no more the author of my own life than I am of that of

others, and have no more power to restore my own life when lost than that of others. If I have no power to either give or restore life to self or to others, it is safe to affirm that I have no right to destroy at will one more than the other. If one man has the right to suicide, then every man has this right, but if this right were universally exercised, it would, of course depopulate the globe, and the end of creation would be subverted, and that, without any ^{violation} visitation of the divine will. If God had a purpose in the creation of man, and that purpose makes it wrong for a man to kill his fellow it necessarily makes it wrong to kill himself. It is hence clear enough that the words "Thou shalt not kill" includes self as truly as others.

2. The Scriptures nowhere recognize the right of self-destruction. Saul killed himself, but God took "him away in his wrath." Judas suicided "that he might go to his own place." But we have no account in the Bible of any good man that suicided, yet many of them were, so far as secular good was concerned, of all men the most miserable and had sufficient reason to suicide if it had been not wrong to do so. They believed with unwavering faith in the immortality of the soul, that to them to die was gain—an exchange of a life of suffering and heartless persecution for a happy life in paradise where the "wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest," yet they never hint at securing that change by laying violent hands upon themselves.

3. Every injunction in the Bible to patience in tribulation, to fortitude in enduring persecutions and all manner of ills to which men are subject in this life, teach by presupposition that men have no right to determine how long they shall live or when they shall die. On the contrary life is represented as a race that is set before us which we are required to run with patience, that after we have done the will of God we might at the end of life receive the promise of rest to the weary. Again, life and death are represented as issues in the hand or at the disposal of the Creator, and not of the creature. In the light of the Scriptures, suicide is in all cases a crime. If committed by a maniac it is not a moral act at all and is of course no crime.

4. Natural and revealed religion are in strict accord in their teachings on this subject. Both teach that parents owe much to their children and children much to their parents; but these obligations exclude the right to suicide, for a right to suicide would be a right to annul or set aside all parental or filial obligations, or what is the same thing, a right to render the discharge of these duties impossible. But God and nature are consistent with each other and with themselves, and they in every aspect of the subject deny the right to suicide, because such a right implies the right to set aside all earthly obligations. But if a man has become extremely old, is perfectly helpless and a great burden to his children or to the commu-

nity, with no prospect of any change for the better, why may he not suicide and relieve his friends of a burden?

(1) It is sufficient answer to say that the question assumes that circumstances may in some way give to a man the right to dispose of himself. But if we admit this to be true in one case we must admit it in all; for the individual must, of necessity, be the sole judge of the circumstances in every case. The individual in such cases, arrogates to himself the prerogatives of the Deity.

(2) It is unnecessary to speculate as to why there are so many invalids in the world, who are apparently a useless burden to their friends. God's ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts. But there are many ways conceivable by which these afflictions may be made to serve valuable moral and religious ends, both to the afflicted and to their friends. It would be exceedingly exceptionable logic to conclude that, because we do not know these ends, therefore there are no ends.

SECTION 6.—*Judicial murder.*

1. Judicial murder is the infliction of capital punishment according to the forms of law upon an innocent person, or a person who does not deserve it. There are two essentially distinct forms of it.

(1) Where a person is condemned and executed upon false or insufficient testimony. That the guilty are often permitted to go unpunished is a fact that no

one doubts. That the innocent sometimes—perhaps much oftener than is generally suspected—suffer unjustly admits of no doubt. This results sometimes from false testimony and witnesses swearing falsely from prejudice or other sinister ends. The real murderer may be the chief witness against an innocent party. Or witnesses intending to tell the truth, may unconsciously so color the facts by their own reason or theorizing, as to make the innocent appear guilty.

(2) But a more frequent source of this evil is the equivocal character of what is appropriately called circumstantial evidence. A large per cent. of the capital punishment inflicted results from evidence chiefly or wholly circumstantial. We know that men may lie, but we know that figures and facts can not lie. This gives to circumstantial evidence a wonderful power over the minds of men. Facts are always self-consistent and can not mislead when they are fully known; but when only partially or imperfectly known they lead to very false conclusions. When a court has investigated all the available facts concerning a murder, if all the known facts easily harmonize with the hypothesis of the prisoner's guilt, it is difficult to resist the conviction that he is really guilty.

(3) But the bare harmony of the known facts proves only the *possibility* of his guilt and not its actuality. Circumstances in order rightfully to convict must not only show the possibility of guilt but must leave no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the

prisoner, and this they very rarely ever can do. But courts assuming, after patient investigation, to know all the facts of the case, when they really do not, not infrequently — ignorantly, of course — condemn the innocent to suffer. A similar mistake occurs when a person is punished for a higher or lower degree of guilt than his crime actually merits, as when a man, who ought to be capitally punished, is only temporarily punished, and conversely.

2. Another form of judicial murder occurs when the act of killing admits of no doubt or is confessed, but when the actor is of unsound mind, but is assumed to be sane, and is actually executed. It is wrong to punish an insane man for any thing, and to hang such for a homicide or any thing else according to the forms of law is judicial murder. It is easy to understand how such cases can occur, and they no doubt do sometimes occur, though there is, from the nature of the case, less opportunity to prove their actual occurrence than in the cases noticed above. The source of this error is the extreme difficulty of discriminating between sanity and partial insanity, or in determining what degree of insanity will in such cases excuse from guilt. Hardly any two authors fully agree as to the real tests of a sound mind. This is because sane men do so many insane things. If we should note all the acts of a man confessedly insane we will find every one of them to be done by some person accounted sane. Perhaps the best evidence of

sanity in such cases is evidence of a consciousness of guilt on the part of the prisoner. But this again is often so hard to discriminate from a consciousness of shame or humiliation occasioned by his circumstances, that one may be mistaken for the other. Another difficulty is that the accused may put on a bold front, disguise his sense of guilt, or Satan may appear as an angel of light and guilt wear the garb of innocence. But while it is possible, and no doubt does actually occur, that an insane man is actually judicially murdered, the greater danger lies on the other side. Many cold-hearted murderers are unjustly acquitted on the false plea of insanity. It does not matter much to the families of those killed nor to the State whether the killer is sane or insane. The consequences to the injured parties are about the same, and the good of society imperatively requires that such persons, sane or insane, shall be so disposed of as to put it out of their power to do other injuries—either the grave or life-long prison walls.

SECTION 7.—*Implications.*

The sixth commandment also requires, by implication, our exertions to save the lives of others when imperiled by accident when there is a greater probability of our saving their lives than of losing our own, as in rescuing persons from burning buildings, from drowning, and in all cases of a similar character. Not to do this is not to do unto others as we would have others do unto us, and is moreover to bring

upon ourselves a life-long sense of shame and selfishness mingled more or less with twitches of remorse, all of which involves unhappiness, as also the reproach of all noble minds who may chance to have knowledge of our inhumanity.

SECTION 8.—*The spirit or animus of the sixth commandment.*

Having considered this command in relation to the various kinds of homicide, it remains to be considered in its spirit, as interpreted in the New Testament. All acts, as we have seen in the previous part of this work, consist of two nearly related but distinct parts, the intention, motive, or end, and the expression of that intention. The first constitutes the essence of the act, or that which constitutes it a moral action. The second is the formal act, or that by which the intention is realized or accomplished. The former is antecedent and gives origin to the latter; but we know that the former may exist without the latter—that is, the intention may never be realized at all. A may intend, purpose, to kill B, but for various reasons may never accomplish this purpose. In this event is he or is he not a transgressor of the sixth commandment? The sacred Scriptures answer affirmatively, “Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.” (1 John iii. 15.) The reason of this answer may be found in the following facts.

1. The word hate is used with great latitude of meaning in the Bible. When applied to God, it

means no more than to disapprove. When applied to men, and the qualities of things are its objects, it may mean only aversion or disapprobation; as the hatred of righteousness or unrighteousness, virtue or vice. But where used of men and men are its objects, it expresses all the various degrees of feeling intermediate between supreme love and the bitterest animosity (see Luke xiv. 26, Romans ix. 13, Genesis xxix. 31). In fact in the texts cited it means simply to love one object less than another. But in its ordinary sense, it is the complete antithesis of supreme love. Love, as we have elsewhere seen, in Bible usage, often expresses, not merely a passive state of mind, but carries with it the idea of will, or purpose, or determination; so of the word hate in its most expressive sense. It carries with it the idea of deep-seated animosity, cherished enmity, out of which grows the murderous purpose. Though actual bloodshed may never result from it, still it is true that all hate tends toward murder, and a spirit of hatred is a spirit of murder.

2. Though this hatred may never result in homicide nor bring its subject to the gallows, still it is incompatible with a self-complaisant and serene state of mind. A man full of hatred to his fellow-man is, of necessity, an unhappy man, because the human mind is so constituted that all happiness comes through the exercise of love; and, of course, all misery other than physical pain, must come through

the indulgence of hate. Hence, while it is true that whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer, it is also true that "no murderer [even in this sense] hath eternal life abiding in him." Eternal life, of course, is not eternal being. If it was, the vilest men would have it; but it is that happiness which comes through loving God and our neighbor. So eternal death is the unhappiness that comes through hating God and our neighbor. Hence, what is required in the sixth commandment is as necessary to our individual happiness as it is to the public good.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT.

The seventh commandment is, "*Thou shalt not commit adultery.*" *Collateral and expository texts*, see Prov. vi. 24-35; Eph. v. 3-5; Heb. xiii. 4; Matt. v. 27; Lev. xx. 10; Deut. ¹²xxiii. 22-25; 1 Cor. vi. 9; James iv. 4; Mark vii. 21; Acts xv. 20; Rom. i. 29; 1 Cor. v. 1; vi. 13-18; vii. 2; Gal. v. 19.

1. This commandment by implication requires purity, chastity, virtue in thought, speech, and conduct; and prohibits all unchasteness and lasciviousness in thought, word, and action. The sacred Scriptures, as appears from the citations given, are full and terrible in their denunciations of this sin and its collateral crimes; such as fornications, incest, prostitution, rape, seduction, polygamy, and the like. These crimes are all severely condemned, not more truly because they are offensive to God than because they are destructive to the highest domestic, social, moral, and physical interests of humanity. God wills, purposes, the highest well-being of mankind, and to secure this highest good, has imposed upon them among other beneficent laws, the law of chastity. He visits, with terrible evils, the violation of this law. These evils come not merely nor generally as

supernatural visitation, but as the natural and inexorable sequences of the transgressions. As well might we expect to walk through a furnace of fire without being burned as to defy this law with impunity.

2. The curse inevitably comes in one or many forms sooner or later. Hence, to violate it is not only to defy God and nature, but is also to inflict an irreparable injury upon ourselves. I say *irreparable* because, though the sin may be forgiven as to conscience, its natural consequences can by no law be averted either in relation to the body or the mind; nor are they restricted to the transgressor, but are transmitted by heredity to succeeding generations. Perhaps in no case are the iniquities of the fathers more surely or fearfully visited upon their children and their children's children than in this. Perhaps no sin is so generally committed in utter ignorance of its physical consequences. This ignorance, in many cases, may be to a large extent unavoidable. It, however, at least in Christian lands, furnishes no sufficient excuse. For a proper reverence for God's will, as revealed in his Word, is a sufficient safeguard against the terrible consequences of this vice. To know that God prohibits it is an all-sufficient reason for not committing the sin.*

* "On either side, it is a violation of this spiritual command; it militates against the ends and intentions of marriage; is inconsistent with that union of hearts and interests which it implies; is a breach of the marriage compact; mars domestic peace; . . . prevents the harmonious agreement in

3. The best natural protection against these evils is the marital relation. But the only effective remedy is obedience to God's word. This sin, as Christ expressly teaches (Matt. v. 28) may be as readily committed in thought, in lascivious feeling, voluntarily fostered, as in act. But when so committed, it is less pernicious in its general effects than when committed in deed; or, rather, when the mental affection is actualized. In one case the immediate consequences are restricted to one party, and in the other, they extend to more than one. Still, in its least pernicious consequences, it is a sin against the purity of the soul because a sin against God.*

4. It is much easier to do a right thing than to undo a wrong thing; easier to prevent a heavy ball from rolling than to stop it after it has started to roll; easier to avoid vice than to free ourselves from its

training up children, and forms an alienation of that property which both husband and wife have in the persons and affections of the other, and which is scarcely ever lost without the bitterest anguish and keenest resentment."—*Scott*.

* "To a virtuous mind scarcely any possession is of more value or more productive of enjoyment and safety than a chastened imagination, regularly subjected to the control of the conscience. That mind has achieved a power of keeping temptation at a distance, of resisting it when approaching, and of overcoming when invading, attainable in no other manner. Its path toward heaven becomes, therefore, comparatively unobstructed, easy, and secure. *Sin does not easily beset it*, and its moral improvement, while it is on the one hand undisturbed, is, on the other, rapid and delightful."—*Dwight*.

consequences. It is the fruitful source of innumerable feuds and jealousies, bitter criminations and revenges, personal abuses and cruelties, frequent temporary separations and divorces, homicides, and suicides. It often entails ignorance, poverty, and infamy upon innocent and helpless children, and converts a paradise into a pandemonium. The young should remember that it is the road to ruin of both body and soul in both time and eternity.

CHAPTER IX.

THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT.

The eight commandment reads, "*Thou shalt not steal.*" The prohibition is often repeated both in the Old and in the New Testament, and generally with but slight variations of form. See Lev. xix. 11; Deut. v. 19; Matt. xix. 18; Rom. xiii. 9; 2 Thess. iv. 6.

SECTION I.—*Preliminary statements.*

1. The beneficent Creator, purposing the physical as well as the moral well-being of the human race, was pleased to condition this complex end upon the activities of individuals. He ordained the general law that he that eats must work, or earn his bread by the sweat of his face. Subordinate to this purpose and subservient of it, he also wills, not a community of provisions or temporal good, subject to the use or abuse of each at will, but that each individual should have his own individual goods or property, subject to his own will and disposition. By this means men are furnished with proper incentives to industry, economy, frugality, and enterprise, which would not be so on the plan of a community of goods and common interests in all the means of subsistence and personal comforts.

2. This exclusive right of individuals to a particular piece of property does not prevent a number of persons from having a common interest in some particular property, as families, corporations, churches, and States. But while all or many may have common rights to some things, each individual may have a right to some particular thing, which is exclusive of the rights of all others. If this were not the case I can not conceive how the human race could long subsist, much less advance in wealth or in any sort of improvement, unless, indeed, one or a few persons should become rulers or task-masters, and all others slaves, who should be reduced to involuntary servitude, and have their rations dealt out of the common supply. Such a plan is not in accord with either the human or divine will.

3. There are two general methods by which men acquire a right to property: first, by production, directly, as in the production of a crop by personal labor, or, indirectly, as in the purchase of a house by money procured by labor; secondly, by gift or inheritance. These rights are equally valid both in morals and in law. What I produce by my own labor or purchase with my own labor or money, also what is given to me by another, is my individual possession. To take it from me by force, or deprive me of it without my consent, or in any way defraud me of it, is an injustice that is calculated to deprive me of all right-ful stimulus to industry, economy, and frugality, and

tempt me to live by depredating in like manner upon the natural rights of others. Now, suppose there was no law, human or divine, against this wholesale mutual spoliation, what would be the state of the world? What the hope of humanity? If our race could exist at all, it would, it seems to me, be under such circumstances as to make life worse than death.

4. Recognition of individual rights to property lies at the foundation of human society, and is of such vital importance that society can not exist without it; nor the purpose of the Creator in relation to mankind be accomplished. In these facts we have at least one aspect of the reason, the philosophy, of the prohibition so tersely given in the eighth commandment, "*Thou shalt not steal.*"

SECTION 2.—*The law of love in respect to property.*

1. This commandment is sometimes appropriately called "the law of love in respect of property." No unjust action is dictated by love, or is promotive of it; but the contrary is true. Injustice is destructive of complacent love, and consequently of the happiness the beneficent Creator intends men to enjoy. The eighth commandment, like all the others, looks not less truly to the happiness of mankind than to the honor of the Creator, its immediate end being the maintenance of justice, which is indispensable to happiness, or from the divinely constituted order of things, there can be no happiness without love, and

no love without justice, and no justice without obedience to the eighth commandment.

2. The word *steal* is here intended to be taken in its most comprehensive sense, as inclusive of all injustice in relation to the persons and property of others. Or the word may be taken as a generic term, and defined to mean the criminal appropriation or use of what belongs to another; hence, there are different modes or kinds of stealing, as by robbery, by stealth, and by fraud.

SECTION 3.—*In relation to property.*

1. It prohibits rapine or robbery in every form, whether committed by individuals, or by combinations, or by nations. *Might*, or superior advantages, do not make *right* in any possible case, though might is often made the final and authoritative arbiter in many conflicting claims. For one person to deprive another of any right or rightful possession by superior strength, or by threats of violence, or by blackmail, is robbery, and is the highest crime recognized by the eighth commandment. Such offenses are often accompanied with murder, either as a means of facilitating the robbery or as a means of concealing it.

2. When an individual is, of himself, unable to accomplish his predatory purposes, he may seek accomplices and combinations, or robber bands, and the evil deed is accomplished. This, however, does not change the moral character of the act, or make it less

unjust or oppressive to the injured party, or less criminal to the predatory party. On the contrary, each one becomes equally as guilty and responsible for the deed as if he had committed it alone.

3. Nor is the case materially changed when one nation makes unjust war upon another. The moral maxims generally of all military codes are equivocal and unsatisfactory. They generally proceed on the false assumption that one party has the right to do wrong, in order to compel the other party to do right. But as a matter of fact, most of the outrages, robberies, and similar crimes, committed upon individuals and their property, have not the cloak of even these false principles, but are committed to satisfy the cupidity of individuals. It must not be forgotten that immorality, all crime, all robbery, is personal. Armies and nations are not personalities, and as such commit no robberies, but the robberies and outrages are the acts of men either in their individual or associated capacity. Men, not nations or armies, as such, are the individually responsible agents of all the injuries done to private and individual property. There is, I think, a vast amount of misapprehension on this subject. Soldiers think, or affect to think, that because they are soldiers, whether they are in their own or enemy's country, especially in the latter, they have full liberty to appropriate to their own use whatever they can consume or carry away of the private property of non-combatants, provis-

ions, clothing, stock, money, or whatever else it may please them to appropriate, and often deem it proper to destroy what they can neither use nor carry off. They absolutely seem to assume that a state of war gives a respite to all moral obligations, except to obey their superiors. But a state of war gives no respite from moral obligation and accountability. Hence, for every injustice and breach of morals committed in warfare, somebody is accountable at the bar of moral retribution. Who is morally responsible in any given case of immoral action—the soldier, by whose hand the deed is committed, or the superior officer commanding it to be done—will depend much upon the circumstances of the case, the soldier's motive of obedience, and his manner of rendering it. Certainly the eighth commandment applies to the acts of individuals as literally and as sternly in a state of war as in a state of peace.

4. The ordinary thief may have more or less natural courage than the robber. He seems, however, to have more caution or more respect for his life, or for the life of another or for both ; hence, he attempts to despoil others of their rights by his stealth rather than by open violence. Both have the same end, but pursue it by different methods. There is, of course, less danger to the property owner from the thief than from the robber, the former intending no injury beyond the taking of the property, while the robber is willing to destroy life itself, if necessary to

the accomplishment of his purpose. In so far as this is the case, the robber is the more dangerous and the more guilty man.

SECTION 4.—*Stealing by fraud.*

1. The robber and the thief, though they may be well skilled in their trades, nevertheless pursue their vocations at considerable peril of personal injury at the hands of their victims. The defrauder or swindler, on the contrary, pursues his wicked end by different and less perilous methods. He does not propose to possess himself of the property of another by violence nor by stealth or without the consent of its rightful owner. His purpose is to get it with the consent of the owner, but without giving for it an equivalent in value. He consequently has no use for an outfit of deadly weapons or of burglar's tools. On the contrary, he invokes the activities of his brain for the device of means and methods for the accomplishment of his purpose. Flattery, persuasion, exaggeration, misrepresentation, and falsehood are the common servitors of fraud. Flattery is often used to disarm the intended victim of all evil apprehension, and make him the more impressible by the arts of persuasion, exaggeration, and misrepresentation. Thus by blandishments rather than by robber violence men are often victimized. One man is made poor^{er} and another richer.

2. All business transactions among men consist of some form of commerce, buying, selling, bartering,

exchanging something for something. If things exchanged are of equal value, neither party is defrauded. If neither party has misrepresented, the transaction is no violation of the eighth commandment; but if either party has knowingly misrepresented, and the things exchanged are of unequal value, this command is violated by the party misrepresenting. If, however, the misrepresentation was made, in the full belief that it was true, one party is truly injured, but the other is not in the proper sense guilty of fraud, but is under obligation to indemnify the injured party, and is, of course, guilty if he fails to do so. The fluctuations of value are so great and the judgments of men so different as to the value of things that actual injustice is often done when none is intended. But the intentional wrong-doer always knows himself as such. The converse is equally true, and in many cases, this is the only available rule—*always intend to do right*.

3. It is worthy of remark that the seller's judgment generally tends to high prices and the purchaser's to low prices. Both may be truly sincere. This, I suppose, is due to inevitable self-love. When men have higgled over the price, and the trade is made, for one party to boast of his fine bargain is not strong evidence of sincerity. It is, however, quite common for men to depreciate a thing when it is the property of another, and to set a very different value upon it after purchasing it.

4. While some men enrich themselves by frauds committed by flatteries and blandishments, others accomplish the same end by still more guilty means; viz., by false weights and measures. This is fraud by rule. The seller receives money for what he pretends to sell but does not sell. The buyer pays money for what he thinks he gets but does not get. No form of stealing is more despicable than this. The Scriptures denounce it in severest terms. "A false balance is an abomination to the Lord, but a just weight is his delight." (Prov. xi. 1.) See Lev. xix. 36; Deut. xxv. 13, 15; Prov. xx. 10, 23; Amos viii. 5; Michah vi. 10.

SECTION 5.—*Infidelity in office.*

1. Unfaithfulness, carelessness, and inefficiency, for any cause, in responsible official stations, is a fraud upon the government and is a violation of the spirit of the eighth commandment. Men are not compelled to hold office under the government. They pledge themselves, generally under oath, to the faithful performance of their official duties. They receive in some form such compensation as they believe will justify them in holding the office. To receive this compensation and not faithfully and efficiently discharge the duties, is to render no equivalent for what they receive, and is a cheat, a fraud upon the public.

2. For men invested with power to appoint men to office, as governors and heads of departments, to appoint through nepotism and favoritism incompetent

mèn to responsible positions, is a fraud upon the public. This becomes an aggravated crime when the appointment is made wholly in the interest of the appointee, with no regard to the interest of the public. To so create a redundance of offices merely for the sake of doing favors to their friends whom they put into them, or to employ a redundancy of men for the discharge of certain duties, is a fraud upon the public. It is serving a friend at the expense of the public, or doing evil to the public in order to do good to favorites. These, however, are the milder forms of public robbery.

3. A much more grievous offense against honesty is committed when officials, availing themselves of the superior facilities given them by their position, lay thievish hands upon the public money and appropriate it to their own use. There are two distinct forms of this robbery. The first occurs when the official takes the money for future use, and supplies his home or place of business; the second, when the official, through extravagant living and love of display, or by speculating on the public funds intrusted to him, involves himself as a public defaulter. Both are public robbers, and if the guilt of a wrong act is to be determined by its consequences, both are equally guilty; for the consequences to the public are the same in both cases. Their motives, however, are somewhat different, but in both cases grossly wrong. In one case a man uses as his own what is not his

own, with no intention of ever returning it. In the other he uses as his own what is not his own, with the intention of returning it; but knowing that, if his speculations do not succeed he can not return it. Both acts are supremely selfish; both are breaches of public trust; and both involve the guilt of deliberately violating his oath of office.

SECTION 4.—*Non-official robberies of the public.*

1. Persons not in official position, though they have less facilities for robbing the government, yet often succeed in doing so. This is done in innumerable ways. Generally, however, by false claims for services never rendered, for injuries in the public service never received; also by exorbitant charges for services actually rendered, and for services promised but never performed. Generally such cases involve not only intentional fraud, but false swearing and often bribery.

2. The question is sometimes raised as to which is the greater crime, to rob the government or to rob the individual. Different views are entertained. The following statements seem to me pertinent and sufficient.

(1) The motives to both crimes are the same—the inordinate love of money—and the person who would not scruple to commit one would not hesitate to commit the other, the chances of escaping discovery and punishment being equal.

(2) In robbing the public false swearing and

bribery, as we have seen generally play a prominent part, and aggravate the crime. This aggravation does not attach to private robbery. In this view of the subject, public robbery seems the greater evil.

(3) The effect upon the public mind, especially upon officials, is very demoralizing, lessening the sacredness of oaths of office.

(4) On the other hand private robberies are more frequently attended with murder or bloodshed than public ones, and these murderers often entail great suffering of various kinds upon others.

(5) If the guilt is in any measure determined by the actual suffering and hardships that result from the robbery, it is evidently a greater crime to rob the individual than the public, for generally the public can better afford to lose money than the individual.

(6) This moral effect of personal robbery upon the popular mind is, perhaps, not less pernicious in familiarizing it with acts of lawlessness, than the lessening of the sanctity of official oaths caused by public robberies. No satisfactory conclusion seems to be possible.

Every case will have its own characteristics which must be taken into account in determining the amount of evil involved.

SECTION 5.—*Frauds in relation to private obligations.*

1. The cash system of business is no guarantee against frauds arising out of inequalities of value. It

is, however, a guarantee against frauds arising out of promises to pay. The credit system of business, as it is called, is liable to frauds of both kinds, particularly so to the latter. In dealing on a credit, the purchaser is particularly liable to be injured by the high price he is required to pay, and the seller by the loss of his property, for promises to pay are not always redeemed.

2. To contract a debt with no intention of paying it is a gross immorality and a fraud.

3. To contract a debt with very slight probability of paying or being able to pay it, when the creditor is ignorant of the facts, is an immorality because it deceives the creditor. If, however, the other party, after having been fully informed of the facts, chooses to take the risk, there is neither immorality nor fraud.

4. To contract a debt with a promise to pay at a particular day, and for want of ability fail to pay, is an injury to the creditor, unless compensation is made in the way of interest or something of this kind.

5. To contract a debt which, with reasonable industry and economy, we could pay, and yet by idleness and extravagance render ourselves incapable of paying, is an immorality and a fraud.

6. To promise money for services rendered or to be rendered, as to a lawyer or physician or preacher* or

* The frequent breaches of promise to pay the preacher, and the unhappy consequences resulting therefrom, deserve to be strongly condemned. How many professed Christians violate the eighth commandment in this!—*N. Green, LL.D.*

other professional characters, and then fail to pay is always an injustice and generally an immorality.

7. To contract for work or any kind of labor, and then refuse to pay, is a fraud.

8. To engage to perform certain work in a faithful and efficient way, and then to perform it otherwise, and still demand full pay, is an immorality and a fraud. Labor can not be paid for with bad money, nor can the laborer earn good money with bad labor, and to demand it is an immorality and a swindle.

SECTION 7.—*Gambling a form of fraud, and a violation of the eighth commandment.*

1. Any dullard can readily propose some contest or feat that will furnish an occasion for a bet or wager. Familiarity with the usual methods of gambling is not a prerequisite to this evil. The vice, however, never becomes inveterate except in the use of certain forms of sport or games practiced for purposes of recreation and amusement. All such games may be used for gambling purposes.

2. The motive in gambling is to get money without any pretext of rendering an equivalent for it. It is true gamblers talk of "a fair game." Certainly there may be in a certain sense honor among rogues and fairness among gamblers; but the honor in one case and the fairness in the other, consists in acting in conformity with certain conventionalities which are adjudged subservient to the interest of the craft; but the very animus of the thing itself is in bold

conflict with every accredited rule of honor and right.

3. But where is the precise point of immorality and fraud in a game of hazard? I have the right to give even a stranger a part or all of my money, provided I in so doing do no injustice to others having claims upon me. I also have the right to offer money as a prize to any party for proficiency in any art or business. I also have the right to adventure my money in any legitimate speculation, provided I do not contravene the rights of others. Why, then, is it wrong to risk my money in a game of hazard, as in a cock-fight, or horse-race, or an election, or any thing else? In all the above-given cases my motive is not necessarily bad or immoral, but may be in fact eminently praiseworthy.

4. But in venturing my money on a game of hazard, my motive is necessarily bad. I do not propose to part with it for another's good. I do not propose to part with it at all. I desire the money of the other party without giving any equivalent for it—without giving any thing at all for it; and as a means of getting that coveted money, I risk my own. The motive is not only supremely selfish, but of the very essence of evil intentions to the other party. The simple fact that the gambler risks his own money in order to get the money of his fellow-gambler does not change the aspect of the case. His conduct is strikingly like that of the highway

robber. The robber *risks his life* to get the money of his neighbor. The gambler risks *his money* to get the money of his neighbor. Both are alike intent on getting what belongs to another, and alike indifferent to the rights of other. It may be said that if he loses his money he voluntarily surrenders it to his competitor, and it, therefore, is not a fraud in the ordinary sense. True, the loser may voluntarily give up his money, but it must be remembered that it is always a choice between two evils, and never a choice between what he deems a good and an evil. He, when he loses, is in a condition very similar to that of the traveler, when attacked by the highwayman. He has the choice between two direful evils—the surrender of his life or his money. To refuse to surrender the money is to lose both life and money. So with the gambler. Having lost his money, he deems it the less of two bitter evils to surrender it; otherwise he will lose caste with his clan, and perhaps his life, too, as thousands have done.

CHAPTER X.

THE NINTH COMMANDMENT.

The ninth commandment is in these words, "*Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.*"

Collateral and expository texts.—"Thou shalt not raise a false report; put not thine hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness" (Ex. xxiii. 1). See Deut. xix. 15-19; 1 Kings xxi. 13; Matt. xix. 18.

SECTION I.—*Definition and examples of falsehood.*

1. This command prohibits all criminal falsehood, for to bear false witness against one person is, by imputation, to bear false witness in favor of self or some other person. To do one is as great a breach of morality as to do the other. Morality requires a man to "swear to his own hurt" in the interest of truth. Whatever is intended to make a false impression, or in any way to deceive or mislead, for immoral purposes, is properly considered a criminal falsehood.

2. If the attempt to deceive does not deceive, still there is falsehood, because the intention determines the moral quality of the actor. In this case, the evil effects of the untruth are restricted to the falsifier. If the attempt to deceive does really deceive, then

there is falsehood, and the falsifier is responsible for the consequences of the deception to the deceived. In this case both parties are injured.

3. There are falsehoods in form which are not so in fact—that is, statements which, taken literally, are not true; but are not criminal because they are not intended to deceive or in any way injure any one; for example, A said in the presence of some of his neighbors, “I cut ten acres of grass and there was not room enough on the ground to stack the hay.” B replied, “I killed a pig weighing eighty pounds and got a hundred pounds of lard out of it.” These are formal falsehoods, but not criminal in the sense in which a lie is criminal, because they deceive no person—in fact, are not intended either to deceive or instruct, but to amuse or please.

4. The same principle holds good in respect to all fictions, parables, allegories, hyperboles, and tropes, as used by writers, both profane and sacred. Much of the Bible is written in language, which, literally construed, would teach false doctrine. Its parables, metaphors, and other figures are intended to present truth both in a clear and attractive form. They are not intended to deceive or injure, but to instruct and please, and are not chargeable with falsehood.

5. One person may deceive another without intending it, even when anxious to give information concerning important matters. This may result from

want of clearness or precision in the speaker, or from the want of attention or capacity on the part of the hearer. In such cases there is no criminality as to intention, though there may be blameworthiness in other respects, but no immorality. If the speaker uses words in one sense and perceives that his hearer takes them in another sense, he is guilty of falsehood if he does not correct the false impression.

6. If a hearer puts a different construction upon the words of a speaker from what is intended, and then so represents him, he is guilty of misrepresentation. If he does this ignorantly he may be pardonable, but if knowingly, he is guilty of intentional falsehood pertaining to the subject.

In the light of all the facts, a criminal falsehood seems to be, like fraud, incapable of any definition that will admit of universal application. Every case must be determined upon its own merits.

SECTION 2.—*Various means by which this sin may be committed.*

Men may intentionally deceive in various ways.

1. By the utterance of unmixed falsehood. The case of Ananias and Sapphira is a pertinent example of this. They, according to previous agreement, asserted without hesitation or qualification that they had sold a piece of land for a specified amount of money, when it was known that they had sold it for a greater sum. This was unmixed and premeditated falsehood. It deserves to be noted here that the

falsehood consisted in the *attempt to deceive*; for the parties concerned were not deceived at all, yet the punishment was immediate death. It may also be noted that the motive for the sin was not material good or ease or sensuous pleasure, but vanity or the mere love of notoriety for generosity.

2. A more common form of falsehood consists of a mixture of truth and error plausibly combined. Such was the character of the falsehood practiced by the servant upon the overcredulous mother of us all. Truly did he say that her eyes should be opened to know good and evil, but not in the sense in which she expected. The truth only partially told is often a grievous falsehood, makes a false impression, and leads to fatal consequences. When the suppression of a part of the truth is intentional, as is often the case, it is exceedingly criminal.

3. A false impression is often made more by what is not said than by what is said. Hints, insinuations, innuendoes, are the facile servitors of falsehood.

4. A false impression may be made by a gesture of the hand, by a wink, a smile, a frown, a sigh, or a laugh, all put forth for effect. All the methods of natural as well as artificial speech may be laid under contribution to falsehood. It is simply impossible to enumerate all the means by which a lie may be perpetrated or a deception practiced for mean and selfish ends.

SECTION 3.—*False swearing and false statements.*

1. A false impression intentionally made for evil ends is a criminal falsehood. There are two distinct forms of this sin—making false statements under oath, and making such statements when not under oath. An oath, in a legal sense, is an affirmation, for the truth of which the affirmant invokes the heart-searching God as a witness. An affirmation under oath is the highest form of human testimony. Such testimony is always assumed to be true unless the contrary is proven; and when the contrary is proven the affirmant is accounted a perjurer and a most execrable character. The object of the oath is to secure the highest possible degree of truth and justice among men, or promote the highest interest of individuals and society generally. But a false oath or a false statement under the solemnities of an oath, is as powerful an agent for evil as a true one is for good. The rights, the property, the reputations, and the lives of men are often put into the hands of men who dispose of them pretty much at will. By bearing false witness men often deprive their neighbor of reputation, or of his property, or of life itself; hence, we readily see why so much importance is attached to the sanctity of an oath by the sacred Scriptures; also, why such severe penalties are attached to civil laws against false swearing. A bad man, especially a collection of bad men, can swear away the character or even life of innocent persons merely to gratify

their avarice, or envy, or malice, as was attempted in relation to our Savior himself. Such false-witness-bearing is the most aggravated form of disobedience to the ninth commandment.

2. Another less pernicious but more common form of bearing false witness against a neighbor consists in false statements concerning him, when not under oath, or when God is not invoked as a witness of our sincerity. This form of the sin is not perjury, because no oath has been taken, and, of course, none has been violated. Nevertheless, falsehood in this form is a grievous offense against God and humanity.

SECTION 4.—*The difference between a false oath against a neighbor and a false statement against him without the form of an oath.*

1. The motives for both acts are generally the same, but may be specifically different and presumably less malignant in the false statement than in the false oath. The object in both cases is the injury of another party. This is self-evident. The object of the false oath is to deprive some innocent person of happiness, character, property, or life. The object of the false statement, if made privately, and, of course, confidentially and under the ban of secrecy, may be to disparage only in a slight degree the character of the innocent party. On the contrary, the animosity or envy or malice may be such that the object is to injure the other party to the utmost possible extent; and if circumstances were such as to render either a

denial or affirmation of the slander on oath necessary, the affirmation would be promptly made. We thus perceive that the motive which occasions a false statement or slander may approximate very closely the motive that occasions the false oath.

2. The results of the two acts will be materially different to all parties.

(1) The perjurer may be severely punished by law.

(2) The libeler may also be criminally punished, and the verbal slanderer may suffer in a suit for damages, but the cost and annoyance of such suits are such as to render them in many cases difficult if not quite impossible. The annoyances, too, are such as to prevent many persons from instituting suits at law; hence, the slander generally goes unpunished by civil law, and the injured party must bear his wrongs as best he can.

(3) The injured party may lose his character, his peace of mind, his prosperity, or his life, or all of these by the false oath. On the other hand, he by the slanderous statement may lose his reputation, his high position in society, and his peace of mind, with all the innumerable evils connected with these things.

(4) Perjury being an offense against the State, and slander being an offense against the individual, the former can be, and generally is, much more effectually punished than the latter. In fact, it is simply impossible for human society to frame laws suitable to punish every species or every degree of slanderous perse-

cution possible among human beings. If moral restraints, the love of truth, and the awards of virtue, can not prevent the sin of bearing false witness against our neighbor, civil legislation, however wise, can do but little for the suppression of the evil.

(5) While it is considered a greater crime to swear falsely against a neighbor than to speak falsely of him, the latter, because it is so much more common, is productive of far more unhappiness in the world than the former.

SECTION 5.—*Some truths worth remembering.*

1. It is as grave a sin against God and humanity to swear away a man's property or life as it is to rob him or murder him. It is as wrong to slander him, or rob him of his good name, as to injure or steal his property. Solomon says, "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and loving favor [the esteem of others] rather than silver and gold." "A good name is better than precious ointment." An immortal poet has said :

"Good name in man or woman
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash ;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.'

2. It is as easy to speak the truth as to speak falsely, and far better to all concerned. It is better to tell our neighbor's faults to him than to others, and better to tell others of his virtues than his vices.

3. It is better to be a peace-maker than a peace-breaker. The tattler and slanderer, which are nearly the same thing, are of necessity disturbers of the peace of individuals, families, and communities.

4. Other things being equal, he is the most useful, the most respected, and the happiest man who is the freest from the sin of bearing false witness against his neighbor.

CHAPTER XI.

SOME HARD QUESTIONS.

SECTION I.—*Is a man ever justifiable in deceiving another?*

The question is quite debatable.

The traveler is justifiable in killing the highwayman, who assaults him with intent to kill. This he may do on the principle that every man has the right to prefer his own life to that of an enemy. But if the traveler has no weapons, has he the right to save his own life by deceiving his assailant, making him believe he has no money, or that he is not the man that he was taken for, or that other persons are near at hand who will visit a terrible retribution upon the assailant if he persists in his purpose, or by any such deceptive means? What would be the difference between such a case and that of killing the robber outright? In one instance the robber would lose his life and the traveler would save both his own life and also his money. In the other case no life would be lost and no robbery actually committed. But a deception, a falsehood, would be perpetrated. We have then in one end of the scale, a falsehood perpetrated with no bad intent to another, but as the only means of self-defense, and in the other end a murder and a rob-

bery. The murder and the robbery would have prevented the falsehood or the deception, but the deception prevented the murder and the robbery. On the hypothesis that falsehood, or deception, is necessarily criminal in such cases there are at least two calamities connected with the falsehood. First, it involves the conscience which is a troublesome thing to deal with—but whether more so than would be manslaughter in self-defense will depend upon the judgment of the party concerned; secondly, the effect of the falsehood upon the public morals. This, too, will depend chiefly upon the estimate in which the two crimes of falsehood and homicide are held.

2. Two facts are to be noted. First, the highwayman is in intention a murderer, and if he loses his life at the hands of the assaulted party, he suffers only what he otherwise should suffer at the hands of the law. The second fact to be considered is, The highwayman is in intention a murderer. If he is instantly killed he has no opportunity of repentance, and, of course, must be eternally lost. The deceiver, however, after saving his own life and money and preventing the other party from committing a great crime, may live to repent of his errors and be saved. As far as I can see, if a man is justifiable in saving his own life by killing, he is justifiable in saving his life by strategy or deception. Still it may be debated whether there is not a higher principle of action than that of self-defense. The reader is left to form his

own conclusions. If a man believes that he may kill his assailant or deceive him, in order to save his life, he may do so without incurring a bad conscience. But there is a vital difference between doing such things and doing what is known to be an offense against God, which is of necessity an offense against conscience.

3. My duty to my Creator and myself is primary and absolute, but my duty to my enemies is secondary and relative; hence, while I may kill or deceive my assailant, in order to save my life, I am not at liberty to sin against God and my conscience by abjuring my convictions of truth in order to save my life; for to do this is to violate the most imperative of all obligations, that upon which my highest happiness depends both for this and the future life; hence, while I may be justified in killing or deceiving my assailant in order to save my own life, I am not justifiable in renouncing my faith in God, or my obligations to him in order to save my life. Here it is that we find the justification and the sublimity of martyrdom—the surrender of life for God and the behests of conscience. “Whosoever will save his [temporal] life, shall lose it [spiritual life]; and whosoever shall lose his [temporal] life for my sake shall find it” [spiritual life].

SECTION 2.—*Is a man ever justifiable in violating an oath or promise?*

This is also a debatable question. About this men

differ. A few remarks will be offered for the consideration of the reader.

1. Oaths are sometimes taken with what are called "mental reservation." Such reservation, however, has no effect upon the obligation involved, nor ought it to have any upon the conscience of the obligor. For the obligation always binds in the sense in which the obligor perceives the obligee to understand the promise.

2. Every person in taking an oath or making a promise, consciously intends either to keep it or to violate it. Hence, violations of oaths and promises divide themselves into two classes: Where the intention, at the time of taking the oath, is to *violate it*; and where it is *not to violate it*.

SECTION 3.—*Is a person ever justifiable in taking an oath intending to violate it?*

1. A few years ago a married lady, visiting a neighbor, was by a negro pulled from her horse and forced a mile or so into a dense forest. Having accomplished his purpose, the villain drew his knife to kill her as a means of preventing detection. She earnestly begged for life, plead the helpless condition of her little children and her own want of preparation for death, and solemnly and repeatedly pledged herself that, if he would spare her life, she would never reveal his crime. She completely deceived him—so completely that he accompanied her back to the public road and on to the first house, where, as soon as

within speaking distance and in his presence, she proclaimed his crime. Was she justifiable in what she did, or did she act a guilty part?

(1) She saved her life by the promise—that, of course, was a good thing.

(2) She occasioned the punishment of a great criminal by breaking the promise, and that was a righteous thing. Or if she had not made the promise she would have lost her life and perhaps her soul; her husband, a wife; and her children, a mother. If she had not broken the promise, a great crime would have gone unpunished, and no doubt would have been repeated the first opportunity.

(3) It may be said that she would have been justifiable in making the promise, if she had intended to keep it and had acted accordingly but not otherwise. But this raises the question whether she had any right to conceal or would have been justified in concealing, or in intending to conceal, so great a sin, and thus expose others to like calamities.

The case, considered in all its aspects, seems in view of all principles discussed in previous sections to authorize the conclusion that she was justifiable both in making and in breaking the promise.

SECTION 4.—*Is a man ever justifiable in violating an oath or promise made in good faith, or with the full intention of keeping it?*

Opinions differ.

1. *A case in point.* About sixty years ago two men

waylaid a road, along which the sheriff with a large amount of money was expected to pass, intending to rob him. It so happened that a preacher came along the road, and being mistaken for the sheriff was forced into the brush. Upon searching him they found nothing but a little Bible, hymn book, and a few articles of clothing. The highwaymen first thought of killing him to conceal their crime, but finally proposed to spare his life on the condition that he would take an oath on his Bible never to reveal the facts. The preacher after deliberation took the oath fully intending to keep it, which he did for a time. It, however, soon became with him a question of conscience, as to whether it was right to conceal so great a crime. Exposure might save the sheriff's life and the county's money, or prevent some other robbery. Unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion, he adroitly put the question, hypothetically, to a Presbyterian preacher in whom he reposed much confidence, not intimating that such a case had ever occurred. The gentleman to whom he put the case, promptly decided, that if such a case were real, the oath ought to be broken and the highwaymen exposed. Other men of good judgment concurred in this opinion, and exposure was duly made and the robbers were arrested.

2. Here was an oath taken in good faith but violated from a conscientious conviction of duty. If there is wrong in the case, where is it? It must be either

Robert James

in taking the oath or in breaking it. There was no malice in the motive, no evil intended to the other party. Self-preservation was the whole of the intention in taking the oath. If a man has the right to save his own life by killing another, surely he has the right to do so without killing another. The wrong then evidently was not in taking the oath.

3. Again, men's judgments change. What a man truly believes at one time to be right, he may come to believe wrong, and conscience requires him to act always according to present convictions. Hence, both conscience and what he believed to be for the public good required the preacher to make the exposure.

4. In these discussions, it will be observed I have spoken of these oaths without noting the fact that they were administered without lawful authority. A formal oath, administered without authority and for unlawful purposes, is not properly an oath at all, and to violate it is neither to forswear or to commit perjury, but is only to lie in the sense of to deceive.

5. A lawful oath duly administered binds a party to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, but the oaths in question bind, if they bind at all, the party to suppress the truth in the interest of crime, and can therefore rightfully bind nothing.

6. But if it should be said that such oaths, though taken under pressure, are nevertheless taken voluntarily, and for this reason ought to be scrupulously

observed, it may be said: Truly the oath is in a sense voluntary—that is, the party has a choice between taking the oath and being murdered; but the motive is too violent to be compatible with true freedom, or such freedom as is necessary to the validity of testimony given under such an oath. A wife's testimony in favor of her husband in criminal cases is not admissible, because the motive to false testimony is too violent. If A, charged with crime, should make B believe that if B did not swear in court to A's innocence he would be murdered, such testimony would be worthless, the motive being not to tell the truth, but to save his life. All testimony given under such circumstances, even though in a sense voluntary, is really worthless, because of the violence of the motive to bear false witness.

7. Hence, no punishment should be inflicted upon the child or any one to make him confess a crime unless he is fully known to be guilty, for if innocent, he may confess guilt merely to escape present punishment. The fact that an oath is voluntary in the sense of the oath being a choice between death and extreme suffering, does not make it binding in law nor afford ground of remorse of conscience. Of course when the oath is lawfully administered for lawful ends, the case is quite different.

SECTION 5.—*But after all, do not all these defenses of deception and sham oaths and promises rest upon the abominable principle that "the end justifies the means,"*

or that "we may do evil that good may come," or "do wrong things for right ends?"

This to many is a plausible objection—is in fact the principal argument against the doctrine indicated in the preceding sections. It deserves a fair examination.

1. Rightness and wrongness are qualities in the agent and not in his acts. Acts are always means to an end, and as such right or wrong accord to their pertinency to the end intended.

2. An agent may be right in his intention and wrong in his action, and hence fail to accomplish his good intention. Or he may be wrong in his intention, and wrong in his action in respect to that intention, and consequently what was meant for evil may result in good to somebody. Or he may be right in intention and right in action and his good intention is realized. This is wisdom—the combination of right means with right ends.

3. An act may be wrong in relation to one end and right in relation to a different end. To give a well man medicine to make him sick would be wrong in intention. To give a patient lobelia to cure nausea would be a wrong act. To give it to produce nausea would be right.

4. Moral qualities, as has been said, belong to agents and not to acts as such. If, by metonymy, we choose to predicate moral qualities of acts, we can see clearly enough how an act can be right both in

intention (or morally right) and in pertinency or as a means to an end; also how the promise of the outraged lady not to reveal the guilt of her persecutor, was right both in intention and as a means to that intention. So also of the other cases. To save life was the end. The oath and promise, the only available means, and these having no moral qualities of themselves, but being adequate to the end, were of course right in the only sense in which oaths can be right. This was not to do evil that good might come, for no evil was done, but it was to do good by the best and only available means. The end did not justify *the means*, but the *woman*. The means, the promises, needed no justification, for as acts they are neither moral nor immoral, but simply pertinent or impertinent, suitable or unsuitable.

5. Of course those who assert that right and wrong are ends in themselves, and not means to ends, can not consistently adopt the doctrine here indicated. It might be well for such to consider the following facts:

(1) The sixth commandment expressly prohibits homicide.

(2) The Bible often enjoins homicide as a punishment for certain crimes, hence the same act, homicide, is right in relation to one end and wrong in relation to another. This demonstrates that moral rightness or wrongness is in the intention and not in the act as such, and that the act is not an end in itself, but a

means to an end; hence acts, homicide, etc., are right or wrong in the sense of proper or improper means to an end. If this is true in regard to homicide, it of course is true in regard to all oaths and promises, for whatever purpose made.

6. But while there is no moral quality in acts apart from the ends for which they are put forth, there may be moral quality in the manner of executing them. It may be right for A to kill B in self-defense, but wrong to subject him to long-continued and grievous tortures, for this would indicate malice or some bad intention.

7. In many cases there may be a choice of means both as to efficiency and as to agreeableness, but this does not give moral quality to the act. But in the cases we have considered, there were no available means except those actually used — promises and formal oaths. Homicide was impossible, and oaths and promises were used instead.

8. This right of self-preservation is primary and inalienable. It is the basis and the sole ground of defending the right, the justice, of capital punishment. Ten men or ten thousand men have no more and no other rights than the individual. They can not by compact or agreement create rights or abrogate or abridge them, for they are strictly natural, or God-given, and are, of course, in no sense the creations of men; hence men in society and men out of society have the same rights, no more and no less.

The individual, in passing into society, or becoming a subject of human government, acquires no new rights and surrenders none. To suppose either is to deny divine, and assume human, sovereignty over the natural rights of men.

9. Hence, governments are combinations for purposes of the protection and defense of the natural rights that God has given. But purposes require means for their execution, hence the establishment of agencies or governments for the protection of the public good which is only a general name for the protection of individual rights. It is clearly seen that the difference between the man in society or under government, and the man who is not in society or under government, is simply a difference in the agency by which individual rights are in some cases defended, and not in the rights themselves.

10. I can conceive of no natural rights which a man can have out of society or in a state of nature, which he does not have in society; for all human rights consist in the right of self-preservation and what is collateral thereunto. The maintenance of these rights does not require any aid from the absurd idea that the end justifies the means, or that we may do evil that good may come.

SECTION 6.—“*The end justifies the means.*”

1. This is a Jesuitical maxim, which is interpreted to mean that a man for right and holy ends may do any thing, however wrong or wicked it may be, that

is deemed necessary to the accomplishment of these ends.

2. The maxim is as false in principle as it is monstrous in its practical consequences. This is readily apparent from the absurd assumptions which it involves:

(1) That the purposes of the Papal church are in utmost accord with the will of God ;

(2) That the emissaries of that church know when arson, or murder, or treason, or any other crime, would serve these ends ; and

(3) That they are Heaven's selected agents for the commission of unholy deeds for these holy ends.

3. Those who approve the maxim and many of those who reject it hold a common error ; viz., that acts, as such, have moral quality—for example, the act of killing a man is a wrong act in itself. But according to the maxim the wrongness of this act is taken away when it is committed for right and holy ends—that is, the holiness of the intentions somehow sets aside or atones for the wrongness of the act, hence, a man may do wrong that good may come. But it is nothing less than a contradiction to say that the end justifies the means ; for it implies that the acts (the means) are in themselves wrong but the end right. But this predicates both rightness and wrongness in relation to the same act, which is a contradiction ; for in morals the motive and the volitional sequences form but one completed act, and this, of

course, can not be at the same time both right and wrong. On the contrary nothing needs to be plainer than the fact that acts apart from their motives have no moral qualities; consequently are right or wrong only in the sense of pertinent or proper. Therefore, such a thing as the end justifying the means, or doing evil that good may come, is an impossible conceit.

SECTION 7.—*Are atheists properly eligible to official stations, competent witnesses, etc.?*

This question is entitled to consideration in the discussion of the ninth commandment. Opinions differ. The weight of argument seems to favor a negative answer. Why should not the bare statement of the atheist be accepted as equally trustworthy as the oath of the theist?

1. Let it be observed that in taking an oath the juror or swearer invokes the name of God as a witness to his sincerity, and imprecates God's curse upon himself if he does not tell the truth. This the theist may do with utmost significance and propriety, but for the atheist who does not believe in the existence of God, nor in moral distinctions at all to do this, is despicable frivolity without sense and without apology. For if there is no God, why call on him as a witness or invoke his curse upon falsehood?

2. Various considerations may operate upon men as incentives to truthfulness or dissuasives from falsehood.

(1) The love of approbation. The desire for the good opinions, confidence and the esteem of our fellow men is often a powerful incentive to truthfulness as well as to other virtues. Now the atheist may have this love of esteem, or of popular favor as strong as other men, and under its influence may be truthful and honorable in all his dealings with his fellow men. He may be a friend to education and good government, and a wise counselor in matters pertaining to the secular good of society, and liberal or even munificent in his benefactions to the temporal interests of society. But this, let it be observed, is the exceptional and not the representative atheist. In all these good qualities the theist is at least his peer.

(2) Another and a more powerful persuasive to truthfulness is the fact that an oath—even in a higher sense than a mere promise—binds the conscience as well as the honor of the juror. The atheist, as we have seen, can not properly take an oath. He can only affirm or promise, and nothing binds him to the truth except his honor or love of esteem, or some temporary or secular interest. All regard to the claims of conscience and to a future life, are by the nature of the case utterly excluded.

(3) Again, there are thousands of cases where the love of honor or of popular confidence would be inoperative—for example, an atheist might go into court and falsely state—he can not swear—that he saw A kill B. A, being the defendant, in many States

can not testify in his own behalf, and thereby offset this false statement, and yet the atheist neither loses his honor nor compromises his conscience, for he has none to compromise; nor does he in any sense subject himself to retributive pains and penalties.

(4) He acts, by hypothesis, purely from motives of secular self-interest, and if this end in his estimation can be better served by a dishonorable course than by an honorable one, he is, according to his doctrine, perfectly right in pursuing that course. The atheist and the Jesuit hold principles equally dangerous to society—the one at liberty to do any thing he may deem necessary to his own interest; the other any thing he may think to the interest of his church; and both alike indifferent to the rights of others.

3. It is readily granted that a theistic belief is no guaranty that men will tell the truth, or keep their oaths, or not swear falsely, but it is very clear that those who believe in God, in moral distinctions, and in moral retribution, have more and stronger inducements to truthfulness and fidelity in office than atheists can possibly have, and hence that the interests of society are safer in the hands of the former than in those of the latter—even of the exceptional class.

4. But what would the world be if its destinies were placed in the hands of representative or average atheists? Even cultivated and honorable atheists themselves would not be willing to consent to such an order of things.

5. But after all that can be said, does it not seem unjust, or in some way wrong, to exclude a man from the jury box, from the witness stand, and from all official positions because he may not happen to believe in God and in moral retribution? To this I reply, first, that while some atheists of culture and a high sense of honor might effectively fill offices and serve as jurors and witnesses, still it is manifestly true that the average atheist has no sort of moral qualifications for such positions, wanting, as he does, all sense of moral accountability for his actions. The government, of course, must have a uniform rule—could not put one under ban without putting all under it. Universal atheism would speedily bring universal ruin. Secondly, no man, theist or atheist, has any natural right to be a jurymen, witness, or office holder, or any thing of the sort. Such things are privileges, or adventitious rights, and not natural rights. An atheist is, therefore, deprived of no natural rights in not being recognized as a competent witness, any more than is the idiot. One is incompetent for the want of intelligence, and the other, for the want of moral qualifications.

CHAPTER XII.

THE TENTH COMMANDMENT.

This commandment is in these words, "*Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's.*"

Collateral texts.—Deut. v. 21; Micah ii. 2; Hab. ii. 9; Luke xii. 15; Acts xx. 33; Rom. vii. 7; Eph. v. 3-5; Heb. xiii. 5; Prov. vi. 29; Jer. v. 7, 8; Matt. v. 28.

SECTION I.—*Characteristics of this command.*

1. It lays its interdictions directly upon the heart—the feelings, the desires of the mind. All the other commands relate directly to human action, and only indirectly to mental states which are antecedent to action and which render action possible.

2. It has been on this account pertinently called the "fencing commandment," because the faithful observance of it precludes the possibility of the actual and external violation of any other commandment, simply because it is impossible to act without wishing or desiring to act. A proper self-control or control of the desires is a guarantee against intentional wrong action. "He that is slow to anger is

better than the mighty ; and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city."

3. This tenth commandment teaches more directly a man's duty to himself than does any other of the Decalogue. In the other precepts attention is directed immediately to others, but in this, attention is directed immediately to one's own internal states as that which vitally concerns his own peace and self-complacency as well as the interests of others. Happiness consists in the gratification of desires. To have wrong desires and not gratify them is to be unhappy. To have them and gratify them is to procure a present pleasure at the sacrifice of a greater good. To have them and cherish them but not gratify them is to subject ourselves to continuous unrest or discontent. But not to have wrong desires or promptly to repress them when they arise, is to escape all the unhappy consequences of their indulgence and gratification. Only right desires can be gratified without the payment of penalties which greatly overbalance the pleasure of gratification. Right desires, and right desires only, result in unmixed good ; hence, no command in the Decalogue so immediately concerns the happiness of the individual as the tenth.

SECTION 2.—*The general requirements of the command.*

1. It requires the suppression of all desires the gratification of which will bring unhappiness sooner

or later, in one form or another, to ourselves and others. The moral government of God is such that no man ever gratifies a wrong desire without injury to himself and generally without more or less injury directly or indirectly to others. This fact is capable of the clearest demonstration. This command, then, requires in general terms, a man not to gratify or indulge any feeling or desire, the indulgence or gratification of which would make either himself or his neighbor unhappy.

2. The prohibition relates, it will be noted, to desires all of whose objects are temporal and secular in character, as houses, wives, and perishable goods. All these desires have their source in the human constitution—are, therefore, natural, and are given for wise and beneficent ends. What is required is not their extermination or suppression, but their proper limitation and control, and in a manner promotive of the good of ourselves and others. It will also be observed that they include all the objects of desire relating to temporal and secular good. House, home, lands, wife, and property, include substantially all covetable secular goods.

3. Though these desires are natural and also necessary for the preservation of individual life and the perpetuation of the human race; yet, through excessive indulgence, they often become the occasion of immorality, disease, and premature death. It is a duty to eat in order to live, but eating is a pleasure

which furnishes a stimulus to the duty. Because of this pleasure men may very readily learn to live to eat instead of eating to live, and thus pervert the end of their being.

4. Again, as houses, food, raiment, etc., can not always be commanded at will, are not abundant and free as the air or light, but require to be provided by industry and care in advance, men naturally acquire a desire for property, or money, which is the representative of houses, food, raiment, and all kinds of temporal good. Hence, we see how, from the natural desire for these things, men may easily become covetous and even excessively avaricious, miserly, and mean. The prevention of these abuses and excesses and their fearful consequences, is the object of the prohibition, "Thou shalt not covet."

SECTION 3.—*The specific requirements of the commandment.*

I. "*Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.*" The word house, though often used for family, is here supposed to mean the place or residence where the family resides. Houses, if not a prime necessity, are generally estimated to be nearly so. The proprietorship of houses implies that of the land upon which they are located. We need not here concern ourselves about the origin of land titles. It is sufficient to know that the soil is intended for the support of all men. That it is better for it to be divided up into individual proprietorships, than to remain the com-

mon property of every man in the same sense, admits of no reasonable doubt. The Bible fully recognizes this right. On the contrary, it is justly esteemed a calamity to mankind that many possess numerous houses and lands, while many possess none. It is better for every man to have his own house than for one half to have two and the other half have none. The more numerous the freeholders and the fewer the renters the better for society generally. Every family, as a rule, should own its own homestead. The following facts may be pertinently noticed :

(1) The renter is generally put at serious disadvantage. He needs a house, and must have it. The landlord is independent, and has a temptation to use his advantage over his houseless or landless neighbor. The temptation is often too strong for resistance. In this way the rich often grind the faces of the poor.

(2) The rental method tends to idleness, or, rather, takes away inducements to the improvement of houses and lands, and thus makes their actual value less than it otherwise would be. Men are not generally inclined to improve, without compensation, property not their own.

(3) Renters generally fail to identify themselves to any large extent with the community in which they live, feeling that, at the most, they have only a temporary interest in the public improvement, the schools, and churches. This is often a serious disadvantage

both to communities and to the renters themselves, as can be readily seen.

(4) Still, the landlord may be a benefactor to his neighbor, and a blessing to his community. Though he has it in his power to oppress others, he need not violate the tenth commandment by exerting that power. By reasonableness in his rental fees he may confer valuable favors upon the poor, and bring into communities those who will contribute to its improvement, materially, morally, and religiously.

(5) I do not understand this commandment to discourage industry or economy, or even a reasonable frugality, or any legitimate secular enterprise that looks to the general prosperity of communities or of the individual. It does not, of course, make it morally wrong to covet or desire a house or land, but wrong to covet inordinately our neighbor's possessions of whatever kind. An inordinate desire is such as is incompatible with self-satisfaction, or contentment, which is itself happiness, and which may become the occasion of some act of injustice or unkindness to others.

(6) Nor does the command teach that A may not covet the possessions of B in such degree as to induce him to practice industry and economy in order to procure them provided he does not permit this desire to render him unhappy, and provided he uses no wrong means to gratify his desire.

(7) It is by no means intended to prevent trade,

barter, buying, and selling, but to prevent men from destroying their own happiness by the indulgence of a lawless cupidity. A fine illustration of this lawless cupidity is given in 1 Kings xxi. Ahab coveted Naboth's vineyard, which the latter refused to sell him, because it was a patrimonial inheritance. Jezebel, Ahab's wife, caused two false witnesses to swear away the life of Naboth. Note the effect of lawless covetousness in this case:

(a) It made Ahab very unhappy; (b) it prompted to lying and bribery; (c) to false swearing; (d) to judicial murder; (e) to a manifestation of the avenging wrath of God. This is a fair exemplification of the general consequences of lawless covetousness, and shows the beneficent intention of the law.

2. "*Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife.*" The law is not violated by desiring a wife, but by coveting our neighbor's wife.

(1) The marital relation is of divine origin. The divine purpose is that each man may have his own wife and the woman her own husband. Polygamy is the result, not of pure and self-sacrificing love, nor of prudential regard to the well-being and happiness of others, or to the public good, but of uxorious licentiousness—sensual libertinism. It is the source of necessary domestic unhappiness, family discord, cruelty, and partiality to children of the same household. No man in the marital relation is happy or contented without believing himself to be supreme in

the affections of his wife; and no woman can be happy or contented without believing herself supreme in the affections of her husband. If she does not believe this, she thinks herself wronged, and is necessarily unhappy. The favorite wife will not fail to look with contempt upon those deemed less fortunate, and will readily extemporize means to make them feel her power. They, in return, will not be slow to annoy, and in innumerable ways torment, the favorite, rendering the domestic circle a fit emblem of pandemonium itself.*

(2) To covet a neighbor's wife either as a temporary or as a permanent possession, is, of course, a palpable violation of the command. In either case it is as destructive of human happiness as it is offensive to God. As we have elsewhere seen, it is unwise to foster any desire which may not be rightfully gratified, because, in such case, it must be a source of continuous torment or dissatisfaction. It is unwise, because so long as the desire is cherished, there is continuous danger that it may lead to actual outward

*The Mormon craze, making polygamy a tenet of their religion, is a pure device of sexual libertinism. For the government to tolerate it because it wears the mask of religion and is called a spiritual marriage, is about as unreasonable as it would be to tolerate treason, or murder, or robbery, when committed in the name of religion. It is gratifying to the lovers of decency, law, and order, to note the recent vigorous legislation looking to the suppression of this abomination, and it is safe to predict that soon polygamy in this country will be a thing of the past.

sin, which will only magnify the evil and involve others in its unhappy consequences.

(3) A very striking illustration of this sin in one of its possible forms is the case of Herod and Herodias. Herod wickedly coveted his brother Philip's wife, and Herodias preferred Herod to her lawful husband. This double unlawful covetousness resulted in a group of evils of the gravest character: (*a*) Philip is defrauded and his happiness more or less blighted for life; (*b*) Salome, daughter of Herodias, is persuaded to commit a great sin; (*c*) the life of John the Baptist is sacrificed to appease the anger of a corrupt woman; (*d*) these persons defiled their characters and their consciences with innocent blood, brought down upon themselves the blighting curse of an insulted God.

(4) As there are various forms of this sin, so the consequences may be more or less varied, but in all cases the consequences are more or less destructive of human happiness. This sin in no form, it should be remembered, can ever be committed with impunity.

3. This command does not prohibit the coveting of man-servants nor maid-servants, but the coveting of *our neighbor's servants*. Bond-servants, and not hired servants, are here intended—such as were bought with money or bound to life-long servitude. At the time the law was given, such servitude was common. The Decalogue recognized the relation.

Whether such relation is wrong *per se* is a question about which honest and sagacious men differ in opinion. The fact that it is recognized in the Decalogue, the supreme law of morality, and in numerous other texts both in the Old and in the New Testament, seems to favor a negative answer. It is, however, certain that the Decalogue does not enjoin the relation, but only permits it, and makes provision for the proper regulation of it, prescribing the respective and relative duties of master and servant. These directions were quite necessary because of the great liability of the relation to abuse. The property right of the owner consisted, of course, in the right to manual labor of the servant, for which the servant was entitled to food, raiment, shelter, and protection. Recognizing this property right, the tenth commandment makes it sinful for one man to covet the servant of another. This form of covetousness is detrimental to personal happiness and the public good in the same sense and for the same reason that covetousness in any other form is so. In non-slaveholding countries this sin can not be formally committed, because no one owns a servant to be coveted. The sin, however, is possible, and is often committed in an informal way. There are two distinct forms of this sin possible, in fact, common.

(1) Knowing that our neighbor has a valuable servant, we may unwisely permit ourselves to become unhappy or discontented because we have him not

ourselves. To do this is to torment ourselves without cause. Still worse is it if we permit this covetous feeling to lead us to attempt, by misrepresentations, insinuations, or promises of better treatment or of higher wages, or of prompter pay, or by any other method, to induce such servant to break with his employer and engage with us. This is as gross a violation of the law as is covetousness in any other form—a wrong to ourselves and a wrong to our neighbor—a wrong to ourselves because it puts into our consciousness a sense of unfairness or injustice to our neighbor, and hardens the heart to a sense of uprightness and honor; a wrong to our neighbor because it estranges his kindly feeling and does him actual, perhaps irreparable, injury in his business.

(2) If the motive in such cases were purely the good of the servant, then there would be no covetousness in the matter, and this sin would not be committed at all; but possibly a real kindness would be conferred upon the servant, and no injustice done to his former employer. If I know a good servant to be badly treated or inadequately paid for his services, and know him to be under no special obligation to his employer, and from good motives choose to offer him a better situation, I may do so with advantage to the servant and without injustice to any one. Such cases, however, it is feared, are of rare occurrence. Again, if a servant, who is free from obligation to others, comes to me for employment, I am free to

engage his services; but if I attempt to induce him to leave another to whom he is obligated by promise or otherwise, I am not guiltless.

4. *Treatment of servants.*

(1) Another, and a more aggravated form of this sin, is injustice to the servant himself. We should not forget that the servant himself is our neighbor, to whom we are as truly bound to render justice as to his employer or any other neighbor. His brain and muscle are a part, perhaps the sum total, of his capital, and to covet this, or take it without adequate compensation, is as truly a breach of the tenth commandment as to covet his money.

(2) We often speak of voluntary and involuntary labor or servitude, and this is not a distinction without a difference. The difference, however, is not so great as we often imagine it to be, and is, in fact, somewhat difficult to define. If we say the words *voluntary* and *involuntary* express the difference we deceive ourselves, for all labor is voluntary in the sense that a man can choose between labor and the consequences of not laboring. The bond-servant can do this as truly as the hired servant.

(3) If we say the motive is much more violent in bond servitude than in non-bond servitude, we again misjudge the case; for no task-master can ever be more cruel than an empty stomach.

(4) If we say the difference lies in this, that in one case the servant can, and in the other can not, choose

his master, it may be replied that this is not necessarily so nor is it generally so, for in bond servitude the servant is often allowed to choose his master. Many men will not own servants who do not wish to live with them. In this they consult both their own interest and the pleasure of the servant. In some cases the bond-servant has no choice between masters. In this respect he is like some hired servants, who have no choice between employers or vocations, but are compelled, for the time being, if they labor at all, to labor for a given man or for given wages and at a given vocation. All this often occurs with hired laborers. The only freedom in both cases consists, in many instances, in the hard choice between labor and the consequences of non-labor.

(5) The chief point of difference, it seems to me, consists in the fact that the hired servant is free, has the legal right to employ his brain and muscle for the accomplishment of his purposes in a manner different from the bond-servant. This freedom, this legal right, has innumerable fascinations and inestimable privileges connected with it, which make it an object of universal desire. All very naturally desire to be free whether they are able by self-direction to achieve for themselves a high or only a low destiny. Men generally would prefer this freedom in poverty, in rags, to slavery in plenty.

(6) But freedom and ability are by no means com-

mensurate. While all are free, have the legal right to acquire by lawful means a competency, or even princely fortunes, many are not able, or at least fail, to put themselves above the necessity of manual labor as mere hirelings. The hard necessities of life compel them to this mode of obtaining the means of subsistence. There is no alternative between this and suffering, even starvation itself. Persons in more independent circumstances, coveting the products of the brain and muscle of such persons may and often do take advantage of this condition of things, which often compels servants to render services without reasonable compensation. Such persons will often labor for half wages, even for half rations, rather than starve. For the physically strong to rob the feeble, or the intellectually strong to rob the imbecile, and the financially strong to rob the poor, are crimes equally heinous and offensive to moral law, though they may not be so to civil law.

(7) Another grave injustice is often done by failing from any cause to pay the laborer when his money is due. Many men are very prompt in keeping their bank accounts and general business engagements all in order. Their credit as business men requires this, but such are often very indifferent to the little pitances they may owe to the poor and to the day-laborer who may be suffering with cold or hunger for the want of these little dues. Such treatment puts the hired servant and the helpless poor, who may

render service, in a far worse condition than that of the bond-servant, because the bond-servant has an assurance of good food, good raiment, and comfortable quarters. The interest of the master, however parsimonious he may be, requires him to do this much for his servant, while the employer has no such stimulus to deal justly with those who render him service. All such mistreatment of servants and those in our employment, is a breach of the tenth commandment, and of the eighth, "Thou shalt not steal," as well.

5.—*The servant's duties.* But all the sins of covetousness pertaining to master and servant, employer and employe, are not committed by the former. The hired servant or employe may be as covetous, and may deal as hardly and unjustly as the employer. This may be done in various ways.

(1) By demanding exorbitant prices for work which the employer's circumstances compel him to have done. This is extortion, as wrong in itself as it is for the employer to take advantage of the laborer's necessities and compel him to labor for less than his labor is worth.

(2) By failing to do a given piece of work according to agreement as to time. This often results in serious inconvenience and even heavy loss to the employer.

(3) By failing to do the work according to engagement as to quality, in using bad material, or in doing bad work. This is a violation of both the tenth and

the eighth commandments. It is taking money without rendering an equivalent, and often worse than this, for the employer may have to pay for undoing what was wrongly done.

(4) By idleness, or unreasonable slowness, where the employe is paid for his time. This is taking money for nothing, and often rendering it necessary for the employer to engage additional labor.

(5) By failing to study the interests of the employer in knowingly or carelessly letting his property go to waste. It is easy for hired servants intrusted with the business of their employer to waste or recklessly destroy more property than their services are worth. The employe should study the interests of his employer as faithfully as he would his own, for he is paid to do this. Sheer justice requires this, and if it was the uniform rule wages would be better, and both parties would be materially benefited. Unfortunately it is not the rule, but the exception. The hired servant, when he is employed on time contracts but too generally has an eye single to his pay, and is indifferent to the interests of his employer. To be idle, or lazy, or do trifling work, or break up or lose tools, and neglect stock, is no loss to himself only so far as it may affect his prospects of a future contract. The employer can not pay in bad money. The law compels him to pay in good money; for the employe to receive good money for bad work—bad in either quality or quantity—is simply a fraud.

SECTION 4.—*Covetousness in relation to other things mentioned in the tenth commandment.*

1. The tenth commandment does not prohibit the coveting of personal and perishable property, as oxen, etc., but the coveting of these things when they belong to our neighbor. It recognizes a difference between property in realty and property in personalty. This is evident from the fact that the verb *covet* is repeated after the word *house*. This is a plain and appreciable distinction. The land is not intended for one man or one generation of men. No man, therefore, has a right to any part of it in the same sense in which he has a right to his wife, his servant, or his ox.

2. A man at the utmost has a property right in land only during his life-time. This property he holds rather on trust for certain uses for himself and others, not with the liberty of rendering it valueless. To do this wantonly or carelessly is to do injustice to others of the present and the coming generations, for all men, whether land owners or not, have an interest in the products of the soil. The land owner is, of course, entitled to the products of his own land, but he has no right for any cause whatever, wantonly to destroy such product or render it useless, nor has any one else such right; and to do so, as is often done in war, is a sin against God and humanity. It is a plain dictate of common justice that land owners should not abuse their lands so as to destroy their product-

iveness or render them less valuable to their successors than they have been to themselves. Humanity rather requires that they should improve them. To do so is to act the part of a benefactor. In this respect a true self-interest and the public good are in the strictest harmony. Houses and lands like most other property may be transferred from one person to another by consent of parties, or may pass from one to another by inheritance, or may be taken for debt. But the difference between this kind of property and all other kinds is obvious.

3. The property of the husband in the wife and of the wife in the husband is peculiar and is inalienable except by death, or by divorce for sufficient cause. Property in the servant is different in kind from that in houses and lands and other such property. Property in oxen and all things else is essentially different from all the preceding. In this property the right of ownership most nearly approximates the right of absolute control. It is a right to use in any manner the owner may judge to his interest or to his advantage. Cruelty, however, to any thing that has life and feeling is a wanton offense against the beneficent Creator whose "tender mercies are over all his works." "The merciful man regardeth the life of his beast." The man who is unmerciful to his beast ought to remember the timely rebuke Baalam's ass administered to her impassioned master. In fact such men generally receive a practical rebuke in the

untimely death or diminished value of their domestic animals.

Coveting this kind of property belonging to our neighbor is in violation of this commandment as truly as is coveting any thing else belonging to our neighbor. It rather makes us unhappy or furnishes a temptation to circumvent or in some way do injury to our neighbor, which we can not do without doing injury to ourselves.

SECTION 5.—*Avarice.*

1. As we have seen, the gratification of normal desires is necessary to the perpetuation and well-being of the human family; but the normal desire may easily become, for the want of proper self-denial, the abnormal, and the abnormal readily leads to avarice or covetousness, and unrestrained by a true sense of our own highest good, and by a clear perception of the rights of others, leads to frauds and to all manner of unlawful methods for the acquisition of property.

2. Avarice is the natural product of a blind and lawless cupidity. It holds, with an iron grip, what a lawless cupidity acquires. It often denies to its victims the proper gratification of their normal desires—denies to them suitable food and raiment and comforts and conveniences, all for the sake of the greed of gold. It urges them to incessant toil, apprehensions of losses, fears of robberies, and continuous and painful unrest; fills them with distrust of God and their

fellow men, and consequently tends to obliterate from the mind every generous feeling and all sense of justice. A remorseless selfishness engrosses the whole mind which is as destructive of their own happiness as it is of the happiness of others. Hence, it is of necessity true that the avaricious man is a *miser*—a miserable man. “He that is greedy of gain troubleth his own soul.”

SECTION 6.—*Excitants to cupidity and avarice.*

Among these may be named the following :

1. The innate love of independence. There is something of a painful humiliation in a state of dependence. The very idea of poverty, of helplessness, of dependence upon others for the necessary means of subsistence and of pleasure, is mortifying to the instinctive pride of human nature. The independent can receive favors which are not to them necessities without a sense of humiliation ; but the poor and the helpless can not. Freedom from such dependence and humiliation is a laudable object of desire. To be independent of the help of others is preferable to a state of dependence ; and to be able to help the needy, is a truly covetable condition. All can readily understand why. “It is more blessed to give than to receive.” But natural and laudable love of independence may be so indulged and fostered as to become a strong stimulus to lawless cupidity.

2. Another excitant to cupidity is the love of power. The love of power is natural to men. Al

experience it, some more and some less. Other things being equal, the man of property has more power over men than the poor man. Men see this exemplified every day, in society, in business circles, in politics, and in religion. This fact stimulates the thirst for wealth.

3. Another very strong stimulus to cupidity is a kind of emulation, or more properly, ambition to surpass others in wealth or to be the richest man in the community. Generous emulation is often a good thing, but when it degenerates to low ambition it results in less good than evil. Any ambition which tends to the inordinate love of money is of course a calamity to the man himself and to others who may be influenced by his example, or victimized by his machinations. The winner, in such a race, is, upon the whole, often the loser. A fool may be rich; wise men only, whether rich or poor, are happy.

4. Covetousness is powerfully stimulated by thirst for pleasure. This, in fact, is the all-comprehensive excitant of cupidity for the love of independence and that of power are only particular forms of the desire of happiness. But abundant wealth renders possible and even facile the gratification of all our purely sensuous desires and some of our mental desires, particularly the æsthetical. It furnishes the means of luxurious living, fine apparel, costly equipage. It consequently contributes largely to human enjoyments, sometimes innocent and sometimes criminal.

If the desires themselves were fixed quantities, if they did not grow, multiply, magnify, intensify, by indulgence, wealth would contribute much more effectively to human happiness than it actually does. But the desires which it gratifies unhappily become more and more insatiable by indulgence. This is pre-eminently true of covetousness. It is the chief calamity of wealth that, while it furnishes facilities for the gratification of many other desires, it has no power to satisfy the thirst for wealth, but intensifies that thirst with the ratio of its own increase; hence the adage, "The more we get, the more we want," is literally true. The thirst for gold is like the grave and the devouring flame that always cry, *Give* and never say, *Enough*. Hence, when all other desires are repressed or held largely in check, and the greed of gold is permitted to dominate the whole man, he yields himself up to a consuming passion which, like the fire, burns the more fiercely the more it is fed.

SECTION 7.—*The pursuit of wealth as a subordinate end compatible with a true morality.*

The munificent Creator gives the ability to acquire property as a thing necessary to the accomplishment of his purposes. Hence, there is nothing evil in it of itself, nor in the pursuit of it. It is not money itself but the love of it, that "is the root of all evil." It is only when it is made the chief end of human endeavor that it becomes the occasion of evil, when

we love it supremely and look to its attainment as the chief end of life, or when we permit the love of it to interfere with the rights of others. Every man should use all his abilities and all his opportunities in the pursuit of property in a manner compatible with his higher obligations to his Creator and to his fellow men, should not be an idler but a worker, contributing something to the material, intellectual, or moral wealth of the world. Laziness, idleness, drowsiness, is, from its very nature, incompatible with a pure morality.

CONCLUSION.

The Decalogue considered in its entirety.

The truths briefly set forth in the Decalogue are at once too deeply profound, too comprehensive and too universally adapted to the needs of humanity in all ages and climes, to be the product of any mind less than omniscient. Men largely ignorant of their own mental and physical constitution and without experience could form no adequate conception as to what laws would best promote their individual and public interests; in fact could not know that any civil, much less any code of moral, law is needful. It is only by experience and observation long continued, that they would come to know the necessity of such laws at all. A still longer course of observation and experience would be required to make known to men what laws

are best adapted to the physical, civil, and moral necessities of human nature. Necessity, or at least prudence or some manifest self-interest, might suggest a law or rule of conduct for the government of the individual or of the community, but experience alone could demonstrate the wisdom and utility of the law.

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